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Abstract
Computer network systems are constantly under attack or have to deal with attack
attempts. The rst step in any network's ability to ght against intrusive attacks
is to be able to detect intrusions when they are occurring. Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) are therefore vital in any kind of network, just as antivirus is a
vital part of a computer system. With the increasing computer network intrusion
sophistication and complexity, most of the victim systems are compromised by
sophisticated multi-step attacks. In order to provide advanced intrusion detection
capability against the multi-step attacks, it makes sense to adopt a rigorous and
generalising view to tackling intrusion attacks. One direction towards achieving
this goal is via modelling and consequently, modelling based detection.
An IDS is required that has good quality of detection capability, not only to
be able to detect higher-level attacks and describe the state of ongoing multi-step
attacks, but also to be able to determine the achievement of high-level attack
detection even if any of the modelled low-level attacks are missed by the detector,
because no alert being generated may represent that the corresponding low-level
attack is either not being conducted by the adversary or being conducted by the
adversary but evades the detection.
This thesis presents an attack tree based intrusion detection to detect multi-
step attacks. An advanced attack tree modelling technique, Attack Detection Tree,
is proposed to model the multi-step attacks and facilitate intrusion detection. In
addition, the notion of Quality of Detectability is proposed to describe the ongoing
states of both intrusion and intrusion detection. Moreover, a detection uncertainty
assessment mechanism is proposed to apply the measured evidence to deal with
the uncertainty issues during the assessment process to determine the achievement
of high-level attacks even if any modelled low-level incidents may be missing.
iv
Acknowledgements
At the end of an amazing experience to pursue a Ph.D, there is always somebody
to thank. First and foremost, I want to express my deepest gratitude to my
main supervisor, Dr. Raphael C.W. Phan, for his tireless eorts to teach me
the knowledge and skills I need to become a real researcher and to learn how
to expand breadth of knowledge without sacricing depth. I am also grateful to
my co-supervisor Professor David J. Parish who gave me many suggestions and
encouragement to improve my research. Raphael and David's willingness to go
beyond their duty to provide me with research directions, valuable guidance and
encouragement throughout my study has made this Ph.D possible.
I am extremely grateful to my parents, and also my ancee, Miss Yuan Cao,
and her parents, without whom I would not have been able to pursue my degree
successfully.
In addition, I want to thank all of my colleagues in the High Speed Networks
group for their support and for sharing their knowledge, especially, Dr. John N.
Whitley, for his comments and suggestions that help me improve the quality of
my research.
Then, I would like to thank all my family members and friends, especially, Ms.
Lihong Wang, Mr. Kun Liu, Dr. Lin Guan, Dr. Chong Fu, Dr. Xunli Fan, Dr.
Lee Booi Lim, Dr. Jin Fan, Mr. Istvan Szabo, for supporting me through all the
years of my study and life in the U.K..
Finally, I would specically like to thank my thesis examiners, Dr. Robert
Edwards and Dr. Ali Al-Sherbaz, who had provided me useful feedback and
contributed to improve the quality of the nal version of this thesis.
v
Contents
Abstract iv
Acknowledgements v
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
List of Abbreviations xiv
List of Symbols xvii
List of Publications xx
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Research Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Intrusion Detection 7
2.1 Classication of Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.1 Classication Based on Detection Principles . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.2 Classication Based on Type of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.3 Distributed Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Typical Research of Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Detection Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.2 Fundamental Theoretical Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.3 Intrusion Detection Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Problems of Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.1 Diculties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.2 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Extensions of Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.1 Intrusion Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
vi
CONTENTS vii
2.4.2 Intrusion Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 Intrusion Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.1 Intrusion Threat and Situation Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.2 Intrusion Detection Uncertainty Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 Attack Modelling Approaches 26
3.1 Attack Graph Modelling Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1.1 Representations of Attack Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1.2 Generation of Attack Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.3 Attack Graph with Intrusion Detection (System) . . . . . . 33
3.2 Attack Tree Modelling Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.1 Dierences Between Attack Tree and Attack Graph . . . . . 35
3.2.2 Representation of Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.3 Extensions of Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.4 Attack Tree and Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 Node Connectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3.1 Order Based Connectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3.2 Threshold Based Connectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Node Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4.1 Generically Dened Node Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4.2 Specically Dened Node Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5 Metric Aggregation Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.5.1 Possible Aggregaters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5.2 Cumulative Aggregations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4 Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree 52
4.1 Formalisation of Conventional Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2 Unied Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3 Formalisation of Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4 Attack Resistance Attribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4.1 Attribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.4.2 Case Study: Analysis of the Weakest Link . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5 Advanced Attack Detection Tree 61
5.1 Quality of Detectability Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1.1 Logical Steps Based QoD Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
CONTENTS viii
5.1.2 Time Based QoD Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1.3 Alert Based QoD Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.2 Detection Uncertainty Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.2.1 Foundation of Dempster-Shafer Evidence Theory . . . . . . 68
5.2.2 Membership Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2.3 Basic Probability Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2.4 Proposed Sequential Based Assessment Approach . . . . . . 71
5.2.5 Proposed Combination Based Assessment Approach . . . . . 74
5.3 Formalisation of Attack Detection Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6 Attack Tree Based Intrusion Detection 79
6.1 Sliding Based Detection Window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.2 Augmented Attack Tree Based Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . 81
6.3 Attack Detection Tree Based Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7 Experiment and Analysis 87
7.1 Design of Attack Tree Based Intrusion Detection System . . . . . . 87
7.1.1 Architecture of ATIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.1.2 Support Database Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.2 Experimental Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.2.1 Testbed Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.2.2 Experimental Data Set Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.2.3 Prerequisite Detection Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.2.4 Attack Tree Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.3 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.3.1 AAT Based Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
7.3.2 ADtT Based Intrusion Detection with Sequential Based De-
tection Uncertainty Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.3.3 ADtT Based Intrusion Detection with Combination Based
Detection Uncertainty Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.4.1 Detector Precision Value Setting for Basic Probability As-
signment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.4.2 Threshold Setting for Alert Amount Membership Function . 121
7.4.3 Discussion Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
CONTENTS ix
8 Conclusions and Future Work 126
8.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
8.1.1 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
References 131
A Formalisation of Augmented Attack Tree 144
B Process of Data Set Ground Truth Analysis 146
C Process of Snort Detection Evaluation 149
List of Figures
1.1 Research Contributions and their Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Abstracted Network Topology of Intrusion Detection System . . . . 8
2.2 Modelling of an Intrusion Detection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Procedure for the Modelling of Intrusion Detection Systems . . . . 13
2.4 Theoretical Activity Spaces Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5 Uncertainties within Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1 Two examples of a Common Attack Graph Representations . . . . . 29
3.2 An example of Jajodia's Attack Graph Representation . . . . . . . 30
3.3 Abstracted Attack Graph Generation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 An example Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5 Sample Attack Trees with Order based Connectors . . . . . . . . . 41
3.6 Sample Attack Trees with Threshold based Connectors . . . . . . . 42
5.1 Process of Sequential Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2 Pseudocode of Sequential Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3 Process of Combination Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4 Pseudocode of Combination Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.1 Pseudocode of AAT Based Intrusion Detection Algorithm . . . . . . 82
6.2 Pseudocode of ADtT Based Intrusion Detection Algorithm (Part 1) 85
6.3 Pseudocode of ADtT Based Intrusion Detection Algorithm (Part 2) 86
7.1 Architecture of ATIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.2 ER Diagram of Support Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.3 Constructed Testbed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.4 Network Topology of DARPA2000 Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.5 Constructed Attack Detection Tree of DARPA2000 . . . . . . . . . 99
7.6 Output Snapshot of AAT Based Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . 102
7.7 Output Snapshot of ADtT Combination Based Intrusion Detection
on Phase 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
x
LIST OF FIGURES xi
7.8 Output Snapshot of ADtT Based Intrusion Detection on LLDOS2.0.2
Phase 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.9 QoD Output Snapshot of ADtT Combination Based Intrusion De-
tection on LLDOS1.0 Phase 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.10 Output Snapshot of ADtT Combination Based Intrusion Detection
on LLDOS1.0 DMZ Phase 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.11 Output Snapshot of ADtT Combination Based Intrusion Detection
on LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ Phase 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.12 Abstracted Relation Between Three Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.1 Abstracted Process of Data Set Ground Truth Analysis . . . . . . . 147
B.2 Flow Chart of Data Set Ground Truth Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 148
C.1 Abstracted Process of Snort Detection Examination . . . . . . . . . 150
C.2 Flow Chart of Data Set Ground Truth Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 150
List of Tables
2.1 Attack Detection Classications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1 Truth Table of Sample Attack Trees with Threshold Based Connector 42
7.1 Typical Attack Phases Matching in DARPA2000 Data Sets . . . . . 92
7.2 Ground Truth of DARPA2000 LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac . . . . . . . 93
7.3 Ground Truth of DARPA2000 LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac . . . . . . 93
7.4 Measured Detection Metrics of DARPA2000 LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac 94
7.5 Measured Detection Metrics of DARPA2000 LLDOS2.0.2 Inside
Trac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.6 Detection Performance of Each Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.7 Typical Attack Phases Matching in LLDOS1.0 Data Set . . . . . . 96
7.8 Typical Attack Phases Matching in LLDOS2.0.2 Data Set . . . . . 96
7.9 Framework of Modelled Attack Detection Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.10 Summary of Low-Level Incident Types in DARPA2000 . . . . . . . 98
7.11 Atomic Attack Signatures of DARPA2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.12 AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac with Non-
overlapped DW Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.13 AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac with
Non-overlapped DW Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
7.14 AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac with
Overlapped DW Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7.15 AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac with
Overlapped DW Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7.16 AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 DMZ Trac . . . . . . 104
7.17 AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ Trac . . . . . 104
7.18 ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac
with Non-overlapped DW Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.19 ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside
Trac with Non-overlapped DW Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
xii
LIST OF TABLES xiii
7.20 ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac
with Overlapped DW Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.21 ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside
Trac with Overlapped DW Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.22 ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 DMZ Trac109
7.23 ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ
Trac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.24 ADtT Combination Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 Trac
with Non-overlapped DW Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.25 ADtT Combination Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside
Trac with Non-overlapped DW Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.26 Measured QoD Metrics of LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac Detection . . . . 113
7.27 Measured QoD Metrics of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac Detection . . . 113
7.28 ADtT Combination Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 DMZ
Trac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.29 Measured QoD Metrics of LLDOS1.0 DMZ Trac Detection . . . . 117
7.30 ADtT Combination Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ
Trac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.31 Measured QoD Metrics of LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ Detection . . . . . . . 118
7.32 Belief Values on Every Single Incident in LLDOS1.0 Phase 2 with
Dierent PIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.33 Belief Values on LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac with Dierent PIDS . . . . 121
7.34 Belief Values on Every Single Incident in LLDOS1.0 Phase 4 with
Dierent PIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.35 Belief Values on LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac with Dierent Thresholds 124
8.1 Summary of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
8.2 Summary of Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
B.1 Applied Files for LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac Ground Truth Analysis . 146
B.2 Applied Files for LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac Ground Truth Analysis 146
List of Abbreviations
IDS Intrusion Detection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ADtT Attack Detection Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
QoD Quality of Detectability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
DUA Detection Uncertainty Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
UPAT Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ATIDS Attack Tree based IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
LAN Local Area Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
DDoS Distributed Denial-of-Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
NSTAC National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee . . . . . . . . 7
SID Signature based Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
AID Anomaly based Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
SBIDS Signature Based IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ABIDS Anomaly Based IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
NID Network based Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
HID Host based Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
NBIDS Network Based IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
HBIDS Host Based IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
DIDS Distributed IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
TP True Positive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
FP False Positive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
TN True Negative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
FN False Negative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
DR Detection Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
FAR False Alarm Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
IDOC Intrusion Detection Operating Characteristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
PPV Positive Predictive Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
IPS Intrusion Prevention System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
NBIPS Network Based Intrusion Prevention System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
HBIPS Host Based Intrusion Prevention System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
GUI Graphical User Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
xiv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xv
TVA Topological Vulnerability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
CAT Conventional Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
AAT Augmented Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
DT Defence Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
ACT Attack Countermeasure Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
ART Attack-Response Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
ADTree Attack-Defense Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
PT Protection Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
MPAT Multi-Parameter Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
SAT Serial Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
UML Unied Modeling Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
EAT Enhanced Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
NFETA Nondeterministic Finite Enhanced Tree Automaton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
OBC Order Based Connector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
PBOC Priority Based Order Connector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
PAND Priority-AND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
TBOC Time Based Order Connector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
PN Parent Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CN Child Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
TBC Threshold Based Connector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
K/N K-out-of-N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
TTL Time-To-Live . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
AL Attack Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
AP Attack Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
ASP Attack Success Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
MC Monetary Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
I Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
R Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
SV System Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
NC Network Conguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
SC System Conguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
APr Access Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
UPAT Unied Parametrizable Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SbD Steps before Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
StG Steps to Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
PtG Progress to Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
TtD Time to Detect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
TtCS Time to Current Subgoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xvi
TtG Time to Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
NAT Number of Alert Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
MAN Mean Alert Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
MAS Mean Alert Severity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
D-S Dempster-Shafer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
bpa basic probability assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
IDMEF Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
DW Detection Window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
NAN Not A Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
List of Symbols
R Representation algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
S Data structure algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C Classication algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
D Data source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13P
Data states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
F Data characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
K Knowledge prole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
P Proling algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
j:j Metric frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
E Elementary node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
O Observed node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48
_ Disjunctive dependency relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
^ Conjunctive dependency relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
r Individual resistance of an exploit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
R Cumulative resistance of an exploit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
e Exploit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
c Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
p(e) Individual score on exploit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
p(c) Individual score on condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
P (e) Cumulative score on exploit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
P (c) Cumulative score on condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
N Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
E Edge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
u Parent Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
v Child Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
C Connector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
eParam Unied edge parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
cParam Unied connector parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
nParam Unied node attribute parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
f connectoru Attribute assignment function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
xvii
LIST OF SYMBOLS xviii
Ru Attribute on node u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
RE Set of all attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
vw The weakest node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58
I The system which parent node has one child node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58
II The system which parent node has multi child nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
ML Logical steps based QoD metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
MT Time based QoD metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
MA Alert based QoD metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
Ac Complex attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
m Number of attack steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
faigmi=1 Sequence of attack steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
P Attack path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
nl Leaf node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
nr Root node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
ns Any node between nl and nr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
P 0 Attack path with achieved attack steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
d Index of the currently detected node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
h: : : i Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
P 00 Attack path with unachieved attack steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
 The number of actual achieved subgoals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63
 The theoretical least eort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
k Number of child node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
ftigmi=0 Sequence of time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
t0 Initial time step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
t1 Time step of the adversary achieved rst attack step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
tm Time step of the adversary achieved last attack step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
td Time step of the adversary currently achieved attack step . . . . . . . . . 64
Tmin Expected minimal time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
q Number of modelled attack incident types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
t Number of actual detected attack incident types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
fI+jgtj=1 Actual detected attack incident types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
fNjgtj=1 Number of actual detected incidents of each attack incident type . . 66
ASi Alert severity level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
AS1 Bottom alert severity level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
ASr Top alert severity level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
 Frame of discernment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
m Mass function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
V Focal element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
 Empty set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
LIST OF SYMBOLS xix
m(V ) V's basic probability number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68L
Orthogonal summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
f1 Alert amount functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Ai Number of generated alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
 Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
f2 Alert severity functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Pr0 Alert severity of an incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70
 The number of severity levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Ii Index of the detected incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70
j Index of the focal element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
PIDS Detection precision of the intrusion detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
V1 First proposed focal element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
V2 Second proposed focal element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
V3 Third proposed focal element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
mIi(V1) Belief value of the rst proposed focal element on incident . . . . . . . . 71
mIi(V2) Belief value of the second proposed focal element on incident . . . . . . 71
mIi(V3) Belief value of the third proposed focal element on incident . . . . . . . 71
Belf1 Belief value set for the alert amount membership functions . . . . . . . . 73
Belf2 Belief value set for the alert severity membership functions . . . . . . . . 73
D Decomposition tuple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
M Metrics on the tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
F Assessment factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Label Name of the exploit associated with each edge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
SIGu;v Attack signature of an atomic attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
T Time interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Ts Starting time of time interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Te Ending time of time interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
S Window size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
 Sliding move step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
[ Incident connector in atomic attack signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
List of Publications
Conference Publications
 J. Wang, R.C.W. Phan, J.N. Whitley and D.J. Parish. Augmented At-
tack Tree Modelling of SQL Injection Attacks. In Proceedings of The 2nd
IEEE International Conference on Information Management and Engineer-
ing (ICIME 2010), vol.6, pages 182-186. Chengdu, China. 2010.
 J. Wang, R.C.W. Phan, J.N. Whitley and D.J. Parish. Augmented At-
tack Tree Modeling of Distributed Denial of Services and Tree Based Attack
Detection Method. In Proceedings of The 10th IEEE International Confer-
ence on Computer and Information Technology (CIT2010), pages 1009-1014.
Bradford, UK. 2010.
 J. Wang, R.C.W. Phan, J.N. Whitley and D.J. Parish. Quality of Detect-
ability (QoD) and QoD-aware AAT-based Attack Detection. In Proceedings
of The 5th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured
Transactions (ICITST-2010), pages 152-157. London, UK. 2010.
 J. Wang, R.C.W. Phan, J.N. Whitley and D.J. Parish. DDoS Attacks
Trac and Flash Crowds Trac Simulation with a Hardware Test Cen-
ter Platform. In Proceedings of IEEE World Congress on Internet Securitys
(WorldCIS2011), pages 29-34. London, UK. 2011.
Journal Publications
 J. Wang, J.N. Whitley, R.C.W. Phan and D.J. Parish. Unied Parametriz-
able Attack Tree. International Journal for Information Security Research,
vol.1(1/2), pages 20-26, 2011.
 J.N. Whitley, R.C.W. Phan, J. Wang and D.J. Parish. Attribution of Attack
Trees. Computers & Electrical Engineering, vol.37(4), pages 624-628, 2011.
xx
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS xxi
 J. Wang, J.N. Whitley, R.C.W. Phan and D.J. Parish. Advanced DDoS At-
tacks Trac Simulation with a Test Center Platform. International Journal
for Information Security Research, vol.1(4), pages 169-177, 2011.
Chapter 1
Introduction
With the advances of computer network systems, it is crucial to ensure the secur-
ity properties such as condentiality, integrity and availability [12, 73] in com-
puter networks. However, since the computer network system becomes more
complex [76], the security properties are threatened by the increasing computer
network intrusions, not only the intrusion number but also the intrusion soph-
istication. The sophisticated intrusions are conducted by applying multiple in-
trusion tools or approaches in order to achieve an attack goal. Typically, they
are composed of multiple attacks as steps and even each step may further be
composed of multiple low-level actions. Both malicious adversaries and network
security researchers are continually investigating new ways for launching or detect-
ing multi-step attacks. The former mainly concentrates on the system compromise
by exploiting various vulnerabilities with such multi-step attacks. While the lat-
ter focuses on the system protection by modelling and detection to mitigate such
multi-step attacks.
Intrusion detection remains a vital task for current as well as emerging net-
works as the threat of adversarial intrusions is ever present, often irrespective of
the underlying technology or architecture. Since the number and types of intrusion
methods increase over time, it makes sense to adopt a more rigorous and gener-
alizing view to tackling those intrusion threats. One direction towards achieving
this goal is via modelling. The purpose of modelling is not only to provide details
on how each sophisticated attack has been carried out, but also to facilitate the
attack detection process itself.
In order to carry out the modelling against the sophisticated attacks, there
is a need to identify any detailed information, for example, the attack step, the
connections between attack steps. While it is good to be able to detect low-
level attacks as these are fundamental to any ultimate attack, it is also necessary
for an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to detect and generate high-level attack
alerts because otherwise it may be prone to (low-level) alert ooding and false
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alerts [68]. Thus, one major challenge is how to model the whole operation of
multi-step attacks to assist the detection process. Once we obtain the model, the
next key challenge is how to conduct the intrusion detection process according to
the generated model.
Within the intrusion detection on any real networks, it is possible that any low-
level attacks may evade the detection from IDS. Therefore, an additional challenge
is how we could deal with any missed or unachieved low-level attack detection
when performing the high-level attack detection. Moreover, the last challenge is
that how the system administrator could quickly know the progress of the ongoing
multi-step attack detection process based on the generated attack model and the
conducted intrusion detection process.
1.1 Research Contributions
In this thesis, the proposed advanced attack tree based intrusion detection is based
on two main research elds: attack tree modelling and intrusion detection. Thus,
the research contributions can be classied into two groups: (1) contributions to
the attack tree modelling research; and (2) contributions to the intrusion detection
research.
Our research contributions and their linkages with the relevance to the related
research eld are illustrated in Figure 1.1. As shown in Figure 1.1, our research
and our contributions are drawn as a block diagram within the big box. An inner
rectangle represents a major contribution, while an inner olive represents a minor
contribution. Several minor contributions contribute the achievement of a major
contribution. In addition, a cloud outside of the box represents an independent
research eld. Each of our minor contribution relates to a research eld. The top
left clouds are about the attack tree modelling research, while the bottom clouds
are about the intrusion detection research. These research elds will be described
in the background part as the following Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Our research
contributions will be presented after Chapter 3.
Our rst major contribution is the Attack Detection Tree (ADtT) and concerns
the multi-step attack modelling. It is shown as the middle inner rectangle with
\ADtT (Advanced attack tree)". To the best of our knowledge, it is the
rst advanced attack tree specialised for intrusion detection and with uncertainty
assessment.
The tree based Quality of Detectability (QoD) metrics (that is, the rst left
bottom olive inside the big box) and Detection Uncertainty Assessment (DUA)
(that is, the middle bottom olive inside the big box) are specialised for Attack
Detection Tree. The rst mechanism is able to conduct the realtime monitoring
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
Intrusion Detection
Research Field
Intrusion Detection
Uncertainty Analysis
Research Field
Attack Tree
Metric Aggregation
Research Field
Real-time Security
Assessment
Research Field
Attack Tree
Modelling
Research Field
UPAT (General attack
tree framework)
Attack Tree based
Detection Algorithm
(Intrusion detection
algorithm based on the
tree framework)
QoD (Metrics
measurement based on
attack tree framework)
Aggregations (Metrics
values computation)
Detection Uncertainty 
Assessment (Intrusion 
detection with 
uncertainty 
assessment on the 
tree framework)
ADtT (Advanced 
attack tree)
ATIDS (IDS with 
attack tree 
algorithm based 
on ADtT)
My Research
Contributions
Figure 1.1: Research Contributions and their Relevance
on the ongoing intrusion detection progress based on the tree framework for the
system administrator. So, the system administrator can quickly know the status
of the intrusion detection progress. The second mechanism is able to conduct the
evidence assessment to deal with the detection uncertainty issues during the tree
based intrusion detection process.
Besides the aforementioned QoD and DUA, two further minor research contri-
butions: (1) the Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree (UPAT) (that is, the rst top
left olive inside the big box), and (2) the attack resistance metrics aggregations
(that is, the second top left olive inside the big box) are also contribute to our rst
major contribution. Both of them provide generic but essential theoretical work
on attack tree research. The rst one modelles the attack tree into the generic
framework and denes three congurable parameters to set the possible attack
tree extensions. While the second one provides the attack resistance aggregation
approaches in the attack tree and analyses the weakest links of security systems.
Our second major contribution is about the attack tree based intrusion de-
tection, which is shown as the rst right inner rectangle with \ATIDS (IDS
with attack tree algorithm based on ADtT)", and concerns in particular
the high-level attack detection instead of the low-level detection on any single
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malicious network packet. We propose two dierent attack tree based intrusion
detection algorithms (that is, the right bottom olive inside the big box), called
Augmented Attack Tree based intrusion detection and Attack Detection Tree based
intrusion detection. The rst one is able to detect the high-level attacks accord-
ing to the Augmented Attack Tree. This is a crucial result, because being able
to detect the modelled high-level attacks not only demonstrates the applicability
of this approach, but also provides the prototype for the second more advanced
one. The second detection algorithm is based on our rst major contribution.
More precisely, our second intrusion detection algorithm conducts the additional
Quality of Detectability measurement and the detection uncertainty assessment to
assist the high-level attack detection. The experimental results show that both
the sequential based approach and the combination based approach can deal with
the detection uncertainty issue, but the combination one has better detection per-
formance with more high-level attacks detection.
1.2 Research Assumptions
The main research scope of this research is to propose an intrusion detection ap-
proach based on the modelled attack tree. However, there are some research issues
outside the research scope of this research. Therefore, we dene three assumptions
used in this research to focus on the research scope.
Assumption 1: The applied low-level detector and the proposed intrusion detec-
tion system are vulnerability free.
Any software systems may have vulnerabilities. If any of the vulnerabilities
been exploited, the adversary may maliciously control the compromised software
system and cause any unpredictable damage. Our applied low-level detector Snort
and our developed Attack Tree based IDS (ATIDS) are software systems. It
is possible that both of them may have vulnerabilities due to poor design or
implementation. Once the adversary compromises any applied software, ATIDS
may conduct the misbehavior, such as, stop the detection process, evade any
particular intrusions.
Therefore, there is a need for us to assume that Snort and ATIDS are vulner-
ability free. Thus, the attack trac from the adversary can neither compromise
ATIDS nor intentionally evade the detection.
Assumption 2: The generated attack detection tree represents the modelled multi-
step attacks precisely.
Though there are some free and commercial tools to generate attack tree model,
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no existing tool can assist us to construct our proposed attack detection tree
against any multi-step attacks. Thus, we model the attack detection tree manu-
ally by analysing the data and documentations about the applied attack data sets.
Because design and development of an automatic attack detection tree generation
tool does not fall in the scope of our research, we assume that our manually gener-
ated attack detection tree can precisely represent the modelled multi-step attacks.
Assumption 3: The adversary can conduct a high-level attack step within a short
time period.
The way to generate the multi-step attack is not our research goal. Thus, we
adopt the attack trac generation within our experiments by replaying the attack
trac captures, which are provided by the third party. In order to facilitate the
conducted detection experiments, the corresponding trac capture of each attack
step is replayed based on the speed of the replaying software. Therefore, we assume
that the adversary can conduct a high-level attack step within a short time period.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 provides a background of intrusion detection including preliminary
concepts and current state of the subject.
Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature on attack graph and attack tree mod-
elling approaches as the foundation of this research.
Chapter 4 describes our Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree to provide the
scope to various attack tree extensions. In addition, this chapter presents our
proposed attack resistance aggregation approaches within the attack tree.
Chapter 5 describes our proposed Attack Detection Tree with two additional
mechanisms: the Quality of Detectability mechanism and the detection uncertainty
assessment.
Chapter 6 presents our two proposed tree based intrusion detection mechanisms
based on the original Augmented Attack Tree and Attack Detection Tree.
Chapter 7 presents the experimental setup and the achieved results.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and presents some future research that
can extend our work.
Parts of this research have been published in international journals and confer-
ence proceedings to demonstrate the novelty of this research. To date, six papers
have been published including two journal articles. An additional journal paper
has been accepted and in press. Moreover, another journal paper will be submitted
soon on the outcome of the attack detection tree based intrusion detection.
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The model of Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree described in Chapter 4 has
been published in part in [117], while the fourth section \Attack Resistance Ag-
gregation" has been published in [124]. In Chapter 5, the rst described \Quality
of Detectability Metrics" has been published in part in [116]. In Chapter 6, the
second section \Augmented Attack Tree Based Intrusion Detection" has been pub-
lished in [115].
Chapter 2
Intrusion Detection
Intrusions are dened to be \unauthorised uses, misuses, or abuses of computer
systems by either internal authorized users or external adversaries" [76]. Accord-
ing to the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC)
of U.S. Government [84], intrusion detection is \the process of identifying that an
intrusion has been attempted, is occurring, or has occurred".
Since Denning [28] methodised and systemised intrusion detection into IDS,
IDS had attracted numerous research in the last two decades and became one
of the important computer network infrastructure components. Figure 2.1 illus-
trates a typical abstracted network topology with IDS. The left Internet cloud
communicates with the right local area network (LAN) cloud through an IDS,
which is located on the physical link between two network clouds. Note that it
is possible to place IDS either outside or inside the rewall of LAN according to
the usage. The Internet is usually the root source of intrusion, whereas the LAN
is usually the ultimate target of intrusion. Take a coordinated attack, Distrib-
uted Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack, for example, the adversary-compromised
secondary victims (also known as bots) consist of the botnet, which may be a
part of Internet cloud, generate and transmit the DDoS trac into the primary
victim server in the LAN cloud through IDS to congest the LAN and overload
the primary victim server. As another example, a Web application attack, such
as SQL injection attack injects the malicious SQL statement into the victim Web
server within the LAN cloud to bypass the authorization and obtain condential
information. Besides the network physical link located IDS, it is also possible to
install and employ IDS on any hosts with LAN to monitor the intrusion to the
corresponding hosts. Hence, the appropriate IDS can detect the aforementioned
computer network attacks and generate alarms to warn the network administrator
of the LAN.
This chapter reviews various intrusion detection related research from the basic
foundation to the additional augmentations. Section 2.1 describes the classication
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Figure 2.1: Abstracted Network Topology of Intrusion Detection System
of intrusion detection based on detection principles and data types. Section 2.2
introduces the typical research of intrusion detection. Then, the research di-
culties and existing limitations are described in Section 2.3. Intrusion detection
extensions like intrusion prevention and intrusion response are discussed in Sec-
tion 2.4. Section 2.5 describes the intrusion analysis including situation awareness
and uncertainty analysis of intrusion detection. Finally, Section 2.6 summaries
this chapter.
2.1 Classication of Intrusion Detection
2.1.1 Classication Based on Detection Principles
Currently known detection techniques can be categorized into two main principles:
signature based intrusion detection (SID) and anomaly based intrusion detection
(AID). Note that signature based intrusion detection is also known as misuse
intrusion detection, knowledge based intrusion detection or rule based intrusion
detection. Likewise, anomaly based intrusion detection is also known as behaviour
based intrusion detection.
 Signature based intrusion detection. The principle of SID is that the intru-
sion detection mechanism contains a number of known attacks description
or `signatures' in the internal database. The stored signatures can be imme-
diately recognized when the intrusion pattern is matched.
The main advantage of SID is that it concentrates on audit data analysis
with less false alerts generation [47, 50]. However, the signicant drawback of
SID is that it only detects the known intrusion patterns. Hence, SID cannot
identify novel intrusions which lack dened signatures. In addition, SID
suers the bottleneck problem of signature updating [62], since the signatures
only can be dened and updated once any intrusions been achieved by the
adversary and been identied by the security researchers.
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The intrusion detection system which applies the SID principle is known
as Signature Based IDS (SBIDS). The most well-known and widely-used
SBIDS in intrusion detection research eld appears to be Snort [2, 94], which
examines the security of each single network packet according to signatures
(rules).
 Anomaly based intrusion detection. The principle of AID is that the intrusion
detection mechanism detects any anomalous activities that run dierently
from the acceptable normal proles. AID relies on the models of the in-
tended normal behaviour of the computer network system and legitimate
user. The typical AID approach is characterise the normal network and user
behaviors with statistical proles. AID interprets deviations from normal
behaviour as evidence of malicious behaviour [28]. Hence, the dierences
between the normal behaviour and the anomaly behaviour can be presented
quantitatively and qualitatively [51].
The key advantage of AID is that it can detect not only AID known in-
trusions but also AID unknown intrusions. The main limitation of AID
is that it suers from the diculty of building robust models [47]. In or-
der to provide the detection precision, the professional expertise is typically
needed for the security analyst to tune the detection threshold of the stat-
istical les [111]. However, the imprecise detection leads the large number
of false alarms generation. These numerous alarms sending from IDS to the
system administrator are known as the alarm ooding, which may cause IDS
to be unusable and decrease the alarm sensitivity presented to the system
administrator [50].
The intrusion detection system which applies the AID principle is known
as Anomaly Based IDS (ABIDS). The widely-applied ABIDSs in intrusion
detection research eld appear to be PHAD [69], PAYL [118] and Bro [3].
2.1.2 Classication Based on Type of Data
The data analysed by intrusion detection are generally classied into two categor-
ies: the network trac, and the log information (including both the operating
system's audit trails and the application's logging information [73]). Accordingly,
there are two general groups of intrusion detection mechanisms on computer net-
work systems, namely, network based intrusion detection (NID) and host based
intrusion detection (HID).
 Network based intrusion detection. NID is normally applied at the gateway
of a network to monitor the real-time trac which are transmitting across
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the network. NID examines the raw network packet and identies the intru-
sion patterns from the packet header and the packet payload. The intrusion
patterns can be as simple as an attempt to access a specic port or as com-
plex as sequences of operations directed at multiple hosts over an arbitrary
period of time.
NID has the following three strengths [8]: (1) NID monitors the network
trac for multiple hosts within local network at the same time; (2) NID
correlates attacks against multiple hosts; (3) NID does not aect host per-
formance.
However, NID has the following three major limitations [73]: (1) NID lacks
the capability to analyse the encrypted network trac; (2) NID faces chal-
lenges to exhaustively capture and examine the network trac since the
trac bandwidth is continually increasing; and (3) NID conducts the de-
tections based on the directly extracted trac information without high
reliability as the trac information may be masqueraded or insucient.
The intrusion detection system which applies NID is known as Network
Based IDS (NBIDS). The widely-used NBIDS in the intrusion detection
research eld is Snort [2].
 Host based intrusion detection. HID is typically applied at the single host
within computer network systems to monitor the events which are generated
by both applications and users on the host. HID examines the host operating
system audit data from host logs, especially the system log, event log and
security log. When any of these log les change, HID makes a comparison
between the new log entry and attack pattern to detect the intrusion.
HID has the following three advantages [8]: (1) HID detects attacks that do
not involve the network; (2) HID can analyse what an application is doing;
(3) HID does not require additional hardware.
Nevertheless, HID suers from the following two main limitations [73]: (1)
HID decreases the system performance due to the system resource and time
consumed to capture the event; and (2) HID examines the intrusion activ-
ities on the single host, which means multiple detectors are required in the
network to achieve ecient monitoring.
The intrusion detection system which applies HID is known as Host Based
IDS (HBIDS). HBIDS started in the early 1980s when networks were not
prevalent, comprehensive and heterogeneous as today. However, in the cur-
rent intrusion detection research eld, there are only very limited research
that still focus on HID (for example, [109, 130]) in comparison with NID.
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In addition, the development of HBIDS has not been as successful as for
NBIDS in the security industry [73].
2.1.3 Distributed Intrusion Detection
Irrespective of the categories described in Section 2.1.1 and Section 2.1.2, an IDS
could be such that the detections of the intrusion are performed on a number of
detectors proportional on the network that is being monitored. This is called a
Distributed IDS (DIDS) [10, 123].
2.2 Typical Research of Intrusion Detection
2.2.1 Detection Techniques
In terms of detection accuracy, the ideal intrusion detection can instantaneously
detect all of the intrusions with 100% detection rate and 0% false rate. Unfortu-
nately, there are several practical problems, which will be presented in Section 2.3
in this chapter, that handicapped the satisfaction of this ideal detection accuracy.
In order to get close to this goal, the typical computer network intrusion detection
research focus on the proposal and implementation of new detection techniques
to detect either known or novel attacks with high detection rate and low false
rate [23, 37].
Many of the proposed detection techniques (for example, Bayesian network [42,
50], data mining [57, 58, 59], neural network [102]) are summarised in the liter-
ature [70, 86]. There are also several recently proposed detection techniques (for
example, self-organizing map [14], support vector machines [15], maximum en-
tropy estimation [38]). Note that normally the applied detection techniques are
falling under the aforementioned main principles and classication.
2.2.2 Fundamental Theoretical Research
Besides the aforementioned typical intrusion detection research that focus on de-
tection techniques, there are few but substantial research [23, 37, 62] that examine
the fundamental theory of intrusion detection (system) to ll in the gap between
practice and theory.
 Modelling of Intrusion Detection Process. The theoretical formalisation of
intrusion detection process has been given in [23]. The modelled intrusion de-
tection is dened as a set of algorithms, including: representation algorithm
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Figure 2.2: Modelling of an Intrusion Detection Process
R, data structure algorithm S and classication algorithm C. The repres-
entation algorithm R contains any functions relating to how to represent
data within the detection process, such as data ltering, feature selection,
formatting, etc. The data structure algorithm S contains any functions re-
lating to how to manipulate data during the detection process, such as data
collection, aggregation, knowledge creation, etc. The classication algorithm
C includes any detection principles.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the general intrusion detection process with the provided
intrusion detection modelling from [23]. The constructed model divides the
implementation of the intrusion detection into two phases: initialization and
detection, which are shown as two bottom solid line boxes. Meanwhile the
three modelled algorithms are represented as the top boxes. In the typical
intrusion detection process, the detector analyses and extracts the relevant
information from the coming trac into the appropriate format, then, the
detector classies the generated data into either the normal or malicious.
Therefore, S runs in the initialization phase and C applies in the detection
phase, while R assists the process in both S and C. Specically, in the ini-
tialization phase, S uses R to process the input; in the detection phase, C
uses R to process towards the detection output.
 Modelling of Intrusion Detection System. The theoretical model of IDS has
been presented in [37] as an eight-tuple (D,
P
, F, K, S, R, P , C). This IDS
modelling considers three dierent procedures of the IDS from the system
development till the system deployment, namely feature selection proced-
ure; training procedure; and detection procedure. Figure 2.3 illustrates the
modelled IDS procedures.
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Figure 2.3: Procedure for the Modelling of Intrusion Detection Systems
In the eight-tuple, the rst four elements represent a set of data structures,
while, the last four elements represent a set of algorithms. For the four
data structure elements, D represents the data source (for example, network
trac, system log) for IDS examination;
P
represents a nite set of data
states indicating whether the data unit is normal or anomalous; F repres-
ents the data characteristics (for example, network protocol, port number);
and K represents the knowledge prole (for example, signatures, rules, stat-
istical proles). For the four algorithms, S represents the feature selection
algorithm to either manually or automatically select and generate the fea-
tures of the data during the developing process of IDS; R represents the
data reduction and representation algorithm to automatically map the data
source D to data features F; P represents the proling algorithm to gener-
ate the prole knowledge base K; C represents the classication algorithm
to map the features of given data to normal or anomalous data state.
Figure 2.3(a) shows the modelling of the feature selection procedure. The
typical feature selection procedure extracts the relevant data characteristics
from D and generates F by applying S. Figure 2.3(b) displays the modelling
of the proling procedure. The typical training procedure generates K from
D by applying R and P . The modelling of the detection procedure is shown
in Figure 2.3(c). The typical detection procedure is to extract F from D by
rst R, then, C conducts the detection and outputs P according to K.
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 The detection principles of intrusion detection have been examined in [62]
to analyse the intrusion detection problems of model inaccuracy and model
incompleteness as well as lack of the distinguishabilily in the features utilised.
Figure 2.4 [62, 73] illustrates the theoretical activity space models for both
signature based intrusion detection and anomaly based intrusion detection.
It is clear that SID consists of illegal activities modelling as Figure 2.4(a),
whereas AID consists of legal activities modelling as Figure 2.4(b).
Legal Activities Space Illegal Activities Space
* TN * FP
* TP
* FN
Signature-based
Model
(a) Signature-based Model
Legal Activities Space Illegal Activities Space
* TN
* FP
* TP* FN
Anomaly-based
Model
(b) Anomaly-based Model
Figure 2.4: Theoretical Activity Spaces Models
According to Figure 2.4, the intrusion detection faced challenges are com-
pleteness (the intrusion detection can detect all illegal activities) and accur-
acy (the intrusion detection can only detect illegal activities) in both SID
and AID [62, 73]. The correctly detected activities within either signature
based model or anomaly based model, that is, the detected illegal activity
in signature based model and the detected legal activity in anomaly based
model are known as True Positive (TP). While, the incorrectly detected
activities within either signature based model or anomaly based model, that
is, the detected legal activity in signature based model and the undetected
illegal activity in anomaly based model are known as false detection. In SID,
the incompleteness leads to FN, whereas inaccuracy leads to False Positive
(FP). In AID, the incompleteness leads to FP, whereas inaccuracy leads to
FN.
2.2.3 Intrusion Detection Evaluation
The utilisation of good evaluation approaches is crucial to attain an accurate
and reliable evaluation of an IDS's detection capabilities and performance. From
the view of intrusion detection evaluation, the IDS can be typically modelled as a
black box, which receives data (for example, network packets, log le entries) from
a certain source and has to determine if the input is an intrusion or not [8]. Gen-
erally, there are two main methods to evaluate intrusion detection performance:
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(1) Metrics Based Evaluation; and (2) Graphical Based Analysis.
 Metrics Based Evaluation. Metrics based evaluation mechanism is funda-
mental but essential in evaluating an IDS. It assesses how many intrusions
are detected correctly and how many are not. Note that, the ground truth,
which is the reality of the examined data with the intrusion information,
must be known in order to conduct the evaluation. Table 2.1 shows the
classication of such evaluation metrics. Normally, the class of generated
alarms is regarded as the positive class, and the class without alarm genera-
tion is regarded as the negative class. The denitions of common evaluation
metrics [34] are given as follows.
Table 2.1: Attack Detection Classications
Attack Data Normal Data
Alarm Generated True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP)
No Alarm Generated False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN)
Denition 1 True Positive. A True Positive (TP) is an instance of the
positive class which is labelled as positive. A TP indicates a piece of attack
data which is correctly detected by the IDS.
Denition 2 False Positive. False Positive (FP) is an instance of the
negative class which is labelled as positive. A FP indicates a piece of normal
data which is wrongly labelled as an attack by the IDS.
Denition 3 True Negative. True Negative (TN) is an instance of the
negative class which is labelled as negative. A TN indicates a piece of normal
data which is correctly labelled as normal by the IDS.
Denition 4 False Negative. False Negative (FN) is an instance of the
positive class which is labelled as negative. A FN indicates a piece of attack
data which is not detected by the IDS and consequently evades it.
Based on these four common metrics, an IDS can be evaluated in terms of
Detection Rate (DR) [62], also called True Positive Rate or Recall ; False
Alarm Rate (FAR) [62], also called False Positive Rate; Precision [34]; and
Accuracy [34]. Note that True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate are
dierent from the TP and FP common metrics. \j:j" denotes the frequency
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of the metrics, for example, jTPj represents the number of TP been classied
within detection process.
DR is dened as
DR =
jTPj
jTPj+ jFNj (2.1)
and measures the ratio between the number of correctly classied attacks
(detected alarms) and the total number of attacks.
FAR is dened as
FAR =
jFPj
jTPj+ jFPj (2.2)
and measures the ratio between the number of incorrectly classied normal
data and the total number of alarms.
Precision is dened as
Precision = 1  FAR
=
jTPj
jTPj+ jFPj (2.3)
and measures the ratio between the number of correctly classied normal
data and the total number of alarms.
Accuracy is dened as
Accuracy =
jTPj+ jTNj
jTPj+ jFPj+ jTNj+ jFNj (2.4)
and measures the ratio between the total correctly classied data, which
includes both the attack data and normal data, against the summation of
the positive class and the negative class.
In addition to the metrics mentioned above, there are other evaluation
metrics used to investigate the intrusion detection's detection performance.
Some of the metrics (for example, F-Score [105] in Equation (2.5)) can be
directly measured by applying the four common metrics. Some metrics need
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extra information (for example, Bayesian detection rate [9] requires the Base
Rate value) to assist the evaluation. While, some metrics require dierent
information instead of the common metrics, for example intrusion detection
capability [36], which is simply the ratio of the mutual information between
IDS input and output to the entropy of the input. Furthermore, some met-
rics are proposed to measure other aspects of intrusion detection, for ex-
ample, fuzzy comprehensive evaluation based entropy weight coecient [106]
considers fuzzy logic to examine IDS in functionality, expansibility, practic-
ability and security aspects by measuring the truth degree of each aspect;
expected cost [35] assesses the monetary investment of an IDS in a given IT
security infrastructure.
F-Score =
2
1
Precision
+ 1
Recall
(2.5)
 Graphical Based Analysis . This oers the graphical evaluation capability to
intrusion detection according to the plotted curves. Instead of the detection
accuracy evaluation, the evaluation curves (for example, Receiver Operating
Characteristic Curves (ROC) [34, 35], Intrusion Detection Operating Char-
acteristic (IDOC) [20]) focus on the provision of additional evaluation tasks
by applying some of the aforementioned metrics.
ROC represents the detection probability at a given false alarm rate. By
illustrating multiple ROC curves, it is easy to identify the total detection
performance of intrusion detection approaches when curves do not cross.
However, the limitation of ROC is that it cannot make comparison if the
curves cross.
Since some of the metrics (like Bayesian detection rate) require priori inform-
ation to measure the performance with uncertainties such as the likelihood of
an attack and the operational costs of intrusion detection, IDOC is proposed
to represent detection probability at a Bayesian detection rate, also known
as Positive Predictive Value (PPV). Hence, IDOC can evaluate intrusion
detection with the model of adversary information.
2.3 Problems of Intrusion Detection
An ideal intrusion detection should be free of false alerts and thus detect attacks
with 100% precision. It should avoid excessive response times and have minimal
computational cost [127]. Though intrusion detection being globally studied for
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more than two decades since Denning's intrusion detection prototype [28], there
are unsolved diculties and limitations that handicap the achievement of perfect
intrusion detection.
2.3.1 Diculties
Many novel intrusion detection techniques have been proposed and employed for
better performance in terms of high detection rate and low false alarm rate, which
are closer to the ideal conditions, in the experimental environments. However, no
perfect intrusion detection practically exists due to the following known diculties.
 Rapid augmentation of computer network systems. Current computer net-
works are becoming more comprehensive, as various emerging digital devices
(for example, laptop, iPad, smart phone) are connected into a heterogeneous
system. Thus, it is dicult for a single IDS to precisely detect all kinds of
known vulnerabilities and known intrusions (as well as deviations of any
intrusions) for dierent IDS-deployed digital devices. Any imprecisely de-
veloped detection signatures or statistical proles will lead to inaccurate
detection with FP and FN.
 Rapid emergence of new vulnerabilities and intrusions. Within the hetero-
geneous networks, there may exist unknown vulnerabilities on either recent
devices or old products. Vendor unidentied security aws, which are new
vulnerabilities and intrusions (that is, zero-day attack, which compromises
publicly unreported vulnerabilities that are exploited by the adversary.), may
exist on the latest computer network products within either hardware drivers
or application software. Normally, the IDS updates the intrusion knowledge
after adversaries compromise or security analysts identify the aws. Thus,
intrusion detection lacks the capability to detect new vulnerabilities and
unknown intrusions leading to inaccurate detection with FN.
2.3.2 Limitations
The limitations of intrusion detection could be solved by the researchers compared
with the diculties of intrusion detection. Usually, the limitations are weaknesses
of intrusion detection mechanisms or deployed systems. Some of the known limit-
ations are as follows.
 Low-level detection with independent intrusion reporting [79, 81]. No matter
what detection principle has been applied and what audit data has been ex-
amined in intrusion detection, the deployed intrusion detection mechanism
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or IDS normally detects the intrusion entirely from low-level raw informa-
tion (for example, raw network trac, host log le record). Though low-level
information contains the potential implications for intrusion possibilities, it
is dicult for the intrusion detector to directly report the high-level alarm
abstraction (that is, the system has been compromised). Typically, IDS
implements the detection by ignoring the context of the overall computer
network system and its most critical resources, like the actual network con-
guration and vulnerabilities. Take Snort for example, it only examines
every single raw network packet's header and payload information to de-
termine the intrusion.
In addition, the current computer network intrusions are not only increasing
in numbers, but have also become more sophisticated. Instead of the single
step intrusion, the adversary proposes a detailed and systematic plan be-
fore conduct the intrusion, then, compromises the system by implementing
multi-step intrusions logically. However, current intrusion detection lacks
the capability to distinguish the hidden logic and relation (that is, causal
relation, which represents that the achievement of one intrusion step causes
the occurrence of another intrusion step) from the various detected low-level
intrusions.
Hence, an additional problem is independent intrusion reporting. As one
low-level detected intrusion causes one alarm, IDS may generate repetit-
ive alarms within one specied period, since the adversary may continually
implement the same type of intrusion for information gathering or other
intrusion purposes. For example, DDoS attacks contain huge numbers of
malicious packets within attack trac. Snort raises alarms against every
malicious packet, though most of the generated alarms may be quite re-
dundant. Also, Snort generated alarms can not tell the precise progress of
multi-step intrusions. Meanwhile, the system administrator is overwhelmed
by the ood of redundant alarms.
 Self-existed vulnerabilities on implemented IDS. Since IDS is usually a set of
computer programs, there are some possibly existed security aws or vul-
nerabilities on the IDS due to the poor system design and implementation.
Hence, if an adversary can somehow prevent or terminate an IDS by com-
promising the explored vulnerabilities, the whole IDS-monitored computer
network system is left without protection.
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2.4 Extensions of Intrusion Detection
Since intrusion detection (system) only deals with discovery of intrusions on com-
puter networks, there are several additional intrusion detection based extensions.
2.4.1 Intrusion Prevention
The process of intrusion detection stops with generating alarms and relies on
manual responses by the administrator. The resulting delays between the detec-
tion and response may range from minutes to months. Therefore, there is a need
to respond to intrusion automatically.
The system that applies the intrusion prevention mechanism is known as an
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). An IPS provides the intrusion detection cap-
abilities additionally reacting in real-time to stop or prevent undesired access,
malicious content and inappropriate transactions [16]. IPS can also be divided
into network based IPS (NBIPS) and host based IPS (HBIPS) according to the
audit data type [16, 125, 128]. NBIPS operates inside the network to monitor
all network trac for malicious code or attacks. The main prevention functions
are trac blockage of potential intrusion and trac termination of current intru-
sion [7]. When an intrusion has been detected, NBIPS drops the malicious trac
while continually allowing legal trac to pass. HBIPS operates on the individual
host where system and user actions are inspected for intrusions.
2.4.2 Intrusion Response
Intrusion response is a further extension to intrusion detection and intrusion pre-
vention. Intrusion response provides the response functions with further analysis
to minimize impact from the intrusion [7]. The response process can be typically
classied into two categories: active response and passive response. According
to [7], an active response ghts against an intrusion in order to minimize the
impact from intrusion to a victim, whereas a passive response informed the occur-
rence of an intrusion to other parties and relies upon them to take further action.
Active response can be further subdivided into a proactive response, which controls
the potential intrusion before it happens, and a reactive response, which reports
and responses after an intrusion.
2.5 Intrusion Analysis
Intrusion analysis refers to the analysis of intrusion detection and forensics to
identify attack traces from possibly large number of audit data [85]. In this thesis,
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the intrusion analysis has only been applied for the intrusion detection aspect.
Typically, intrusion detection concentrates on the detection processing of any ad-
versary intended and executed intrusions. However, there is a need to analyse the
intrusion detection for the additional information beyond the low-level detection
before and during, even after the detection process. The intrusion analysis process
can be classied into two main categories according to the time of analysis: (1) in-
trusion threat and situation analysis, which take place before the end of intrusion
detection; and (2) intrusion detection uncertainty analysis, which is conducted
during intrusion detection process.
2.5.1 Intrusion Threat and Situation Analysis
Intrusion threat analysis and intrusion situation analysis investigate any additional
intrusion information (for example, adversary's prerequisite intrusion conditions,
intrusion progress within the multi-step intrusion) before and during the intrusion
detection process.
 Intrusion threat analysis. Intrusion threat analysis mainly investigates the
preconditions of intrusions by taking the standpoint of the adversary before
intrusion detection takes place. In order to implement a successful intrusion,
the adversary usually needs to achieve the following three aspects [39]: (1)
capability (the ability to execute an intrusion); (2) opportunity (the envir-
onment permits the intrusion to happen); and (3) intension (the adversary
must have a reason for the intrusion).
An adversary's capability depends not only on the types of intrusions that
he/she can implement, but also the ability to execute these intrusions ef-
ciently [30]. The sophisticated adversary, who has high level of intrusion
capability, usually has a detailed intrusion plan before the intrusion and
adapted methodology to treat problems identied during the intrusion pro-
cess, even tricking the intrusion countermeasures (for example, botnet usage,
malicious intrusion packet masquerade) and cleaning the intrusion trials to
prevent the potential forensic analysis. An adversary's opportunity implies
the vulnerable and exposed entities on the computer network system that
can be accessed given the current progress of attack [30]. The opportunity
information contains the physical connection between the explored vulner-
abilities within entities of the network system. These compromised entities
sometimes are simply the stepping stones to the ultimate victim or intrusion
goals. An adversary's intentions are the desired eects that the adversary
wants to achieve [87]. Some typical intrusion goals are the satisfaction of
curiosity, condential information theft and hostile intrusion.
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Intrusion threat analysis may partially provide intrusion detection with the
adversary's opportunity information. However, as per the previously men-
tioned limitations of existing intrusion detection in Section 2.3.2, the detec-
tion mechanisms usually concentrate on low-level detection of the adversary
launched intrusions. They seldom combine the potential opportunity inform-
ation into the detection process. Besides the opportunity information, it is
extremely dicult for intrusion detection to identify capability and inten-
tion information due to both capability and intention cannot be objectively
measured or identied.
 Intrusion situation analysis. Intrusion situation analysis analyses the pro-
gress of intrusion from the point of detection during the intrusion detection
process. This analysis usually needs the assistance of the priori construc-
ted model, which constructs the formal model of intrusion situation meas-
urement and supports the general process of using and analysing intrusion
alerts collected from intrusion detection detectors. Attack graph [6, 40, 41,
43, 99, 103] and attack tree [25, 56, 107, 108] are main stream graph-based
modelling approaches that provide the security analysis to computer network
systems. Either attack graph or attack tree illustrates possible multi-stage
intrusions for the targeted network, typically by presenting the logical caus-
ality relations between intrusion steps and physical conguration settings.
More information about attack graph and attack tree will be described in
Chapter 3.
Through the run time intrusion situation analysis against the model, the
derived information from on-going situation may be additionally used to
determine appropriate actions for proactive defense [39]. In addition, the
casual relations between intrusion steps allow pinpointing where the cur-
rent intrusion situation is located within the sophisticated multi-step attack
process.
The generation of network security situation [33] can be divided into three
steps: (1) to obtain attack patterns from the sample data set by apply-
ing knowledge discovery methods; (2) to transform the measured patterns
into the correlation rules; and (3) to conduct the network security situation
assessment with real-time data set. However, there are several main di-
culties [33] that handicap the implementation of intrusion situation analysis:
(1) there are lots of detection uncertainties because the false detection rate
may be high from the applied IDS; (2) the relations between the alerts, which
are generated from the large scale network attacks, are complex and dicult
to be determined.
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Figure 2.5: Uncertainties within Intrusion Detection
Therefore, one could conclude that the modelling of intrusion opportunity in-
formation and the multi-step intrusion with hidden logical relation can enable the
analysis function before and during the intrusion detection process to overcome
the limitation of low-level detection.
2.5.2 Intrusion Detection Uncertainty Analysis
Uncertainty is an innate feature of intrusion analysis due to the limited informa-
tion obtained by system security monitoring tools (that is, IDS, rewall, system
logs) [85]. Within the scope of intrusion detection, the possible uncertainty ana-
lysis deals with any uncertain intrusion logical relations and uncertain intrusion
information, such as, trustworthiness of the detection result and trustworthiness
of the intrusion source, during the intrusion detection process.
Figure 2.5 shows three uncertainties during the whole intrusion detection pro-
cess: input observation uncertainty, detection process uncertainty, and output ob-
servation uncertainty.
 Input observation uncertainty. This uncertainty issue is related to the ob-
served input data by the detector. Normally, the intrusion detector simply
extracts the relevant information from the requested elds of the observed
audit data. However, the professional adversary may fake the audit data.
The typical process is to masquerade the source IP address of malicious net-
work packet. In addition, they remotely control the compromised bots to
conduct further intrusions on the primary victim without revealing his/her
real location.
Thus, the typical input observation uncertainty means the uncertainty of
whether the incoming audit data is generated by the claimed source or not,
where the adversaries are, and what intrusion options he/she has made to
carrying out the intrusion [61].
 Detection process uncertainty. This uncertainty represents uncertainty issues
during the detection process by the IDS. There are two possible uncertainties:
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(1) classication uncertainty ; and (2) alert correlation uncertainty.
 Classication uncertainty is related to how the IDS can ascertain that
the observed symptoms can correctly lead to the alarm generation. IDS
typically conducts the detection process by matching the captured or
partial predened signatures or statistical proles. Thus, the obtained
information has varying levels of certainty to raise the alarm. In Snort,
a rule denes a set of malicious information as a specied attack sig-
nature. Some rules have specic information (for example, specied
port number in port eld, unique malicious packet payload content in
content eld) on every rule eld, while, some rules have less specic
information (for example, any in IP address eld, any in port eld)
instead of xed malicious information on some rule elds. But, it is
possible for a single malicious packet to be matched with several dif-
ferent Snort rules. In that case, it is dicult to ascertain that the
generated Snort alerts are correct.
 Alert correlation uncertainty. In the alert correlation process [24, 74,
105, 112, 113], the uncertainty is related to how to explicitly model
or determine the certainty level in the correlation process [85]. The
typical scenario of alert correlation uncertainty is within DIDS. Since
the multiple intrusion detectors may generate dierent detection results
on the same piece of audit data, the question is how the analyser can
deal with dierent detection results and fuse them into the a single
output. Dempster-Shafer theory [21, 123] has been applied to deal
with this issue.
 Output observation uncertainty. This uncertainty can be regarded as IDS
detection performance analysis in terms of detection accuracy. Once the
detector obtains any results, it lacks an automatic capability to verify the
generated results as being a true positive alarm. It is dicult even for the
human security expert to identify the detection accuracy without the ground
truth of the examined trac.
2.6 Summary
This chapter has described the background of intrusion detection, which is a mech-
anism to identify unauthorized use, misuse and abuse of computer network sys-
tems. Firstly, the intrusion detection classications was described according to
dierent detection principles and dierent data types. Next, the typical intrusion
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detection research were presented including detection techniques, fundamental the-
oretical research and the evaluation approaches as the concrete research results in
recent years. Then, the diculties and the limitations to intrusion detection re-
search were discussed to motivate why intrusion detection is a challenging but still
attractive research area. After that, intrusion prevention and intrusion response
were briey described as subsequent stages after the intrusion detection. Finally,
the existing intrusion analysis approaches were identied and reviewed.
The following chapter reviews attack graph and attack tree modelling tech-
niques as our research's second background part.
Chapter 3
Attack Modelling Approaches
This chapter reviews the recent attack modelling research. As we need to build
an attack model to facilitate the corresponding intrusion detection process, it is
necessary for us to propose a specialised attack modelling approach by identifying
and extending the current and known attack modelling approaches. In addition,
it is essential for us to examine the known node connectors, node metrics and ag-
gregations for the relevant modelling and computation. Moreover, since the attack
graph modelling technique has been applied to conduct any intrusion detection
related research already, we additionally investigate the attack graph modelling
technique. The presented information in this chapter provides the foundation for
our attack tree modelling research. Thus, we may propose our attack tree model-
ling technique by applying or extending the selected node connectors, node metrics
and aggregations to generate attack tree model for the intrusion detection in the
following chapters of this thesis.
In the multi-step intrusion process, the adversary usually uses a compromised
victim machine as a stepping stone to launch another exploit on a new victim ma-
chine and then, repeats the process until an ultimate goal has been achieved. This
style is normally known as a chain style [6]. Attack chaining is an iterative pro-
cess that supports automated vulnerability analysis by enumerating vulnerability
interactions [26].
In order to modelling these multi-step attacks, security researchers often organ-
ise the chains of exploits into graphs or trees by applying attack graph modelling
techniques or attack tree modelling techniques. Although the precise denitions
of attack graph or attack tree vary by the researcher, it is useful to think of an
attack tree as a structure in which each possible attack chain ends in either a leaf
node or a root node that satises the intrusion goal, and an attack graph as a
consolidation of the attack tree in which some or all common states are merged
[6].
The attack graph modelling technique has usually been applied to model and
26
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analyse the given computer network system security with system information (for
example, specic vulnerabilities on various hosts, connectivity between hosts, ad-
versary access privileges on various hosts) in conjunction with the intrusion pro-
cess. While attack tree modelling technique, which is a specialised attack graph
with a tree structure, typically has been applied to model and analyse system
security without additional hybrid system information.
An attack path in either attack graph or attack tree represents a series of
intrusions (also known as atomic attacks) corresponding to a sequence of state
transitions culminating in the adversary achieving his/her goal. The entire attack
graph or attack tree is thus a representation of all the known ways that the ad-
versary can succeed to compromise the target victim [99]. Hence, the resulting set
of all possible attack paths is a predictive attack roadmap [82].
In this chapter, Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 describe the attack graph and the
attack tree with the following aspects: representations, generation approaches, and
the combination with intrusion detection, respectively. Section 3.3 investigates the
node connector extensions besides the conventional conjunctive and disjunctive.
Section 3.4 classies and describes the metrics and attributes on the modelled
graph/tree nodes. Then, the possible metric aggregation approaches and the at-
tack resistance aggregation are represented in Section 3.5. Finally, the summary
of this chapter is given in Section 3.6.
3.1 Attack Graph Modelling Approach
The attack graph modelling technique provides capabilities for the network se-
curity researcher or the system analyst to model, analyse and assess the security
among any particularly given networks. Based on the constructed graph model,
both the analyst already known and the analyst unexplored attack information
may be explicitly illustrated. This attack information usually includes the rela-
tionship between network components and potential attacks and also their con-
sequences in a particular context. Such a context typically considers the physical
or logical connectivity between network devices, vulnerabilities on each single net-
work device. Thus, attack graphs allow the network security researcher or the
system analyst to assess the true vulnerability of critical network resource, and
to understand how vulnerabilities in individual network components contribute to
the overall vulnerability [77, 121].
Since attack graphs try to model various possible intrusion paths on the tar-
geted system, the constructed attack graph is termed as exhaustive if it covers all
possible attacks, and is termed as succinct if it contains only those network states
from which the adversary can achieve his/her intrusion goal [99].
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3.1.1 Representations of Attack Graph
There are many dierent attack graph literature and many representations [43, 89,
99, 119, 120, 121]. However, the core idea of attack graph [40] remains the same: an
attack graph shows the ways an adversary could compromise a network or host. In
addition, the fundamental elements of an attack graph remain the same: the node
usually represents the possible state and the edge usually represents the possible
state transition. Several typical representations of attack graph are now discussed.
Common Attack Graph Representations
The usual attack graphs [43, 89, 99] apply a geometrical shape to represent the
node. Within the node, there is various information, such as, intrusion information
to describe node state, which can be lled in according the modelling requirements.
The node in the attack graph [89] represents the state as the combination of
a physical host, the corresponding user access level, and eects of the attack so
far. An edge is a change of state caused by a single malicious attack or legitimate
action taken by the adversary, or a single action taken by an unwitting victim from
a piece of malicious code. Figure 3.1(a) illustrates a sample attack graph diagram
from [89]. The top node is the ultimate intrusion goal on the primary victim
machine. While the two connecting branches are the attack paths from another
two machines which are physically linking to the primary victim machine. Each
node contains any of the following node attributes information: user level as the
possible user privilege; host machine ID; vulnerability that represents the changes
to the original conguration caused by the intrusion; capability that represents
the physically possible intrusion behaviors.
The node in attack graph [43, 99] contains the state information with several
attack information (that is, pre-dened attack ID, the detectable ag of IDS, and
attack source and target hosts). An edge corresponds to an atomic attack whose
preconditions are satised in the source node and postconditions in the destination
node. Figure 3.1(b) shows the generated example attack graph from [99]. The
rst left node on the top row \att 0" represents the researcher dened attack
index number, which corresponds to the intrusion step to be attempted next;
\S" indicates the detection capability of IDS to the corresponding attack, which
is detectable or stealthy; \0  > 1" represents the intrusion source \0" to the
intrusion destination \1", where \0" and \1" are dened host numbers.
Though Figure 3.1(a) and Figure 3.1(b) look dissimilar (that is, node shape
(circle in Figure 3.1(a) and square in Figure 3.1(b)), graph structure (Figure 3.1(a)
had modelled the graph from the standpoint of host with physical connection,
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Figure 3.1: Two examples of a Common Attack Graph Representations
whereas Figure 3.1(b) had built the graph from the standpoint of attack process),
node attribute types), both of them have applied the single node type to represent
the state in addition with the dened node attributes.
Jajodia's Attack Graph Representation
Besides the above mentioned representations with geometrical shapes, Jajodia,
who is the world leading attack graph researcher, had proposed his unique attack
graph representation approach [119, 120, 121] compared with the common ap-
proaches [43, 89, 99].
In Jajodia's attack graphs [119, 120, 121], the system states have been dened
as conditions in plaintext instead of any geometrical notations. Additionally, the
commonly represented edge transition splits into two edge sections by an additional
oval in the middle. The ovals are shown as exploits, which are adversary utilised
vulnerabilities between connected host machines. Moreover, the split directed
edge represents the relation and connects conditions with exploits. An edge from
a condition to an exploit denotes the required relation, which means the exploit
cannot be executed unless the condition is satised; whereas an edge from an
exploit to a condition denotes the implication relation, which means that the
adversary executes the exploit to achieve the condition.
Figure 3.2 illustrates an attack graph example from [119]. The top node user(0)
indicates the root node and the bottom node root(2) indicates the leaf node. Com-
pared with the aforementioned attack graphs, the condition node within this rep-
resentation provides less state information. The only depicted information are
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Figure 3.2: An example of Jajodia's Attack Graph Representation
the user level at any particular machine (for example user(0) represents the user
level at host machine 0, root(2) represents the root level at host machine 2) and
trust relationship between two physical hosts (for example trust(0; 1) represents
the established trust relationship from host machine 0 to host machine 1). How-
ever, the additional exploit oval on the state transition shows the vulnerability
between two host machines (for example rsh(0; 1) represents a remote shell login
from host machine 0 to host machine 1). Furthermore, the probability attributes
are assigned to the condition and the exploit to analyse the likelihood of successful
intrusion from the adversary.
Generally, no matter what kind of attack graph representation had been pro-
posed or applied, the core idea of attack graphs is essentially the same, that is,
for the graphical illustrations of how an adversary can compromise a network or
host step by step.
3.1.2 Generation of Attack Graph
Specialised Attack Graph Generation
The old fashioned attack graph generation method was that security experts
(like Red Team [100]) manually drew the graph, which is tedious, error-prone and
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impractical for large network [99]. In recent years, there have been several ad-
vanced attack graph generation approaches [41, 89, 99, 100, 103] been proposed
to generate attack graph automatically. The automated generation process can
be mainly classied into following two steps: (1) model the target network; and
(2) produce an attack graph for the target network. In the former step, the ana-
lyst identies and collects the fundamental information of a targeted network (for
example, network topology, host vulnerability) as the input source for the auto-
mated attack graph generation. In the latter step, the developed graph generator
processes the input source and displays the constructed graph on a graphical user
interface (GUI).
Since the incomplete information or the wrong information may lead to inac-
curate description of the target network, the fundamental information identic-
ation and collection is the critical process in attack graph generation. In order
to build a complete and correct attack graph, the analyst tries to collect various
information from the network. The common information contains the following
aspects: network information, host information, vulnerability and attack library.
Dierent researchers also have their own extra focuse (adversary attack capabil-
ity (novice or expert) [89], IDS detection capability (detectable attack or stealthy
attack) [99, 100], adversary privilege level on host (none, user, root) [99, 100]).
Network information usually includes the physical network topology, the network
connectivity between hosts and ports, whereas host information usually includes
the host type, operating system version of host, enabled service on the host. Vul-
nerability lists the measured vulnerabilities on host. Attack library stores the
knowledge of known attacks. The abstracted attack graph generation process is
illustrated as Figure 3.3.
The way to obtain this input information is another problem that aects the
quality of attack graph generation. As the analyst may manually specify all of
the necessary information, there is no guarantee about the correctness and com-
pleteness during the manually analysis, especially with large and comprehensive
networks. One direction to address this problem is to apply an automatical in-
formation gathering tools, such as Nessus vulnerability scanner [80, 82]. With the
assistance of Nessus, which generates the vulnerability report for each host and
the host connectivity in network, the Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA)
tool [41] can automatically generate attack graphs for the large network. Simil-
arly, Network Security and Planning Architecture [65] provides the attack graph
generation capability with up to 50,000 hosts with the assistance of Nessus. Be-
sides Nessus, more scanning tools (like Nmap [22]) obtain the detailed system
information about host and vulnerabilities, then integrate the scan outputs from
the multiple scanners into the merged information with the unied format to fa-
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Figure 3.3: Abstracted Attack Graph Generation Process
cilitate the attack graph generation.
In terms of automatically gathering information, vulnerability analysis [6, 41,
65, 89, 104] is one of the foundations of attack graph modelling. This topic is
beyond the scope of my research.
Other Attack Graph Generations
Besides the above specialised attack graph generation approaches and tools,
some security researchers have applied other methods (for example, data min-
ing [60, 63]) to generate the attach graph. However, since the goals of attack
graph generation may be dierent, the dierences between graph representations
do occur.
In the data mining approach [60, 63], instead of vulnerability analysis against
the targeted network, the researchers target on the generation and the probability
computation of attack scenarios in the attack graph, and apply the constructed
attack graph to predict the next attack step. Through the data mining approach,
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the researchers mine the associations between the attack classes according to the
o-line IDS analysis of captured dataset, which is the only attack graph generation
input source. Hence, in contrast with the generated attack graphs by the special-
ised aforementioned attack graph tools, the representation of generated nodes lack
detailed host information and network information.
3.1.3 Attack Graph with Intrusion Detection (System)
The main goal of attack graphs is to analyse the security of a target network,
whereas the main goal of intrusion detection is to identify the intrusion by the
adversary to a target network. Since intrusion detection by IDS typically explores
the attacks according to the known vulnerability signatures or attack rules from
the vulnerability analysis, thus, attack graph can serve as the basis of intrusion
detection for the analyst and IDS.
Refer to IDS, two following principles [43] have been pointed out about IDS
based on attack graph: (1) the generated alerts from an IDS can match individual
alerts to attack edges in the graph; and (2) the successive matched alerts to in-
dividual paths in the attack graphs dramatically increases the likelihood that the
network is under attack. Hence, attack graph allows the IDS to predict attacker
goals, aggregate alarms to reduce the volume of alert information to be analysed,
and reduce the false alarm rates [43].
Fundamental Intrusion Detection Analysis
A generated attack graph describes all likely attacks and possible attack paths
against the targeted network. As mentioned in the above paragraphs, the at-
tack graph has been generated based on network and host information together
with the vulnerabilities in the network or hosts. Thus, the attack graph analyses
the vulnerabilities and potential intrusions by the analyst for intrusion detection.
Usually, the attack graph assists the analysis of intrusion detection to examine
the intrusion behaviour from the adversary within a given network, instead of
providing the foundation for detection process from IDS on the given network.
Security analysts [43, 99] use attack graphs for intrusion detection analysis,
which has targeted on the generation of all attack paths and demonstration of how
the adversary can compromise the target without detection by the IDS. According
to the provided network example, an attack graph model with nite states has
been constructed. A state in the constructed model represents the state of the
system between atomic attacks, whereas a state transition corresponds to a single
atomic attack by the adversary. The main analysis steps including: (1) State
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Identication; (2) Connectivity Determination; and (3) Transition Analysis.
The State Identication step identies the nite states of the model. Each
state contains the following three components: the fact of network; the privilege
of intruder; and the detection capability of IDS. For the fact of network, the ana-
lyst determines host services, host vulnerabilities, connectivity and remote login
trust relation between hosts. For the privilege of intruder, the analyst determines
the level of privilege that the intruder has on each host. For the detection cap-
ability of IDS, the analyst determines the stealthy or detectable attack for IDS.
The Connectivity Determination step determines the connection availability and
trust relation between hosts. The Transition Analysis step models the atomic
attack with the four following elds: adversary preconditions; network precondi-
tions; intruder eects; and network eects. Referring to the adversary's threat
assessment, the rst two conditions dene the adversary's opportunity, whereas
the third condition represents the adversary's intention.
In the constructed attack graph, the node contains four elements: attack type;
source host; target host; and attack strain indicator. The root nodes represent the
initial intrusion states from the adversary's source host. While the leaf nodes rep-
resent the achieved intrusion states on the compromised victim host. Any path in
the graph from a root node to a leaf node illustrates a sequence of atomic attacks
that the intruder can employ to achieve the ultimate goal.
Advanced Implementation for Intrusion Detection
Besides the intrusion detection analysis of the targeted network, the attack
graph had been applied to assist other intrusion detection related research.
In [82], the attack graph assists the optimal placement of IDS on the network
to cover all critical paths with minimal cost. In [95], the attack graph has been
integrated into the IDS management system to improve the alert and correlation
quality. In [60, 63], the attack graph assists the analyst to predict the next attack
step from the adversary.
Intrusion Uncertainty Analysis in Attack Graph
In the typical security analysis with attack graph modelling technique, the
logical relations are usually regarded as deterministic: the successful intrusions by
adversary will certainly happen in their worst forms as long as all the prerequisites
are satised, and no intrusions will happen if such conditions do not hold [61].
However, such logical causalities encoded in a deterministic attack graph do not
precisely describe the process of real-time security events and nor do that exactly
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identify the nature of real-time security events. Usually, the implemented cyber
intrusions are not 100% guaranteed to exactly obey the modelled intrusion paths
on the attack graph due to the incompleteness of attack graph construction with
missed known vulnerabilities or any unknown vulnerabilities compromised by the
adversary. Thus, there may be any uncertainties from the nature of exploits [61].
Incorporating probabilistic behaviour into attack graphs [43] may assist to
address the uncertainty of attack graph. The Bayesian network had been suggested
to encode the uncertain nature into the conditional probability table on graph
nodes [61]. However, since it is dicult to examine the ground truths of real
attack traces, the unaddressed problem is how to set and maintain the statistical
parameters in the practical security analysis.
3.2 Attack Tree Modelling Approach
The attack tree research area has seen relatively moderate developed in the past 10
years since Schneier's work [97]. Therefore, there is still much potential research
to forge attack tree into new discoveries and developments [32]. In the computer
network security, the attack tree modelling technique was informally introduced to
model intrusions against computer network systems in [97]. Generally, the attack
tree provides a formal, methodical way to describe the security of a system [97].
From the view of intrusion by the adversary, an attack tree shows the progression
of exploits to the top-level goal [26]. An alternative formalisation [71] is given
in a denotational semantical way to study not only the equivalence of attack
tree transformation, but also the attribute and the projection of an attack tree.
Generally, the attack tree modelling technique has a more generic and structured
manner [71, 110]. Construction of an attack tree depends on the expertise of
the analyst. Any designing errors result in a awed attack tree that can lead to
incorrect analysis.
3.2.1 Dierences Between Attack Tree and Attack Graph
Though both attack tree and attack graph are graph-based security modelling and
analysis techniques, and attack tree can be seen as a special case of attack graph
with tree like structure, there are several main dierences in terms of root-leaf
relation, standpoint of modelling, and functional application.
 Root-leaf relation. The root-leaf relation describes the relationships between
the root and the leaf in terms of quantity by borrowing the concept of entity
relations from relational database.
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In a typical attack graph without tree-like structure, there are usually multi-
root nodes and multi-leaf nodes. Any of the root nodes within the attack
graph usually have more than one attack paths which are leading to dierent
leaf nodes. It is possible to conclude that one root node has 1 : n relation
to multi-leaf nodes. Hence, an attack graph typically has n : n relations
between multi-root nodes and multi-leaf nodes.
In a typical attack tree, there is only one single root node and multi-leaf
nodes, whereas all of the leaf nodes have their own attack path with the
root node. Thus, the attack tree typically has 1 : n relation between the
single root node and multi-leaf nodes.
 Standpoint of modelling. Attack graph and attack tree have signicant
modelling dierences in terms of standpoint. In attack graph, the mod-
elling is conducted by considering the possible intrusions, and especially
with host and system information. Some attack graphs [89] apply the
physical machine connectivity as the fundamental structure. Other attack
graphs [43, 99, 119, 120, 121] embed the communication between source and
destination as node attribute. However, attack tree ignores any additional
system information by purely concentrating on the modelling of intrusion
techniques and the process.
 Functional utilisations. The main functionalities of both attack graph and
attack tree modelling techniques are model and analyse the security of a
given computer network system.
In terms of intrusion detection, the attack graph is more suitable to im-
plement the intrusion analysis of the security vulnerabilities on the given
network before the intrusion detection process. The main reason is because
the generated attack graph is often unique and only representable according
to the current conguration of the given network. Even if the generated
graph can facilitate the intrusion detection, it is workable specic to that
given network.
However, although attack tree has similar modelling and analysing functions
as attack graph, attack tree is not only available to conduct the intrusion
analysis before the intrusion detection process, but can also assist the intru-
sion detection process as we will show later in this thesis. As the generated
attack tree model is generic by focusing on the conducted intrusion tech-
niques from the adversary, the constructed attack tree can be applied to
represent multi network environments. Therefore, intrusion detection can
execute the high-level detection against the multi-step intrusion in dierent
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Figure 3.4: An example Attack Tree
networks by applying the attack tree model as the intrusion roadmap.
Besides the aforementioned functional disadvantage for intrusion detection,
the attack graph modelling technique has several additional limitations compared
with the attack tree technique. Since the generated network attack graphs can be
both large and exhibit very dense connectivity, it is a serious challenge for humans
to understand [78]. In addition, it is a complex and time-consuming modelling
process to generate and analyse attack graphs if there are many hosts, even with
automatic generation approaches [66].
3.2.2 Representation of Attack Tree
In the attack tree, the tree structure is utilised to represent attacks against a
system, with the root node representing the ultimate attack goal (for example,
bypass authentication, obtain condential, system compromise) and the branches
representing the ways to achieve the goal. Two connection types, OR and AND,
are used to connect multiple child nodes with their parent node. OR means that
the goal can be reached if any one of the subgoals is reached, whereas AND means
that the goal can be reached only if all subgoals are reached. Some attributes (for
example, descriptive intrusion information [6], boolean value [97]) can be assigned
on the node. In this thesis, we will term such a basic attack tree as conventional
attack tree (CAT) to dierentiate it from further extensions. Figure 3.4 displays an
example conventional attack tree. The example abstracted CAT has 5 leaf nodes,
3 intermediate subgoals and 1 root node, but, does not a particular computer
network intrusion and assigning any node attributes.
3.2.3 Extensions of Attack Tree
As one of the critical security analysis and modelling tools, CAT has been built on
to produce extensions in order to provide exibility and adaptability with more
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precise information. Generally, these extensions can be classied into three main
categories: (1) functional extension; (2) computational extension; and (3) hybrid.
The main purpose of the rst category is to enlarge the modelling capability and
augment the modelling functionality with extra information for CAT. The key
goal of the second category is to compute and measure the relevant attack de-
cision making from the view of the adversary. In the last category, CAT had been
combined with other modelling methods together as a hybrid method. Part of our
discussion here has appeared in [117].
Functional Extensions
The functional extensions proposed in the literature for the forensic analysis
and the intrusion countermeasure analysis.
Augmented Attack Tree (AAT) [91, 92] modelling technique was originally
proposed for the computer attack forensic purpose with top-down investigation.
It extends CAT with extra attack modelling capability on the tree edges by asso-
ciating the tree branches with a sequence of malicious operations that could have
been implemented in the attack.
Besides CAT and AAT, there are several extensions specialised to provide cor-
responding countermeasures against attacks into the modelled tree structure in
order to protect the system. Defence Tree (DT) [13] provides a set of attack
countermeasures on each leaf node. The provided countermeasures represent the
possible threat mitigation of the specic vulnerability scenario. Attack Counter-
measure Tree (ACT) [96] provides a similar attack countermeasure mechanism as
Defence Tree does, but ACT oers countermeasures at every tree nodes instead
of only the leaf nodes. There are three distinct types of nodes in ACT: attack
event node, detection event node and mitigation event node. Attack-Response
Tree (ART) [131] denes and analyses the possible vulnerabilities to compromise
a system and the possible response actions against attacks. In ART, every leaf
node represents a specic vulnerability exploitation attempt by the attacker, while
the root node represents the security property. The consequence nodes in ART
are tagged by the response box that represents countermeasure actions. Attack-
Defense Tree (ADTree) [49] describes the attack actions an attacker can take to
compromise the system and the defense actions that a defender can employ to
protect the system. A node in ADTree could be an attack node or a defense node.
Each node may also have one additional child node representing a countermeas-
ure. The node of Protection Tree (PT) [31] contains four metrics: probability,
cost, impact and risk. With the run-time obtained metrics value, PT ensures the
limited resources are consumed to achieve the highest probability to stop an attack
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successfully.
Computational Extensions
Most attack tree research applies the essential modelling nature of attack tree
to model dierent security scenario, and additionally with the aforementioned in-
trusion countermeasures to analyse the security of system. Few pay attention to
the comprehensive computation studies for the whole generated attack tree ana-
lysis, but simply apply conjunctive and disjunctive decompositions or any possible
metrics aggregation approaches, which will be discussed in Section 3.5.
The substantial computational based extensions for the entire tree analysis
are given in [18, 44, 45, 46]. Generally, the modelled attack tree investigates
the possible attack option combinations from the view of the adversary to study
the adversary's decision making process in order to predict and execute the most
protable intrusion. The analysis process particularly considers the cost-and-gain
relation in terms of the monetary cost of intrusion, the monetary gain of intrusion
and the monetary penalty once caught, and further with any probabilities like
the likelihood of successful intrusion, the probability of being detected and the
probability of being caught.
The basic Multi-Parameter Attack Tree (MPAT) computation [18] has intro-
duced the idea of game-theoretic modelling associated with the aforementioned
parameters. Then, the proposed basic computation had been expanded by provid-
ing estimated parameter values [44] and exact parameter values [45]. Moreover,
the Serial Attack Tree (SAT) model [46] extends the classic parallel attack tree
model with the temporal order of the elementary attacks. The main advantage
of serial attack tree model is to provide the exibility to model the adversary's
behaviour more accurately and reality, for example, the skipping of elementary
intrusions. In addition, SAT computes the better expected outcomes of the ad-
versary.
Hybrid
In order to enrich the attack modelling capability, some additional modelling
techniques have been combined with the attack tree into a more comprehensive
modelling mechanism.
Misuse cases, derived from Unied Modelling Language (UML) use cases, de-
scribe the actions that may harm the system. In [110], misuse cases are applied
together with the attack tree and linked to model the detailed security activity
and analyse the system security requirements to achieve threat mitigation during
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the software development lifecycle.
3.2.4 Attack Tree and Intrusion Detection
Besides the modelling capability, attack tree modelling technique had been applied
to assist the process of intrusion detection in both indirect and direct forms.
In the former, the intrusion detection related analyses are conducted to provide
intrusion information and detection information to facilitate the intrusion detec-
tion process. Usually, the attack tree modelling technique generates the attack
pattern or attack process information (for example, automatic attack pattern gen-
eration [126], causal attack plan [90], and threat damage evaluation [93]) for in-
trusion detection.
In the latter form, the constructed attack tree provides the intrusion detection
roadmap, which enables the detector to detect the high-level intrusions according
to the modelled attack tree. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is little
work that applies the attack tree technique to directly implement the intrusion
detection process based on the constructed framework of an attack tree. [19] is the
only work relating to that direction. In [19], enhanced attack tree (EAT) had been
utilised to perform the intrusion detection of complex attacks for 802.11 WLAN
with the Nondeterministic Finite Enhanced Tree Automaton (NFETA) technique
and tree automaton to achieve the tree structure update.
3.3 Node Connectors
In the attack tree modelling technique, the nodes are usually connected with con-
necters based on logical relations such as conjunctive (also known as AND) and
disjunctive (also known as OR). Besides the typical AND and OR connectors,
there are some advanced node connectors. We summarise and classify these ad-
vanced node connectors into the following two categories: Order Based Connector
and Threshold Based Connector, respectively.
3.3.1 Order Based Connectors
The Order Based Connectors (OBC) are subdivided into Priority Based Order
Connector and Time Based Order Connector according to the specied sequences.
Usually, the order based connectors are implemented based on the conjunctive
decomposition.
 Priority Based Order Connector (PBOC). PBOC represents that the parent
node can be achieved only if all the child nodes are accomplished in a priority
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order, from the highest priority one to the lowest priority one.
Figure 3.5(a) shows a sample PBOC connector with one parent node PN
(attack goal) and three child nodes (sub-goals) CN1, CN2 and CN3. The
corresponding priority level on these child nodes are P3 (the lowest priority),
P1 (the highest priority) and P2 (the medium priority), respectively. Since
the priority levels are P1! P2! P3, the child nodes must be accomplished
in the sequence of CN2 ! CN3 ! CN1 by following exactly that priority
levels. Priority-AND (PAND) [17, 48] obeys this kind of order.
Note that, it is possible that multiple child nodes are attributed with the
same priority level. In that case, it is suggested to apply the rst come, rst
achieve principle on those equal-priority nodes.
PN
CN1 CN2 CN3
PBOC
P1 P2P3
(a) Priority Based Order Connector
PN
CN1 CN2 CN3
TBOC
T3 T1T2
(b) Time Based Order Connector
Figure 3.5: Sample Attack Trees with Order based Connectors
 Time Based Order Connector (TBOC). TBOC represents that the parent
node can be achieved only if all the child nodes are accomplished in a pre-
dened time sequence manner.
Figure 3.5(b) illustrates a sample TBOC connector with one parent node
PN (attack goal) and three child nodes (sub-goals) CN1, CN2 and CN3.
The corresponding timed achievement sequence on three child nodes are T2
(timed second achievement), T3 (timed last achievement) and T1 (timed rst
achievement), respectively. According to the time order T1 ! T2 ! T3,
the child nodes are accomplished with the CN3 ! CN1 ! CN2 sequence.
Ordered-AND (O-AND) [19] and Sequence Enforcing (SEQ) [48] are known
extended connectors applying this time based order mechanism.
Practically, POBC and TOBC share some similarities since both of them follow
the dened sequences. In POBC, the priority sequence requests that the highest
priority level child node be achieved rst, whereas the lowest priority level child
node be achieved last. It is possible to view that the timed rst achieved child
node has the top priority, whereas the timed last achieved child node has the least
CHAPTER 3. ATTACK MODELLING APPROACHES 42
priority as in TOBC. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that POBC and TOBC
are similar connectors but focus on dierent views.
3.3.2 Threshold Based Connectors
Threshold Based Connector (TBC) determines the number of accomplished child
nodes for the successful accomplishment of the parent node according to the pre-
dened threshold. However, TBC concentrates on the threshold satisfaction of the
number of achieved child nodes without the determination on which nodes need to
be achieved. The threshold can be further classied into amount based threshold
and weight based threshold.
PN
CN1 CN2 CN3
TBC2/3
(a) Amount Based Threshold
PN
CN1 CN2 CN3
TBC
W1 W2 W3
W=0.6
(b) Weight Based Threshold
Figure 3.6: Sample Attack Trees with Threshold based Connectors
Table 3.1: Truth Table of Sample Attack Trees with Threshold Based Connector
Child1 Child2 Child3
Amount Based Threshold Weight Based Threshold
TA Parent TW Parent
F F F 2 F 0.6 F
F F T 2 F 0.6 F
F T F 2 F 0.6 F
T F F 2 F 0.6 F
F T T 2 T 0.6 T
T F T 2 T 0.6 T
T T F 2 T 0.6 F
T T T 2 T 0.6 T
 Amount based threshold. Amount based threshold makes the connector de-
termine the minimum quantity of achieved child nodes to accomplish the
parent node. The amount based threshold connector is also known as K-out-
of-N (K=N) [48]. Figure 3.6(a) displays a sample attack tree with three child
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nodes (CN1, CN2 and CN3) and one parent node (PN), where the node de-
composition is a 2-out-of-3 threshold connector. In this model, the amount
of child nodes is 3 and the threshold value is 2. Typically, the parent node
can be achieved if more than 2 child nodes have been accomplished. The
truth table of the sampled 2-out-of-3 threshold based connector is given in
Table 3.1 with three child node columns (Child1, Child2 and Child3), one
threshold value column TA and one parent node column Parent within the
Amount Based Threshold column set. The symbol T indicates the achieved
node, whereas the symbol F indicates the unachieved node.
Note that K=N has two special cases. K=N is equivalent to OR decompos-
ition if the dened threshold value is one. Meanwhile, K=N is equivalent to
AND decomposition if the dened threshold value equals to the amount of
all child nodes.
 Weight based threshold. Weight based threshold determines the probabilistic
threshold as the number of child nodes that need be satised for the parent
node accomplishment. For this weight based connector, weight components
Wi (i is the index of child nodes) must satisfy the following two conditions:
(1) 0Wi1 and (2)
Pn
i=1Wi=1, where n is the total number of child nodes.
As each child node had been individually assigned one weight probability,
the number of child nodes is determined by accumulating the achieved child
nodes' weights together. Once the accumulated value exceeds the threshold,
the number of accomplished child nodes is determined.
Figure 3.6(b) illustrates a WBC connected sample attack tree with one par-
ent node (PN) and three child nodes (CN1, CN2 and CN3). Each child node
has been assigned with their own weight, W1 of CN1 is 0.2, W2 of CN2 is
0.3 and W3 of CN3 is 0.5. The threshold value is set as 0.6. The Weight
Based Threshold column set with TW and Parent on Table 3.1 shows the
truth values of this sample.
3.4 Node Metrics
Metrics are a good way to assess the security risk of a computer network. In
the attack graph and attack tree modelling techniques, metrics have been widely
applied to measure the real-time security status and the on-going intrusion process
of the node. In order to appropriately dene metrics in an attack graph and an
attack tree, ve principles [121] have been suggested as follows: (1) the metric
value assignment should be based on specic, unambiguous interpretations rather
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than abstract and meaningless rules ; (2) the metrics should take into consideration
all the information that may be relevant to its potential application; (3) the metrics
should at the same time leave to users the decisions that cannot be automated with
unambiguous rules ; (4) measuring hosts as collections of vulnerabilities, instead
of as the combination of hardware/software congurations ; (5) the outcome of the
metrics should enable its application to make an immediate decision.
No matter what principles have been suggested, generally, there are two main
approaches to apply metrics in attack graph and attack tree: (1) a global metric
concludes the general security for the overview; (2) multiple metrics elaborate the
relevant aspects for the detail.
The rst group assesses the risk by the only metric directly. The Attack Like-
lihood [83] metric quanties the risk probability with the initial uncertain input
values by the consistent computing based on the node of the attack graph. The
k-Zero Day Safety [122] metric assesses the network security risk against the un-
known attacks by counting the number of needed unknown vulnerabilities on the
attack graph to compromise a network asset. Attack Probability [91] is dened as
the probability to measure how far the adversary has progressed towards achiev-
ing the ultimate goal in terms of the least eort along the attack path in AAT by
counting the number of achieved nodes as well.
In the second group, the obtained metrics represent the particularly dened
information, and, these metrics need to be further processed by extra aggregation
or fusion manipulations, for example the IDS alert-based metrics were fused by
Dempster-Shafer theory to assess the risk of intrusion scenarios [75].
In the attack graph and the attack tree, most of the proposed node metrics
can be summarised into two groups: (1) the generically dened metrics and (2)
the specically dened metrics.
3.4.1 Generically Dened Node Metrics
The generically dened metrics are generic without the explicit representations to
any specied aspects. They are usually applied to examine the overall security of
the system. There are two main kinds of metrics to assist the analysis execution,
namely, attack resistance metric and attack probability metric.
Attack Resistance Metrics
Attack resistance metrics on attack graph or attack tree have abstractly been
dened as conditions to represent dierent concepts and issues to achieve the
attack and quantify potential attacks [120]. Attack resistance metrics are intuitive
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properties derived from common sense. In addition, they assess and compare the
security of dierent network congurations according to the constructed attack
graph and attack tree.
Attack resistance metrics have been applied to study the metric aggrega-
tion [120], which will be discussed in Section 3.5, and [124].
Attack Probability Metrics
Attack probability metrics on attack graph or attack tree have been dened
to represent the likelihood that all the required conditions are accomplished to
achieve the parent node, and the probability of any node transitions (intrusions)
being executed.
Attack probability metrics have been applied to investigate the probability
aggregation to determine the probability of the root node achievement [119]. The
aggregation is described in Section 3.5.
3.4.2 Specically Dened Node Metrics
The explicitly dened node metrics have specied any particular meanings for
each metric. With the specic state information within attack graph or attack
tree, these node metrics are usually known as node attributes.
Attack graph and attack tree can not only capture the steps of attack on
the constructed attack roadmap, but also represent and calculate risks, cost or
weighting [101]. In CAT, Schneier [97] had dened that node metrics can be as-
signed with either boolean or continuous values. The raw value of those explicitly
dened node metrics are assigned at the leaf nodes. The metrics of upper nodes
are obtained through the propagation of pre-dened mathematical calculation.
With the assistance of metrics, attack tree provides the ability to describe the full
complexity of the attacker's decision-making process. Besides those original node
attributes, there are several extra node metrics applied in attack tree modelling.
In the terms of usage, we classify those attributes into two main categories, attack
metrics and victim system metrics. Meanwhile, the attack metrics are subdivided
into two sub-categories, attack accomplishment metrics and attack evaluation met-
rics. The general metrics in each group are stated as follows.
Attack Accomplishment Metrics
Attack accomplishment metrics examine the real-time attack procedure in-
formation on the current node. They describe the temporal dependencies between
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attack graph/tree nodes, expiration of an attack, and the attack success probab-
ility.
 Time-To-Live (TTL). TTL [19] denes the lifetime for attack actions at
attack tree nodes. With the regulation of TTL, the adversary needs to
nalize the attack within the TTL specied period. If more than TTL time
has elapsed since the node accomplished, the intrusion must be expired and
be implemented again.
 Attack Level (AL) and Attack Probability (AP). AL and AP [19] dene the
level and the percentage of whole constructed attack paths on the attack
roadmap when any particular nodes have been accomplished. As attack
graph/tree usually models the multi-step attack process, AL and AP as-
sist in the measurement of the distance between the current node and the
ultimate root node by examining the latest accomplished node. AL calcu-
lation assumes each attack action has equal diculty and weight, whereas
AP calculation denes each attack action with dierent diculty and weight
according to the statistical analysis. Through the statistical analysis, the ac-
tions generated more often are assumed as easier to be accomplished. From
the standpoint of security analyst, AL and AP reveal the on-going progress
against the predened intrusion roadmap to any particular ultimate goals,
and both AL and AP can be used to establish an early warning system
against intrusions.
 Attack Success Probability (ASP). ASP [18, 31, 44, 45] indicates the likeli-
hood to successfully execute an attack action and accomplish one particular
node. From the standpoint of the adversary [44, 45], ASP represents the
intrusion capability and the condence of the adversary in terms of probab-
ility.
Attack Evaluation Metrics
Attack evaluation metrics are associated with each of the nodes in the attack
tree to analyse and evaluate attacks.
 Monetary Cost (MC ).MC [18, 31, 44, 114] indicates the money cost of man-
hour to achieve the subgoal during the whole attack procedure. Besides the
basic cost to conduct the intrusion, monetary based penalty [44, 45] had
been considered to pay the ne once the intrusion had been caught by the
defender.
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 Impact (I ). I [31] indicates how serious the damage is, that is caused by the
intrusion to the system. The impact has been dened as the numeric set
I 2 [1,2, . . . , 10] [31] to represent the harmful level of the intrusion to the
system.
 Risk (R). R [31] indicates how risky the intrusion is. The exploitability,
the dependency and the potential damage [11] have been utilised to assess
the risk. The exploitability is associated to each vulnerability to measure
the likelihood that the vulnerability may be successfully used against the
security of the system. The dependency is identied between the enabling
vulnerabilities of the former and the latter attacks. The damage potential
measures the ability to damage as the number of the aected users times
the average number of days the aected service is unavailable.
Victim System Metrics
Victim system metrics describe the attack information relating to the victim
system on the attack tree node. It is possible that dierent properties of computer
network system may aect dierent ways for an adversary to compromise the
victim [29].
Several network properties such as System Vulnerability (SV), Network Con-
guration (NC), System Conguration (SC) and Access Privilege (APr) have been
applied as the attack tree node attributes. SVs are already reported vulnerabilit-
ies from some well-known security databases (like Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS)). NC is the related network information (for example, open port,
unsafe rewall conguration). SC may include any information about data ac-
cessibility, unsafe default conguration, or read-write permission in le structures.
AP includes user account, guest account and root account.
3.5 Metric Aggregation Approaches
Relevant to the computational aspects on the attack graph and attack tree, the ag-
gregation approaches provide the relevant mechanisms to aggregate metric values
from dierent nodes on the attack graph and attack tree.
Compared with the node connectors of attack tree, the metric aggregater shares
similar background principle, as both of them fuse the provided multiple element-
ary values into the single one.
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3.5.1 Possible Aggregaters
The fundamental possible approaches include Min, Max, Multiply, Weighted 
sum and Average [88], which are some common logical computations. In order
to formalize these aggregation approaches, the following denitions are given to
assist the sematic representations of metric aggregations by borrowing the ideas
from [88] and [92].
Denition 5 Elementary Node. An elementary node E is an attack graph/tree
node, which attributes with n dierent metrics Mi (i 2 [1, 2, : : :, n]) to signify one
set of arguments to the aggregater.
Denition 6 Observed Node. An observed node O is an attack graph/tree
node, which is under the processing of aggregation with at least two elementary
nodes Es.
Denition 7 Aggregation. An aggregation is a process to combine the same
kind of metric values MEi from multiple Eis (i 2 [1, 2, : : :, n]) into O as MO with
the selected aggregater.
The formalisations of fundamental aggregation approaches are stated as fol-
lows.
 Min. TheMin aggregater provides the function to select the single minimal
metric value from the number of n nodes as the aggregation result.
MO = min(ME1 ;ME2 ; : : : ;MEn) (3.1)
 Max. The Max aggregater provides the function to select the single max-
imal metric value from the number of n nodes as the aggregation result.
MO = max(ME1 ;ME2 ; : : : ;MEn) (3.2)
 Addition. The Addition aggregater provides the function to aggregate the
same type of metrics from all number of n nodes by summing each single
metric on all n nodes.
MO =ME1 +ME2 + : : :+MEn (3.3)
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 Multiplication. The Multiplication aggregater provides the function to
aggregate the same type of metrics from all number of n nodes by multiplying
each single metric on all n nodes.
MO =ME1 ME2  : : :MEn (3.4)
 Weighted-Sum. TheWeighted Sum aggregater provides the function to
aggregate the same type of metrics from all number of n nodes with dierent
node weight value into the single one. Note that the summation of weight
on all Es equals to 1.
MO =
nX
i=1
(wi MEi); where
nX
i=1
wi = 1 (3.5)
 Average. The Average aggregater provides the function to aggregate the
same type of metrics from all number of n nodes into the single mean one.
MO =
ME1 +ME2 + : : :+MEn
n
(3.6)
3.5.2 Cumulative Aggregations
Besides the aforementioned fundamental aggregaters, there are several advanced
aggregation approaches [119, 120] particularly proposed based on attack graph
by cumulating either the real number or the probability from the attack graph
elements.
Attack Resistance Aggregation
In the attack graph [120], the attack resistance has been presented to assess
the security of network congurations, especially on the graph exploits (nodes E
and O). The resistance of an attack is interpreted as the eort that an adversary
requires to put in until the target is compromised. In order to aggregate the
attack resistance metrics, two types of aggregaters, denoted as _ and ^, represent
disjunctive and conjunctive dependency relationships between exploits with the
ideas of series and parallel circuits theory.
Generally, there are two possible scenarios how node relates with another: (1)
the parent node has only one child node; and (2) the parent node has more than
two child nodes. For the rst scenario, the aggregation principle is based on the
series circuits theory by adding each attack resistance metric together in sequence.
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For the second, the aggregation principle is based on the parallel circuits theory
by adding the reciprocals of the attack resistance metrics.
r represents the individual resistance of an exploit, whereas R represents the
cumulative resistance of an exploit from the corresponding exploits. The main
task of R in aggregating attack resistance metrics is to aggregate the individual
resistance r on both E and O by applying either _ or ^. The cumulative resistance
of each attack goal provides a quantitative measure as how likely that attack goal
can be achieved, or equivalently, how vulnerable the corresponding resource is
under a given network conguration.
The aggregater ^ is simply the summation of metric values. Equation (3.7)
represents the aggregation of conjunctive with both E and O. The aggregater _
represents the reciprocal of the sum of the reciprocal of individual metric values.
Equation (3.8) illustrates the disjunctive aggregation with E and O.
RO(rE1 ^ rE2 ^ : : : ^ rEn) =
nX
i=1
rEi + rO (3.7)
RO(rE1 _ rE2 _ : : : _ rEn) =
1
rE1
+
1
rE2
+ : : :+
1
rEn
+ rO (3.8)
Attack Probabilistic Aggregation
The cumulative attack probabilistic score of a given goal condition thus indic-
ates the likelihood that a corresponding resource will be compromised during an
attack, or equivalently, among all adversaries attacking the given network over a
given time period, the average fraction of adversaries who will successfully com-
promise the resource [119].
Two probabilities have been associated with exploit e and condition c: indi-
vidual score p(e) and p(c); and cumulative score P (e) and P (c). The individual
score p(e) stands for the intrinsic likelihood of an exploit e being executed, given
that all the conditions required for executing e in the given attack graph are
already satised. The cumulative scores P (e) and P (c) measure the overall likeli-
hood that an adversary can successfully either reach and execute the exploit e or
satisfy the condition c in the given attack graph.
In addition, the cumulative attack probabilistic aggregation takes into ac-
count the causal relationships between exploits e and conditions c in the attack
graph [119]. Rr indicates the relation which represents condition c causing exploit
e, whereas Ri indicates the relation which represents exploit e causing condition c.
Equation (3.9) and Equation (3.10) show the cumulative probabilistic aggregations
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on exploit e and condition c in the attack graph.
P (e) = p(e)
Y
c2Rr(e)
P (c) (3.9)
P (c) =
8<:p(c) if Ri(c) = ;p(e1) + p(e2)  p(e1) p(e2) if Ri(c) 6= ; (3.10)
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, the states of the art in attack graph and attack tree modelling
techniques are summarised. The attack graph has seen a fair amount of research
but it had been limited for the security analysis on large network systems due
to the computational complexity. The attack tree, which is a subset of attack
graph, has been developed with the moderate amount on the theoretically security
analysis, but lacks of practical applications or concrete results. Then, the known
node connectors, node metrics, possible metric aggregation approaches and their
extensions have been investigated and discussed.
With many dierent extensions having been proposed based on attack trees, it
is important to summarise these extensions into a unied attack tree framework
and locate the potential extension points for a new attack tree in Chapter 5. In the
next chapter, the Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree and the attack resistance
metrics aggregation within attack tree are presented.
Chapter 4
Unied Parametrisable Attack
Tree
This chapter presents the unication of dierent ways in which parameters of an
attack tree may be extended, notably: node attribute, edge augmentation and
connector type. In formally describing the elements of the tree, a better overview
of the relationship between the tree elements can be appreciated.
This generic attack tree structure is termed as Unied Parametrisable Attack
Tree (UPAT). With UPAT, any of the CAT based extensions (such as tree struc-
ture extensions and computational extensions) can generally fall in the scope of
parameter settings.
The remainder of this chapter is written as follows. Firstly, section 4.1 presents
the formalisation of the conventional attack tree with elementary components.
Then, Section 4.2 describes the denitions of unied parameters for conventional
attack tree in order to extend it into a unied parametrisable attack tree formalized
in Section 4.3. Next, Section 4.4 presents the attack resistance aggregation in
attack tree. Finally, the summary of this chapter is given in Section 4.5.
4.1 Formalisation of Conventional Attack Tree
Although the attack tree has been studied for over a decade, few results formally
propose a solid and complete attack tree formalisation with a theoretical found-
ation analysis. Although aimed to extend Schneier's informally described attack
tree [97], Mauw and Oostdijk's proposed attack tree formalisation [71] is unable
to represent the essence of a conventional attack tree.
The formalisation [71] denes a parent node connecting to a multi-set of child
nodes viewed as a bundle, which ignores the internal structure within the attack
tree. But in CAT, it is important not only to identify the conjunctive and dis-
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junctive connections between multiple nodes, but also to determine the amount
of connected child nodes to each parent node. In addition, the formalisation [71]
denes that one child node can connect to more than one parent node causing dir-
ected cycles, which is more analogues to attack graphs rather than attack trees.
In order to provide a general and complete attack tree formalisation, we pro-
pose a formalisation to represent CAT with all of the possible attack tree com-
ponents, namely, nodes, edges, connectors and attributes.
Denition 8 Conventional Attack Tree. A Conventional Attack Tree (CAT)
is a rooted tree denoted by AT = hN ; E ; C;Ai, where
 N is the set of nodes in the tree representing the dierent states of partial
compromise or sub-goals that an adversary needs to move through in order
to fully compromise a system, such that for the two subsets leafNodes  N
and internalNodes  N , we have
 leafNodes [ internalNodes = N and,
 leafNodes \ internalNodes = ; and,
 v0 2 N is the root and represents the ultimate intrusion goal of ad-
versary.
 E  N  N is the set of edges in the attack tree. An edge hu; vi 2 E
represents the state transition (emergent) from a child node v (and incident)
to a parent node u, where u; v 2 N .
 C is a set of tuples of the form hu; nodeConnectori where
 u 2 internalNodes and,
 nodeConnector 2 fAND;ORg, where the denitions are given in Den-
ition 9 and Denition 10.
 A is a set of tuples of the form hu; nodeAttributei where
 u 2 N and,
 nodeAttribute 2 fbooleanvalueAttribute; continuousvalueAttributeg, where
the denitions are given in Denition 11 and Denition 12.
Denition 9 AND Connector. A node u 2 internalNodes has an AND connector
if all linked child nodes vi incident to the parent node are connected by the AND
connector, or there is exactly one edge incident to the node.
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Denition 10 OR Connector. A node u 2 internalNodes has an OR connector
if all linked child nodes vi incident to the parent node are connected by the OR
connector.
Denition 11 booleanvalueAttribute Attribute. A node u 2 internalNodes has
a booleanvalueAttribute attribute if it is a boolean value.
Denition 12 continuousvalueAttribute Attribute. A node u 2 internalNodes
has a continuousvalueAttribute attribute if it is a continuous value.
4.2 Unied Parameters
As already described in Section 3.2.3, Section 3.3 and Section 3.4, it is known that
most attack tree extensions focus on the structural expansions such as adding
advanced connectors into the attack tree, or appending additional attributes on
nodes within the attack tree. Hence, three parameters are dened to generally rep-
resent the types of extension parameters, namely, edge, connector and attribute,
respectively, as the unied attack tree inputs.
Past literature [91, 92] has considered edge extensions to the conventional
attack tree. For this purpose, we have the following denitions.
Denition 13 Edge Parameter. eParam is assigned a boolean value, i.e. eParam 2
f0; 1g to determine whether to augment the edge within the attack tree. eParam = 0
denotes that the edge is devoid of augmentation, while eParam = 1 denotes that
the edge is augmented with tuples hLabel; SIGu;vi as per Denition 16.
The connector parameter cParam denotes dierent types of connectors includ-
ing both classic AND and OR decompositions or any advanced connectors (that is,
order based connector, threshold based connector) on any particular nodes within
the attack tree.
Denition 14 Connector Parameter. cParam is assigned with an integer
value, i.e. cParam 2 f1; 2; : : : ; pg where: each integer denotes an index to a par-
ticular connector type, and p is the maximum index number of connectors to select
a particular connector on one parent node. The possible connectors may be the
ones aforementioned in Section 3.3.
The node attribute parameter nParam indicates possible attributes assigned to
any particular nodes within the attack tree.
Denition 15 Node Attribute Parameter. nParam is assigned with the tuples
hn;AttrIDi, where: n denotes the number of desired node attributes and AttrID
denotes the index of a particular attribute type. The possible attributes may be the
metrics aforementioned in Section 3.4.
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4.3 Formalisation of Unied Parametrisable
Attack Tree
The main purpose of UPAT is to serve as a general framework for attack tree based
extensions. As modern computer network intrusions increase in the sophistication,
UPAT could capture tree extensions to CAT that split an attack into multiple
fractions as denoted incidents [91, 92]. In addition, the formalisation of UPAT
can be expressed by expanding the formalisation of CAT with three parameters
eParam, cParam and nParam on the corresponding tree components.
Denition 16 Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree. A unied parametris-
able attack tree (UPAT) is a rooted labelled tree given by UPAT = hN ; E ; C;Ai,
where
 N is a nite set of nodes in the tree representing the dierent states of
partial compromise or sub-goals that an attacker needs to move through in
order to fully compromise a system.  2 N is a special node, distinguished
from others, that forms the root of the tree. It represents the ultimate goal
of the attacker, namely system compromise. The set N can be partitioned
into two subsets, leafNodes and internalNodes, such that
 leafNodes S internalNodes=N and,
 leafNodes T internalNodes=; and,
  2 internalNodes.
 E is the set of edges in the attack tree. An edge hu; v; eParami 2 E denes
an atomic attack, as per Denition 17, and represents the state transition
(emergent) from a child node v (and incident) to a parent node u, where
u; v 2 N . While, eParam determines the edge augmentation as dened in
Denition 13.
 C is a set of node connector tuples of the form hu; cParam; nodeConnectori
such that
 u 2 internalNodes and,
 cParam, as Denition 14, determines the particular connector choice of
one node, and,
 nodeConnector 2 fOBC, TBC, ORg, where OBC and TBC are given
in Denitions 19 and 20.
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 A is a set of node attribute tuples of the form hu; nParam; nodeAttributei,
where
 u 2 N and,
 nParam, as Denition 15, determines the node attributes information,
and,
 nodeAttribute 2 fbooleanvalueAttribute; continuousvalueAttributeg.
Denition 17 Atomic Attack. An atomic attack is a combination of n (n 
1) incidents (incident1, incident2, : : :, incidentn) with a particular order. The
occurrence of an atomic attack contributes towards the state transition in the attack
tree.
Denition 18 Incident. An incident is a basic benign or malicious action per-
formed by the adversary. The occurrence of a single incident may not contribute
to an attack but taken together leads to an atomic attack.
Denition 19 Order Based Connector. Given a node u of a unied para-
metrisable attack tree such that u 2 internalNodes, the node has an Order Based
Connector (OBC) if all edges incident to the node are connected by the AND
operation but with either the priority based order or the time based order.
Denition 20 Threshold Based Connector. Given a node u of a unied
parametrisable attack tree such that u 2 internalNodes, the node is a Threshold
Based Connector (TBC) if all edges incident to the node are connected by the AND
operation and the parent node is reached by either the amount based threshold or
the weight based threshold.
4.4 Attack Resistance Attribution
Attack trees have been applied to model diverse security systems in dierent set-
tings [19, 29, 45, 72, 129]. In a parallel direction, work has also been dedicated
to enriching the attack tree technique itself. Some notable works consider: dier-
ent node connectors; node attribution; multi-attribute (or parameter) nodes; and
augmented edges [17, 18, 19, 44, 45, 71, 92, 107].
In this section, we revisit the notion of attack tree attribution, that is, how
explicit attribute values of child nodes are aggregated to form the attribute of the
parent node, and present a novel attribution approach. We use this attribution
within the context of analysing the weakest links of security systems; and thereby
demonstrate how the weakest link may not necessarily always be so, instead it
depends on the existence of other stronger links.
CHAPTER 4. UNIFIED PARAMETRISABLE ATTACK TREE 57
4.4.1 Attribution
The attribution at a parent node u with a connector 2 fAND;ORg is the function
f connectoru : N n ! RE taking as input all the n child nodes v1; : : : ; vn 2 N of u and
outputting an eective attribute value Ru 2 RE .
The specic instantiations of this attribution operation is parametrised by the
type of combining operation of the parent node.
Denition 21 Attribution for AND Connector Node. For some n child
nodes v1; : : : ; vn of parent node u, we dene the attribution operation for the AND
connector parent node u as the mathematical summation of the attributes Ri (for
i = 1 : : : n) of all child nodes. More precisely, the output of this attribution is the
eective resistance of these n child nodes that will lead to the parent node u, and
is dened as
fANDu (v1; : : : ; vn) = R
AND
u =
nX
i=1
Ri: (4.1)
Denition 22 Attribution for OR Connector Node. For some n child
nodes v1; : : : ; vn of parent node u, we dene the attribution operation for the OR
connector parent node u to be
fORu (v1; : : : ; vn) = R
OR
u =
1
1
R1
+ 1
R2
+   + 1
Rn
: (4.2)
Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2) are inspired from the eld of electrical cir-
cuit analysis for eective electrical resistance across series and parallel circuits
respectively. For AND connector, the adversary needs to fulll all child nodes
before achieving the parent node, hence the overall resistance of the system up to
that point of abstraction (represented by the parent node) is the summation of
individual resistances of each child node. For OR connector, the adversary only
needs to fulll any child node in order to achieve the parent node.
So it is clear that the AND and OR attributions as dened in Equation (4.1)
and Equation (4.2) capture the `all' and `any' requirements that an AND and/or
OR connector dictates; that is, for any n and some parent node u with n child
nodes vi of resistance Ri (i = 1 : : : n), it is always the case that f
AND
u (v1; : : : ; vn) >
fORu (v1; : : : ; vn).
It turns out that these two attribution equations intuitively capture an ad-
versary's view of his attack options in terms of ease (or resistance) with which to
achieve the goal represented by the parent node.
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To see why Equation (4.2) intuitively models the adversary's options in this
context and why existence of options aects the overall eective resistance of a
system to attacks, we revisit the weakest link principle with regards to a system's
strength against attacks.
4.4.2 Case Study: Analysis of the Weakest Link
For a security system composed of n components, each can be seen as a link
within a security chain that represents the overall resistance of the entire system
against attacks. Then the overall resistance of the system and its reliance on the
individual security of each component can be described by an attack tree having a
parent node whose attribute represents the overall resistance of the system, while
its n children nodes each represents one of the links connected together via an OR
connector. This models the fact that a system is only as strong as its weakest link.
In more detail, for some n child nodes v1; : : : ; vn of an OR connector parent u,
the node vw for w 2 f1; : : : ; ng is said to be the weakest node if Rw = min(RE)
where RE = fR1; : : : ; Rng denotes the set of n resistances corresponding to the
n nodes. Clearly, the weakest node is considered the weakest link to the security
of the parent node because if the adversary decides to target this node vw, this
would lead to achieving the parent node with the least resistance, in line with the
weakest link principle.
Going further, Equation (4.2) can be put to good use to analyse the inuence
that the weakest link and other stronger sibling links have on the overall resistance
of the system. More precisely, consider two systems I and II with parent node u,
and where in system I the parent node u has one child node vw with resistance
Rw while in system II the parent node u is an OR connector node that has n + 1
child nodes v1; v2; : : : ; vn; vw where Ri 2 fR1; R2; : : : ; Rng > Rw, for example, vw
is the weakest link. The easiest path for the adversary would be via the weakest
child node vw, thus it appears in both systems that the adversary in this case
meets with the same resistance if he decides to attack the weakest link. This is
evidently demonstrated by conventional attribution methods for the OR connector
for example [97], which is simply the min() function.
Nonetheless, eectively the resistance of the systems against a generic ad-
versary, without presuming on how the adversary behaves, can be computed based
on our attribution denitions above as
RIu = Rw; (4.3)
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RIIu =
1
1
R1
+ 1
R2
+   + 1
Rn
+ 1
Rw
: (4.4)
We then have the following result.
Lemma: The Eect of Being There. For a parent node u with n+1 child nodes
v1; : : : ; vn; vw, the existence of the child nodes v1; : : : ; vn with resistance Ri > Rw
stronger than that of the weakest child node vw =2 fv1; : : : ; vng decreases the eect-
ive attributed resistance of the parent node u.
Proof. Rewrite Equation (4.4) as
RIIu =
1
i6=1Ri+i 6=2Ri++i6=nRi+n1Ri
Rwn1Ri
=
Rw  n1Ri
i6=1Ri +i6=2Ri +   +i 6=nRi +n1Ri
where n1Ri denotes the product of all Ri for i = 1 : : : n and i 6=jRi denotes the
product of all Ri for i = 1 : : : n except for i = j. Rewrite Equation (4.3) as
RIu =
Rw
1
=
Rw  (i 6=1Ri +i6=2Ri +   +i 6=nRi +n1Ri)
i6=1Ri +i 6=2Ri +   +i6=nRi +n1Ri
Comparing the above two equations, it is clear that RIIu < R
I
u. 
For an adversary considering which system to attack, the above lemma justies
that system II is a better choice because although all child nodes other than vw
have stronger resistance than vw, the fact that they exist actually decreases the
eective resistance of system II because there is now more than one way to break
the system, even if the ways other than the easiest (that is, vw) do have higher
resistance.
From the perspective of a system administrator, the above result is counter-
intuitive in the sense that the eect of the weakest link vw cannot be strengthened
by ensuring that all other nodes have a stronger resistance than vw, and this even
if the node vw exists in both systems as the weakest link individually. In fact in the
case of system II, the eective resistance is weakened to a value even below that
of vw. In contrast, such a result cannot be suciently captured by conventional
attribution techniques for the OR connector.
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4.4.3 Concluding Remarks
In this section, we considered the notion of attack trees with node attributes; each
such node attribute denotes the resistance of a system against an attack action
represented by that node. We proposed a novel attribution approach and applied
this within the context of analysing the weakest links of security systems. This
helps to cast the relevance of the weakest link in interaction with other stronger
links to show how their presence impacts the eective security of the entire system.
4.5 Summary
The essential reason to the proposed UPAT is to provide a general framework
for any attack tree based extensions. At rst, the formalisation of CAT had
been described by adapting notions from AAT. Then, several unied parameters
were proposed to represent the extendable elements on the attack tree. Next, the
formalisation of UPAT was presented by embedding the unied parameters into
CAT's formalisation. Finally, the attack resistance attributions of attack tree with
the weakest link analysis are presented.
In the next chapter, a new attack tree will be proposed based on UPAT to
provide the relevant mechanisms to facilitate the intrusion detection process.
Chapter 5
Advanced Attack Detection Tree
Although the attack tree has been widely applied to model and analyse system
security in terms of vulnerabilities and countermeasures, while, the attack tree
had been additionally utilised to conduct the intrusion detection analysis as the
early discussion of this thesis in Section 3.2.4, no previous contribution had been
provided to execute intrusion detection based on a modelled intrusion road map
in conjunction with the real-time intrusion threat analysis on high-level detection
(that is, one aggregated intrusion alarm generated after the multiple relevant ma-
licious network packets been identied), and the detection uncertainty analysis
(that is, the high-level detection process to deal with the uncertainty and the
ignorance when an intrusion detector generates a false detection result).
This chapter presents the proposed mechanisms, which contribute to the func-
tionalities of advanced attack detection tree. First, Section 5.1 proposes three
categories of Quality of Detectability (QoD) metrics. All of these QoD metrics
provide the guarantees of service on the modelled attack tree structure with respect
to the ability of an intrusion detector to detect service-disrupting events caused by
malicious attacks. Then, Section 5.2 describes how the Dempster-Shafer evidence
theory based detection uncertainty analysis mechanism can be used to examine any
uncertainty or ignorance caused during the intrusion detection process. Section 5.3
gives the formalisation of Advanced Attack Detection Tree. Finally, Section 5.4
describes the summary of this chapter.
5.1 Quality of Detectability Metrics
In views that the hidden logics and relations, for example, the causal relation
(one attack step enables another), the temporal relation (one attack step happens
before another), the spatial relation (one attack step relates to another in the
network topology) [67], usually exist in complex attacks involving multiple steps
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between atomic attacks. It is crucial to consider some way of keeping track of
the state of an attack and its corresponding state of intrusion detection. For this
purpose, we propose to consider Quality of Detectability (QoD) metrics.
This section describes three QoD metrics groups: logical steps based QoD met-
rics ML, time based QoD metrics MT , and alert based QoD metrics MA. To
appreciate the detection capability of an IDS protected computer network system
that leverages on the attack tree, it is possible to view the intrusion event occur-
rence logically or along the time axis, denoted as logical steps based QoD metrics
and time based QoD metrics. Both of these are in terms of the sequence of attack
steps between the start of the attack, the actual detection and the end goal of the
attack, which are represented by the nodes of the tree. To investigate the nature
of the raw alerts generated by the intrusion detector, alert based QoD metrics
examine the attack detector's output during the specic atomic attack detection
process in terms of the alert type number, the total counted alert number and the
alert threat level.
5.1.1 Logical Steps Based QoD Metrics
The main concept behind logical steps based QoD metrics ML is to provide the
logical threat level information of the protected target, which is currently facing
the multi-step attack according to the modelled attack tree. It considers the attack
tree node level as the logical step between nodes. The higher value of node level,
the closer the adversary is to achieve the ultimate goal.
A multi-step attack Ac is represented as a sequence of m attack steps faigmi=1,
the culmination of the last attack step, that is, am denotes the achievement of
the attack end goal. In this sense, each attack sequence can be projected into
the corresponding attack path P = hnl; : : : ; ns; : : : ; nri traversed upwards from a
leaf node to the root node via any particular subgoal nodes, represented simply
by the terminal nodes (that is, leaf node nl, root node nr), and any nodes ns
in between. Typically, an attack step is embedding between the corresponding
child node and parent node. Therefore, the number of required attack steps from
start to culmination of attack is simply jP j   1, where j  j denotes the number
of elements in a sequence h: : : i. With this in place, the logical steps based QoD
metrics ML can be dened as follows.
 Steps before Detection (SbD): SbD is dened as the number of attack steps
already achieved on path P 0 (P 0 = hnl; : : : ; ndi) between the leaf node nl
and the currently detected node nd (for d 2 f1; 2; : : : ;mg as the index of the
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currently detected node). The computation of SbD is give as,
SbD = jP 0j   1 (5.1)
SbD logically measures how fast an intrusion detector can discover something
is wrong once an attack sequence is launched, in terms of how many attack
steps have gone past before the detection occurs. The higher value of SbD,
the more risk of the adversary to compromise the victim system.
 Steps to Goal (StG): StG is dened as the number of attack steps not yet
achieved on path P 00 between nd and nr (P 00 = hnd; : : : ; nri). The computa-
tion of SbD is give as,
StG = jP 00j   1 (5.2)
Rather than measuring the eectiveness of an intrusion detector, this is more
of a metric to indicate after an attack detection, how many more steps have
yet to be performed by the adversary before the attack succeeds. The less
value of StG represents the closer to achieve the ultimate goal of intrusion.
 Progress to Goal (PtG): PtG [91] is dened as the probability to measure
how far the adversary has progressed towards achieving the ultimate goal
in terms of the least eort along the attack path in the constructed attack
tree. The computation of PtG is given as
PtG =


(5.3)
where,  denotes the number of actually achieved subgoals moving towards
the ultimate goal, and  denotes the theoretical least eort to achieve the
ultimate goal.
In order to automatically obtain the value of , it is dened that a node u
has k child nodes fvigki=0. The least eort of a child node vi is denoted as
vi . The computation approaches [91] of least eort  are stated as follows:
(1) if u is a leaf node of the modelled attack tree, u 2 leafNodes, then, =0;
(2) if u is an interior node of the modelled attack tree, u 2 internalNodes
and has an conjunctive decomposition, then, the computation approach is
as Equation (5.4); (3) if u is an interior node of the modelled attack tree, u
2 internalNodes and has a disjunctive decomposition, then, the computation
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approach is as Equation (5.5).
 =
kX
i=0
(vi) + k (5.4)
 = min(vi) + 1 (5.5)
5.1.2 Time Based QoD Metrics
Alternatively to viewing the logical steps based QoD metrics along the logical
sequences, analogous metrics can be dened to work along the time axis of the
attack steps (represented as edges within the modelled attack tree). Let ftigmi=0
denote the time sequence corresponding to the attack sequence with the discrete
time steps, thus, t0 denotes the initial time step that the adversary started the
attack actions, t1 denotes the time step that the adversary achieved the rst
attack subgoal, tm denotes the time step at the end goal achievement. Thus, td
(for d 2 f1; 2; : : : ;mg) denotes the time that an attack step ai 2 faigmi=1 is detected
by the applied IDS if it can detect the attack step instantaneously. Note that in
terms of traversing the program of the attack through the constructed attack tree,
a0 would correspond to a leaf node nl and a1 is its parent node, etc. The time
based QoD metrics MT are dened as follows.
 Time to Detect (TtD): TtD measures how fast an intrusion detector can
discover something is wrong once an attack sequence is launched. It is
dened as the dierence between t0 and td:
TtD = td   t0 (5.6)
However, practically, it is not possible to determine t0 from the view of
protection (neither the system administrator nor the intrusion detector can
identify when an adversary has started an attack). Instead, it can be only
measured when an attack activity has been implemented or achieved, that
is, an edge has been traversed, and therefore detected.
W.l.o.g and for simplicity of discussion, the minimum time factor Tmin is
dened as the assumed time cost for each attack step in the attack scenario
corresponding to an attack tree edge that is emergent from a leaf node.
Hence, it is able to compute t0 once t1 is determined by rolling back Tmin,
that is, t0 = t1   Tmin.
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 Time to Current Subgoal (TtCS): TtCS measures how long an intrusion de-
tector had taken to detect the next consecutive attack step after the achieve-
ment of last attack step. TtCS is dened as the dierence between td 1 and
td:
TtCS = td   td 1 (5.7)
It implicitly represents the adversary's attack skill. Typically, a skilless ad-
versary may spend quite a long time to conduct the attack, while a skillful
adversary may execute the attack quickly. On the other hand, the soph-
isticated adversary may wait a long period to implement the consecutive
intrusion steps or slow down the intrusion process to avoid the intrusion
exposure.
 Time to Goal (TtG): TtG is dened as the dierence between td and tm
as Equation (5.8). Rather than measure the eectiveness of an intrusion
detector, it is the metric indicating that, after an attack detection, how
much more minimal time is left before the ultimate attack goal would be
compromised.
TtG = tm   td (5.8)
Similarly, it is also not possible to determine tm (neither system admin-
istrator nor IDS detector can identify when an adversary is expected to
complete an attack). Instead, it can be only determined by calculating the
assumed expected minimal time Tmin in each step with the number of un-
achieved steps to goal StG as Equation (5.9), if all Tmins have the same value
for all steps.
tm = Tmin  StG (5.9)
Alternatively, it is possible that dierent steps may have their own unique
expected minimal time Tmin (for example, Tmin may be short for a single
SQL injection attack, but Tmin may be quite long for a DDoS attack). Thus,
tm can be computed by summing all Tmins of the unachieved attack steps
from step d+ 1 to step m on the attack path (that is, steps to goal StG):
tm =
mX
i=d+1
Tmini (5.10)
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5.1.3 Alert Based QoD Metrics
Besides the tree structure based QoD metrics, an additional group of QoD metrics
is to investigate the possible detected atomic attack information by intrusion de-
tection detector. By providing the possible and essential attack information within
QoD mechanism, it implicitly indicates or predicts the next possibly intrusion step
and the on-going threat from the adversary.
According to Denition 17 and Denition 18 in Section 4.3, an atomic attack
ai is a combination of q types of modelled attack incidents fIjgqj=1.
However, the amount of actual detected attack incident types during one attack
step process may be dierent from the modelled number of incident types, because
the audited data may contain other kinds of un-modelled incident types due to
noise, or, the adversary may be attempting to achieve the subgoal by applying
dierent attack techniques. Let t denotes the number of actual attack incident
types, and fI+jgtj=1 denote the actual detected attack incident types. Let fNjgtj=1
denote the actual detected incident number corresponding to each attack incident
type fI+jgtj=1. The metrics in this category are proposed based on metrics in [75]
and examine the statistical information about the generated alerts of the low-level
incidents. The dened MA metrics are then as follows.
 Number of Alert Types (NAT): NAT is dened as the number of actual IDS
detected incident types within an attack step detection between node nd and
nd 1. The measured NAT means that the attack is in progress to comprom-
ise the subgoal. In addition, NAT provides the basis for the following two
metrics.
NAT = t = jfI+jgtj=1j (5.11)
 Mean Alert Number (MAN): MAN is dened in Equation (5.12) as the av-
erage alerts amount of the actual detected incident types within one attack
step detection. The larger value of measured MAN, the more likely that the
adversary is attempting intrusion, and more possibly DoS/DDoS attack.
MAN =
PNAT
j=1 Nj
NAT
(5.12)
 Mean Alert Severity (MAS): MAS is dened as the average alert severity risk
level of the actual IDS detected incident types within one attack step detec-
tion. The alert severity ASi (for i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; rg) denotes the severity level,
where, AS1 denotes the bottom severity level, ASr denotes the top severity
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level. Note that the value of a single alert severity risk level AS may be ob-
tained from the low-level detector directly, for example three \sig priority"
values (\1" indicates highest risk, whereas \3" indicates least risk) in the
\signature" table of the Snort database. The higher (lower) the MAS level,
the less(more) risk of the intrusion incident.
MAS =
PNAT
j=1 ASi Nj
NAT
; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; rg (5.13)
5.2 Detection Uncertainty Analysis
Most intrusion detector and attack tree modelling research treat alerts and symp-
toms with certainty without doubting the truth behind the alert detectors. In
intrusion detection, the intrusion is considered detected if the identied symp-
toms completely match the predened signature or statistics information. While
in attack tree modelling, the event denoted by an edge, is considered satised if
the prerequisites denoted by incidents forming the edge, are explicitly achieved.
Very little work appear to consider the uncertainty analysis.
Though there are many potential uncertainty issues, as previously discussed
in Section 2.5.2, our proposed detection uncertainty analysis considers the uncer-
tainty of the generated intrusion alerts and the tree edge achievement process.
In order to propose the detection uncertainty analysis within the attack tree,
Dempster-Shafer evidence theory (D-S theory) [98] will be applied to deal with
the uncertainty due to the following reasons: (1) it reects uncertainty or a lack of
complete information; and (2) Dempster's Rule of Combination gives a numerical
procedure to fuse multiple uncertain data as evidence together. Note that D-S
theory has been widely applied in the DIDS related research to fuse the multiple
intrusion alerts from the high-level IDS detectors [21, 123].
In this detection uncertainty analysis mechanism, the main idea is to analyse
how the missed intrusion alerts or the false alerts can eect the modelled attack
tree edge transition based on incidents achievement. Since the intrusion detector
monitors the real-time network trac to examine any malicious attack packets,
it is possible to obtain statistical information denoted as the assessment factors
from alerts generated by the intrusion detector. The assessment factors can be
measured by applying the membership functions, which will be discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2.2. Once a set of assessment factor values have been generated, the next
step is to conduct the basic probability assignment process to determine the belief
on each claimed focal element for one particular observer. Section 5.2.3 explains
the corresponding process in detail. Finally, the Dempster's Rule of Combination
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will be applied to fuse the belief values from multiple observers with two dierent
assessment approaches as discussed in Section 5.2.4 and Section 5.2.5.
5.2.1 Foundation of Dempster-Shafer Evidence Theory
Dempster-Shafer evidence theory allows the explicit representation of ignorance
and uncertainty. Precisely, it is not only \a theory of evidence because it deals with
weights of evidence and with numerical degrees of support based on evidence", but
also \a theory of probable reasoning because it focuses on the fundamental operation
of probable reasoning: the combination of evidence" [98].
The Frame of Discernment  in D-S theory is a nite hypothesis space that
consists of mutually exclusive propositions for which the information sources can
provide evidence. All possible subsets V of  are also called as focal elements.
Equation (5.14) is called a basic probability assignment (bpa) or mass function
m whenever it satises conditions in Equation (5.15) and Equation (5.16). Equa-
tion (5.15) reects the fact that no belief ought to be committed to , where  is
an empty set. While Equation (5.16) reects the convention that one's total belief
has measure one. The value of m(V ) is called V 's basic probability number, and it
measures the belief committed to V .
m : 2 ! [0; 1] (5.14)
m() = 0 (5.15)
X
V
m(V ) = 1 (5.16)
Dempster's Rule of Combination provides a data fusion approach that can
combine dierence pieces of evidence from dierent observers together to obtain
a joint support contribution and can reduce uncertainties simultaneously. The
general rule is given by the combined mass function as Equation (5.17), where
the combination operator
L
is called orthogonal summation. If there are more
than two sets of belief values that need to be fused, the combination process is
expressed as Equation (5.18). Equation (5.19) shows two equivalent computa-
tional approaches based on the dierent intersection between the observers' focal
elements.
m = m1
M
m2 (5.17)
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m = m1
M
m2
M
  
M
mn (5.18)
m(V ) =
PT
Vj=V
Q
1qnmq(Vj)
1 PTVj=Q1qnmq(Vj)
=
PT
Vj=V
Q
1qnmq(Vj)PT
Vj 6=
Q
1qnmq(Vj)
(5.19)
5.2.2 Membership Functions
For our detection uncertainty analysis, three focal elements are dened to determ-
ine the risk of the achievement of the corresponding attack incident. These three
focal elements are: not risk (V1), risk (V2) and uncertain (V3).
All of the elementary membership functions examine the related aspects on
modelled attack tree edge according to the intrusion detector generated alert in-
formation. The generated alert information normally contains the detected attack
information (for example, source information, target information) as requested by
the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [27] and the corres-
ponding statistical information, yet it is dicult to distinguish the evidence from
the genuine and direct source of attack. One of main reasons is that the adversary
may masquerade the content of malicious packet and intrusion detector therefore
identies the attack symptoms without the capability to judge between the genu-
ine or fake malicious packets. Possible measures [75] to overcome this are to count
the number of alerts and retrieve the severity of each alert.
 Alert Amount. The alert amount functions f1 examine the total number
of generated alerts to each single incident type during an edge detection
process. The obtained value represents not only the attack strength but also
the attack condence. The more the alerts in an edge detection process, the
more likely the intrusion and the achievement of the edge.
The alert amount Ai represents the quantity of generated alerts on incident
type Ii, where i is the index of attack incident type on the modelled attack
tree edge. Three possible thresholds 1, 2 and 3 indicate the border of
no risk, the border between no risk and risk, and the border of risk. Thus,
there are four corresponding ranges as [0, 1), [1, 2], (2, 3) and [3, 1]
to represent no risk, may be no risk, may be risk and risk.
Therefore, the assessment factor on no risk is measured by considering 2
as Equation (5.20), while the assessment factor on risk is measured by con-
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sidering 1 and 3 as Equation (5.21).
f11 =
8<:
2 Ai
2
if Ai  2
0 if Ai > 2
(5.20)
f12 =
8>>><>>>:
0 if 1 > Ai
Ai 1
3 1 if 1 < Ai  3
1 if 3 < Ai
(5.21)
 Alert Severity. The alert severity functions f2 of an incident type determine
how serious is the impact of the attack incident. The low-level intrusion
detector normally predenes the severity level. Thus, the alert severity Pr0
of an incident type Ii can be directly obtained from most low-level intrusion
detectors, such as Snort.
 represents the number of severity levels according to the intrusion de-
tector's pre-dened signature database. In Snort, the \sig priority" eld
within \signature" table denes three attack severity levels for each corres-
ponding alert to the detected attack. sig priority = 1 represents the top
severity level for the detected attack; sig priority = 2 indicates the medium;
while sig priority = 3 indicates the lowest. Hence, set  = 3 and Pr0 = 4  
sig priority for each Snort detected attack.
Equation (5.22) expresses the computation process to measure the assess-
ment factor about no risk. Equation (5.23) shows the computation process
to measure the assessment factor about risk.
f21 =
8<:  Pr0 if Pr0  0 if Pr0 >  (5.22)
f22 =
8<:Pr0 if Pr0  1 if Pr0 >  (5.23)
5.2.3 Basic Probability Assignment
According to the above membership functions, the basic probability assignment
can be conducted by generating a set of belief values mIiq (Vj) on the claimed
focal elements (not risk, risk and uncertain) for each incident type. Note that
q indicates the index of the above two membership functions, Ii represents the
index of the detected incident type and Vj only represents the j
th focal element
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without the uncertain one. Equation (5.24) and Equation (5.25) provide the way
to compute each focal element's belief value.
mIiq (Vj) =
fqjP2
j=1 fqj + 1  PIDS
(5.24)
mIiq (V3) = 1 
2X
j=1
mIiq (Vj) (5.25)
where, q = 1,2; j = 1,2; PIDS is the general detection precision of the intrusion
detector. 1   PIDS represents intrusion detector's incorrect detection rate, which
is one of the main uncertainty issues. In addition, V1 denotes the rst focal element
as not risk, V2 denotes the second element as risk, while V3 denotes the third focal
element as uncertain.
Once a set of belief values have been generated, these belief values can be fur-
ther fused into mIi(V1), m
Ii(V2) and m
Ii(V3) based on Dempster's Rule of Com-
bination as Equation (5.19).
5.2.4 Proposed Sequential Based Assessment Approach
This subsection describes our proposed sequential assessment approach. In the
sequential based approach, the two membership functions are selected as the only
observer set. Figure 5.1 depicts the abstracted assessment approach on a modelled
edge. The edge between child node CN and parent node PN has n kinds of
incidents Ii (i 2 f1,2,: : :,ng). For each incident, the corresponding belief values
of all three claimed focal elements not risk, risk and uncertain are represented as
mIi(V1), m
Ii(V2) and m
Ii(V3), respectively.
PN
CN
I1
In
mI1(V1), mI1(V2),
mI1(V3)
mIn(V1), mIn(V2),
mIn(V3)
Phase 1
Phase n
Figure 5.1: Process of Sequential Based Approach
Sequential based approach examines the detection uncertainty by investigating
the belief values of each single modelled attack incident type within the tree edge
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Algorithm 5.2.1: Sequential Based Assessment(Input)
01 fDenitions:
02 n: Number of Modelled Incidents within one Edge
03 Ii: ith Incident Type I within one Edge
04 q: Index of Membership Function
05 Focal Elements: V1 as Not Risk, V2 as Risk, V3 as Uncertain
06 Belief Values of Incident Type Ii: mIi(V1), m
Ii(V2), m
Ii(V3)g
07 fInput: Real-time obtained Alert Amount Ai and Alert Severity Pr0g
08 fOutput: Edge Transition with Success or Failureg
09 BEGIN
10 FOR (i = 1; i  n; i++)
11 IF (q == 1) //First Membership Function to Examine Alert Amount
12 mIiq (V1) = fq1(Ai), m
Ii
q (V2) = fq2(Ai)
13 mIiq (V3) = 1 - m
Ii
q (V1) - m
Ii
q (V2)
14 END IF
15 IF (q == 2) //Second Membership Function to Examine Alert Severity
16 mIiq (V1) = fq1(Pr0), m
Ii
q (V2) = fq2(Pr0)
17 mIiq (V3) = 1 - m
Ii
q (V1) - m
Ii
q (V2)
18 END IF
19 mIi(V1) = DSCombination(m
Ii
1 (V1), m
Ii
2 (V1))
20 mIi(V2) = DSCombination(m
Ii
1 (V2), m
Ii
2 (V2))
21 mIi(V3) = DSCombination(m
Ii
1 (V3), m
Ii
2 (V3))
22 IF (mIi(V2) > m
Ii(V1) + m
Ii(V3))
23 IF (i < n)
24 Check Next Incident Type in Sequence
25 ELSE
26 Current Edge Achieved and Check Next Edge in Sequence
27 BREAK
28 END IF
29 ELSE
30 Keep Check Current Incident Type Till Been Achieved
31 END IF
32 END FOR
33 END
Figure 5.2: Pseudocode of Sequential Based Approach
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according to the modelled bottom-up sequence. The main purpose of this ap-
proach is to certain that each incident type within edge has been achieved by the
adversary according to the detected evidence from the intrusion detector without
any ignorance.
By applying two membership functions as two independent observers to provide
probability belief evidence, the main analysis principle is to take the provided
belief evidence and examine whether the detected incident alerts are trustworthy
or not for each particular incident type. Each process of the incident type is
regarded as a separate phase. Figure 5.1 illustrates the abstracted process from
the rst modelled incident type I1 to the last modelled incident type In. Note that
the horizontal dash line distinguishes the connective incidents as the consecutive
phases.
There are two main steps in each phase. The rst main step obtains the belief
values of the incident. Once the values of assessment factors have been measured
by applying the membership functions (that is, Equation (5.20), Equation (5.21),
Equation (5.22) and Equation (5.23)) based on intrusion detector's real-time de-
tection results, two sets of belief values (that is, Belf1 = fm1(V1), m1(V2) and
m1(V3)g; Belf2 = fm2(V1), m2(V2) and m2(V3)g) to focal elements are generated
for both membership functions f1 and f2. Then, the essential process is to fuse
the two set of belief values into one set (m(V1), m(V2) and m(V3)) by applying the
D-S's Rule of Combination as Equation (5.19).
The second key step is to compare m(V2) against the summation of m(V1) and
m(V3). Once the conducted analysis generates the appropriate results (that is,
m(V2) > m(V1) + m(V3)), the analysis determines the current incident had been
achieved and goes up to examine the next type of modelled attack incident along
the edge. Because the measured evidence proves that the detected incident is risky
enough as the intrusion. Otherwise, the checking process remains at the current
incident. When all of the modelled attack incidents have been achieved, then,
the whole current edge is considered to be achieved. Consequently, the sequential
based analysis on that edge is completed. Figure 5.2 shows the pseudocode for
this sequential based approach.
The strength of the sequential based approach is that every modelled incident
has been proved by the evidence, considering the uncertainty of the alerts. How-
ever, the possible limitation is that the edge cannot be deemed to be achieved if
any incident along that edge is not achieved.
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5.2.5 Proposed Combination Based Assessment
Approach
Combination based approach examines the detection uncertainty by investigating
the fused belief values from all modelled attack incident types as a bundle. The
main purpose of this approach is to determine if the whole edge has been achieved
by the adversary according to the provided evidence from the intrusion detector,
even if the intrusion detector generates any wrong detection results (for example,
miss any malicious network packets without alert generation, mark any normal
network packets with alert generation) due to ignorance or uncertainty.
PN
CN
I1
mI1(V1),mI1(V2),
mI1(V3)
mIn(V1), mIn(V2),
mIn(V3) m
E(V1), mE(V2),
mE(V3)?
Phase 1 Phase 2
Figure 5.3: Process of Combination Based Approach
In the combination based approach, the two membership functions are selected
as the rst observer set, then, all of the modelled incidents within one edge are
selected as the second observer set. Compared with the previous sequential based
approach, the dierence is the selection of observers. Beyond the membership func-
tions as the rst observer set, all of the modelled incident types are additionally
taken as the second observer set.
There are two main phases in the processing of this approach. The former phase
is to measure the belief values of each incident type by applying the membership
functions as the observer. While the latter phase is to fuse multiple belief value
sets into the ultimate set by applying the incident types as the observer. Figure 5.3
displays the abstracted overview of the combination based approach on one sampled
attack tree edge with all of the incident types from I1 to In. Note that a vertical
dash line had been plotted to separate the two phases.
In Phase 1, by conducting the same process as the rst step of each phase
in the sequential based approach, we rstly generate n sets of belief values BelIi
= fmIi(V1), mIi(V2), mIi(V3)g, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n, for all incident types by
applying D-S combination according to evidence provided by the rst observer.
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Algorithm 5.2.2: Combination Based Assessment(Input)
01 fDenitions:
02 n: Number of Modelled Incidents within one Edge
03 Ii: ith Incident Type I within one Edge
04 q: Index Number of Membership Function
05 E: Targeted Edge
06 Focal Elements: V1 as Not Risk, V2 as Risk, V3 as Uncertain
07 Belief Values of Particular Incident Type: mIi(V1), m
Ii(V2), m
Ii(V3)g
08 fInput: Real-time obtained Alert Amount Ai and Alert Severity Pr0g
09 fOutput: Edge Transition with Success or Failureg
10 BEGIN
11 //Phase 1 Process
12 FOR (i = 1; i <= n; i++)
13 IF (q == 1) //First Membership Function to Examine Alert Amount
14 mIiq (V1) = fq1(Ai), m
Ii
q (V2) = fq2(Ai)
15 mIiq (V3) = 1 - m
Ii
q (V1) - m
Ii
q (V2)
16 END IF
17 IF (q == 2) //Second Membership Function to Examine Alert Severity
18 mIiq (V1) = fq1(Pr0), m
Ii
q (V2) = fq2(Pr0)
19 mIiq (V3) = 1 - m
Ii
q (V1) - m
Ii
q (V2)
20 END IF
21 mIi(V1) = DSCombination(m
Ii
1 (V1), m
Ii
2 (V1))
22 mIi(V2) = DSCombination(m
Ii
1 (V2), m
Ii
2 (V2))
23 mIi(V3) = DSCombination(m
Ii
1 (V3), m
Ii
2 (V3))
24 BelIi = fmIi(V1), mIi(V2), mIi(V3)g
25 END FOR
26 //Phase 2 Process
27 BelE = BelI1
L
BelI2
L
: : :
L
BelIn
28 IF (mE(V2) > m
E(V1) + m
E(V3))
29 Current Edge Achieved and Check Next Edge in Sequence
30 ELSE
31 Keep Check Current Edge Till Been Achieved
32 END IF
33 END
Figure 5.4: Pseudocode of Combination Based Approach
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Then, in Phase 2, the Phase 1 generated belief values are taken as another set of
evidence and further fused by applying D-S rule of combination as Equation (5.19)
by selecting all incident types as the second observer set. Note that the combina-
tion rule may be repeatedly applied since there could be more than two incidents
types. The combination process is shown as Equation (5.18). Figure 5.4 illustrates
the pseudocode of the combination based analysis with two-phase computation.
The limitation of the combination based approach is that it does not require
that every modelled incident type had been achieved according to the evidence.
Nevertheless, the signicant advantage is to conduct the edge-based intrusion de-
tection analysis that considers ignorance and uncertainty in the alerts.
5.3 Formalisation of Attack Detection Tree
This section presents the formalisation of Attack Detection Tree. Attack Detection
Tree (ADtT) 1 is proposed to model the attack detection progress and addition-
ally satisfy the quality of detectability mechanism and the detection uncertainty
analysis by extending the notations of AAT [91, 92]. The formalisation of AAT is
given in Appendix A. The formalisation of ADtT is given as follows:
Denition 23 Attack Detection Tree. An attack detection tree is a node-
labelled rooted tree given by ADtT=hN , E, D, M, F , Label, SIGu;vi, where
 N is a nite set of nodes in the tree representing the dierent states of partial
compromise or sub-goals that an adversary needs to move through in order
to fully compromise a system. r 2 N is a special node, distinguished from
others, that forms the root of the tree. It represents the system compromise
as the ultimate goal of the adversary. The set N can be partitioned into two
subsets, leafNodes and internalNodes, such that
 leafNodes S internalNodes = N ,
 leafNodes T internalNodes = ;,
 r 2 internalNodes.
 E  NN constitutes the set of edges in the attack detection tree. An edge
hu,vi 2 E denes an atomic attack, as per Denition 26, and represents the
state transition from a child node v to a parent node u, for u; v 2 N . The
edge hu, vi is said to be emergent from v and proceeding to u.
1Note that the abbreviation \ADtT" is used to represent Attack Detection Tree instead of
\ADT" to avoid the confusion with the acronym for Attack Defence Tree in [49].
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 D is a set of tuples of the form hv, decompositioni, such that
 v 2 internalNodes,
 decomposition 2 [O-AND-decomposition, OR-decomposition], where O-
AND-decomposition and OR-decomposition are given in Denition 24
and Denition 25 below.
 M is a nite set of metrics on the tree nodes and tree edges representing
Quality of Detectability of an attack detector. More details on the types of
metrics considered have been presented in Section 5.1. The setM partitioned
into two sections, edgeMetrics and nodeMetrics, such that
 edgeMetrics S nodeMetrics = M,
 edgeMetrics T nodeMetrics = ;.
 F is a nite set of assessment factors to an incident, as per Denition 27, on
the tree edges representing Detection Uncertainty Analysis mechanism to an
attack detector. More details on the detection uncertainty analysis considered
have been presented in Section 5.2.2. The set F can be partitioned into two
subsets, amountFactor and severityFactor, such that
 amountFactor S severityFactor = F ,
 amountFactor T severityFactor = ;.
 Label is the name of the exploit associated with each edge.
 SIGu;v is an attack signature of an atomic attack for attack detection purpose
which is dened in Denition 28 below.
Denition 24 O-AND Decomposition. Given a node v of an attack detection
tree such that v 2 internal nodes, the node is an O-AND-decomposition if all edges
incident to the node are connected by the AND operation but with a particular
sequence order.
Denition 25 OR Decomposition. Given a node v of an attack detection tree
such that v 2 internal nodes, the node is an OR-decomposition if all edges incident
to the node are connected by the OR operation.
Denition 26 Atomic Attack. An atomic attack A is a combination of n
incidents (I1, I2, : : :, In) with a particular order. The occurrence of an atomic
attack contributes towards the state transition in the attack tree.
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Denition 27 Incident. An incident I is a basic benign or malicious action
performed by the adversary or the corresponding response by the target victim.
The occurrence of a single incident does not contribute an attack but taken together
may lead to an atomic attack.
Denition 28 Attack Signature. An attack signature SIGu;v of an atomic
attack is a sequence of sub-signatures combination for each single incident (SIGI1,
SIGI2, : : :, SIGIn) in the atomic attack.
5.4 Summary
This chapter has described two proposed mechanisms: the Quality of Detectability
mechanism and the detection uncertainty assessment mechanism. The goal of the
rst mechanism is to measure and show the on-going intrusion state and intru-
sion detection progress based on the tree structure and the generated low-level
alerts. While the task of the second mechanism is to measure the evidence from
the obtained low-level alerts information to identify the achievement of the mod-
elled atomic attack. Two relevant processes are proposed: the sequential based
assessment and the combination based assessment. The former conducts the as-
sessment on every single modelled incident according to the measured evidence,
whereas the latter conducts the assessment by fusing the measured evidence to-
gether from all modelled incidents. By applying the notion of AAT, ADtT is
proposed and formalized by additionally augmenting the QoD mechanism and the
detection uncertainty assessment mechanism into the tree framework.
In the next chapter, the intrusion detection approaches will be proposed based
on the original AAT and our proposed ADtT.
Chapter 6
Attack Tree Based Intrusion
Detection
This chapter describes two dierent detection mechanisms based on two advanced
attack trees: Augmented Attack Tree (AAT), and Advanced Attack Detection Tree
(ADtT), respectively. The AAT-based intrusion detection conducts the bottom-
up high-level detection process based on the modelled attack tree by applying the
original AAT modelling technique [91, 92]. Then, taking the AAT-based intrusion
detection mechanism as the foundation, ADtT-based intrusion detection mechan-
ism further implements the Quality of Detectability mechanism and investigates
the detection uncertainty from the lower-level intrusion detector to guarantee the
quality of detection results, despite there being uncertainty in low-level alerts.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 describes
the proposed time window scheme for the detection mechanisms. Then, two intru-
sion detection mechanisms based on AAT and ADtT are described in Section 6.2
and Section 6.3, respectively. Finally, the summary of this chapter is given in
Section 6.4.
6.1 Sliding Based Detection Window
The detection algorithms are implemented with respect to sliding window based
time intervals, denoted Detection Window (DW). The main purpose of DW is
to provide an expected detection time range to facilitate the implementations of
our detection algorithms, not only to provide the high-level detection, but also
to identify hidden relations of intrusions within time bound. Within each DW,
the algorithms examine the detected low-level alert information to ascertain if any
high-level alerts would be triggered. The possible time unit of DW is set in terms
of seconds.
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There are two possible scenarios with this DW scheme. The rst time scheme
provides the overlapping part between two consecutive DWs, whereas the second
time scheme provides the non-overlap between two consecutive DWs. The main
advantage of the former is to investigate the hidden relations between the currently
detected alerts in current DW and the partial history from the previous DW.When
carrying over from the current DW to a subsequent one, the algorithm should
continue along the modelled tree path from the detected edges in the current DW
to the next one so that this historic information is also carried forward to the
next DW. Meanwhile, the latter concentrates on the detection within current DW
without any information provision from the previous DW.
The formalisation of sliding based detection window scheme is as follows:
Denition 29 Detection Window. A sliding based detection window is given
by DW = hT, S, i, where
 T is the time interval [Ts; Te], where Ts and Te are the starting time and the
ending time of one desired time interval.
 S is the window size:
 S = Te   Ts + 1
  is the sliding move step:
 [Te +, Ts +]
For example, a detection window sets as DW=h[Ts; Te], 5 ,2i means the window
size is 5 seconds and the move step is 2 seconds. If the rst DW is [11:26:01,
11:26:05], then, the second DW is [11:26:03, 11:26:07], the third DW is [11:26:05,
11:26:09], etc. For another example, DW=h[Ts; Te], 1 ,1i represents the window
size is 1 second and the move step is 1 second. Thus, this dened DW works as
the normal second tick.
Note that the size of DW plays an important role in the detection mechanism,
not only in terms of detection performance, but also to the potential logical rela-
tions between the atomic attacks that constitute multi-step attacks. In practice,
both of these points can be achieved by slicing the detection in time into overlap-
ping windows, such that atomic attacks detected in dierent time windows can
be considered in unison to avoid mis-detecting multi-step attacks that span more
than one time window.
Lemma: DW Overlap. Two DWs could overlap only if S > .
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Proof. For any pair of distinct DWs, with starting and ending times respectively
denoted as [Ts1; Te1], [Ts2; Te2], Ts1 6= Ts2 and Te1 6= Te2, we consider all possible
scenarios: (1) S = ; (2) S < ; (3) S > . Observe that w.l.o.g. it must be that
Ts2 = Ts1 + k and Te2 = Te1 + k for some integer k. For the DWs to have any
chance of overlapping, it suces to consider the smallest integer multiple, k = 1.
In scenario (1), for k = 1, we have Ts2 = Ts1 +  = Ts1 + S = Te1 + 1, so there
can be no overlap. In scenario (2), we have (Ts2 = Ts1 +) > (Te1 = Ts1 + S  1)
since S < , so in fact some gap of at least Ts2   Te1 =   S exists between two
DWs. In scenario (3), we could have, for example for k = 1, the situation where
(Ts2 = Ts1 +)  (Te1 = Ts1 + S  1) since S > , so the DWs could overlap. 
6.2 Augmented Attack Tree Based Intrusion
Detection
The AAT based intrusion detection is proposed according to the original AAT [92].
The corresponding AAT formalisation is given in Appendix A. Generally, this pro-
posed detection mechanism is a bottom-up approach by detecting the atomic at-
tacks from the initial leaf nodes towards the root node of the modelled attack tree.
For the detection of every atomic attack, the detection mechanism inspects the
specied low-level alerts from the low-level intrusion detector to match the pre-
dened atomic attack signature within multiple successive DWs. This detection
algorithm notably considers the overlapping time windows mechanism to determ-
ine the potential relations between the consecutive intrusions within the dened
time range.
Algorithm 6.2.1 within Figure 6.1 shows the pseudocode of proposed AAT
based intrusion detection mechanism. The top part, which is from Line 2 to Line
7, provides some basic information of algorithm. While, the main body, which
from Line 8 to the last line, provides the algorithm. The part between Line 2 and
Line 5 is the relevant denitions relating to AAT formalisation. Line 6 states the
algorithm input, which is the real-time network trac. Line 7 states the algorithm
output, which is the high-level detection alert on each atomic attack.
The proposed algorithm works as follows. It initializes the detection at one of
the bottom edges (whose child nodes are leaf nodes) by dening all the bottom
edges as a set of SelectedEdges. The SelectedEdges are all potential atomic attacks,
and either of them could be achieved in the next step. Meanwhile, the low-level
intrusion detector commences to examine the coming trac and generates any
alerts once any malicious packets have been identied. Once both of the initial-
ization steps have been achieved, the algorithm identies the DW information to
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Algorithm 6.2.1: AAT-based Intrusion Detection(Input)
01 fDenitions:
02 Nodes (currentChild, currentParent, leaf, root)
03 Edges (currentEdge, parentEdge, siblingEdge)
04 Signatures (compoundAlert, compoundSig)
05 Decompositions (AND,OR)g
06 fInput: Real-time Network Tracg
07 fOutput: High-Level Intrusion Alertg
08 BEGIN
09 Select All Bottom Edges as SelectedEdges
10 WHILE (INTRUSION DETECTOR IS DETECTING) DO
11 Determine the Current DW
12 FOR currentEdge 2 SelectedEdges
13 Retrieve compoundSig of currentEdge
14 Generate compoundAlert in Current DW
15 IF sigMatch(compoundAlert, compoundSig) THEN
16 Record compoundSig, edgeID and DW
17 Retrieve currentParent.Decomposition
18 selectNextAppropriateEdge(currentParent.Decomposition)
19 IF currentParent.Decomposition == OR THEN
20 Select parentEdge
21 END IF
22 IF currentParent.Decomposition == AND THEN
23 IF All siblingEdge been Detected THEN
24 Select parentEdge
25 ELSE
26 Select siblingEdge
27 END IF
28 END IF
29 break
30 END IF
31 END FOR
32 IF rootMatch(currentParent, Root) THEN
33 Generate High-Level Alert
34 END IF
35 Update SelectedEdges
36 DW Move Forward
37 END WHILE
38 END
Figure 6.1: Pseudocode of AAT Based Intrusion Detection Algorithm
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set the specied time range for current intrusion detection process as its rst mis-
sion, as Line 11. Then, from Line 12, the algorithm retrieves each bottom edge
from the SelectedEdges, and for each, the algorithm retrieves the corresponding
signature information (Line 13). In addition, the algorithm generates the com-
pound alert (compoundAlert) in the specied DW (Line 14). Then, in Line 15, the
algorithm compares between the generated compound alert (compoundAlert) and
the retrieved edge signature (compoundSig). If they match, the algorithm records
the related information, compoundSig, edgeID and DW information, as Line 16.
Then, the algorithm identies the subsequent edge that should be checked next.
To do so, the algorithm retrieves the decomposition of the current edge's parent
node from Line 17 to Line 28. If the decomposition is OR, the algorithm sets the
current parent node as the next child node and retrieves the corresponding edge
that has that node as a child node. If the decomposition is AND, the algorithm
selects the sibling edge, which has the same parent node. If all sibling edges have
been detected, the algorithm would proceed to select the parent edge.
Next key step is to check if the current parent node of the newly selected
edge is the ultimate root node and generates a nal high-level alert if it is, as
the part between Line 32 and Line 34. The algorithm is then ready to start from
the beginning, in preparation for the next DW to detect new ultimate attacks,
as Line 36. Part of this preparation involves updating the SelectedEdges set to
include edges in the path following the recently detected edges, which should be
checked next. The algorithm adds the newly selected edge into SelectedEdges, due
to that edge may be one of the next attack steps by the adversary; also, it removes
the just achieved non-bottom edge from SelectedEdges, because that attack step
had already been achieved. Aside from bottom edges, the remaining edges within
SelectedEdges should also be checked in the next DW to ensure continuity between
DWs.
6.3 Attack Detection Tree Based Intrusion
Detection
The ADtT based intrusion detection is proposed according to our formalisation
of ADtT in Section 5.3. Generally, this detection mechanism adds the detection
uncertainty analysis mechanism and the QoD mechanism into the existed AAT
based intrusion detection algorithm.
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 display the pseudocode of ADtT based intrusion
detection algorithm. The whole pseudocode had been separated into two parts
due to the limited page length. This algorithm is also a tree-based bottom-up
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detection mechanism. It starts with the same detection process as AAT-based
intrusion detection algorithm does. In each edge's detection process, the ADtT
based algorithm further conducts the detection uncertainty analysis, the QoD
mechanism measurement, the metrics aggregation.
Once compoundSig and compoundAlert have been generated in each DW, the
algorithm deals with the signature matching process.
If compoundSig is fully matching with compoundAlert, the algorithm records
the related information, for example, compoundSig, edgeID and DW information.
Then, the next essential step is to implement the detection uncertainty analysis
with the real-time measured assessment factors as Line 19, for example, alert
amount, alert severity, based on either the sequential based assessment or the
parallel based assessment. If the measured result is failure (the part from Line 20
to Line 22), the D-S evidence theory based assessment claims that the detection
result is failed. Thus, the algorithm stops the following additional analysis for
this DW and prepares another detection on the next coming DW. However, if
the assessment result is success, then, the algorithm continually implements the
QoD metrics measurement (as Line 23) and the metrics aggregation (as Line 24).
For Line 23, the algorithm measures the detectability quality metrics from the
logical, time and alert statistics aspects. For Line 24, the algorithm computes the
aggregated values of the parent node from the multiple child nodes.
If compoundSig is only partially matching with compoundAlert, the algorithm
records the relevant detected incidents information. Then, the algorithm updates
compoundSig of that edge by marking the already matched incident alerts. Hence,
it records the current detected process. The undetected incident types within
compoundSig will be examined in the following coming DWs. The part between
Line 39 and Line 42 in Figure 6.3 shows the corresponding process.
Then, the algorithm identies the subsequent edge that should be checked next,
according to the modelled attack detection tree. To do so, the algorithm retrieves
the decomposition of the current edge's parent node. If the decomposition is OR,
the algorithm sets the current parent node as the next child node and retrieves
the corresponding edge. If the decomposition is O-AND, the algorithm selects the
next sibling edge (sharing the same parent node) following some dened order; if
all sibling edges have been detected in that order, the algorithm would proceed to
select the parent edge. The part between Line 27 and Line 36 in Figure 6.2 shows
the corresponding process. The rest of process is same as Algorithm 6.2.1.
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Algorithm 6.3.1: ADtT-based Intrusion Detection(Input)
01 fDenitions:
02 Nodes (currentChild, currentParent, leaf, root)
03 Edges (currentEdge, parentEdge, siblingEdge)
04 Decompositions (O-AND,OR)
05 Metrics (resistanceMetrics, QoDMetrics)
06 Assessment Factors (alertAmount, alertSeverity)
07 Signatures (compoundAlert, compoundSig)g
08 fInput: Real-time Network Tracg
09 fOutput: High-Level Intrusion Alert and QoD Valuesg
10 BEGIN
11 Select All Bottom Edges as SelectedEdges
12 WHILE (INTRUSION DETECTOR IS DETECTING) DO
13 Determine the Current DW
14 FOR currentEdge 2 SelectedEdges
15 Retrieve compoundSig of currentEdge
16 Generate compoundAlert in Current DW
17 IF sigFullMatch(compoundAlert, compoundSig) THEN
18 Record compoundSig, edgeID and DW
19 detectionUncertaintyAnalysis(alertAmount, alertSeverity) on currentEdge
20 IF detectionUncertainAnalysis obtains Failure THEN
21 break
22 END IF
23 QoDMeasurement(QoDMetrics) on currentEdge
24 metricsAggregation(resistanceMetrics) on currentParent
25 Retrieve currentParent.Decomposition
26 selectNextAppropriateEdge(currentParent.Decomposition)
27 IF currentParent.Decomposition == OR THEN
28 Select parentEdge
29 END IF
30 IF currentParent.Decomposition == O-AND THEN
31 IF All siblingEdge been Detected THEN
32 Select parentEdge
33 ELSE
34 Select siblingEdge in Order
35 END IF
36 END IF
37 break
38 ELSE
to be continued
Figure 6.2: Pseudocode of ADtT Based Intrusion Detection Algorithm (Part 1)
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Algorithm 6.3.2: Continue of Algorithm 6.3.1(Input)
39 IF sigPartMatch(compoundAlert, compoundSig) THEN
40 Record detected incidents information
41 Update compoundSig of currentEdge
42 END IF
43 END IF
44 END FOR
45 IF rootMatch(currentParent, Root) THEN
46 Generate High-Level Alert
47 END IF
48 Update SelectedEdges
49 DW Move Forward
50 END WHILE
51 END
Figure 6.3: Pseudocode of ADtT Based Intrusion Detection Algorithm (Part 2)
6.4 Summary
This chapter has stated two attack tree based intrusion detection mechanisms
based on AAT and ADtT, respectively. Both of the proposed detection mechan-
isms apply detection window based on the sliding window scheme. The AAT based
mechanism provides the prototype as a bottom-up tree based detection algorithm.
Then, the additional QoD metrics measurement and the detection uncertainty as-
sessment mechanisms are added into the detection algorithm as the ADtT based
mechanism.
In the next chapter, we will set up the experimental testbed and conduct exper-
iments to evaluate our proposed attack tree based intrusion detection mechanisms.
Chapter 7
Experiment and Analysis
This chapter presents and evaluates the experimental results on our proposed at-
tack tree based intrusion detection mechanisms. First, Section 7.1 describes the
design of the attack tree based intrusion detection system. Second, the initializa-
tion processes of the experiment are stated in Section 7.2. Then, the experimental
results of AAT based intrusion detection mechanism and ADtT based intrusion
detection mechanism are presented in Section 7.3. Next, Section 7.4 presents our
discussions on the detection uncertainty assessment with dierent value settings.
Finally, Section 7.5 summarises this chapter.
7.1 Design of Attack Tree Based Intrusion
Detection System
This section describes the architecture and database structure for the proposed
intrusion detection system, named as Attack Tree based IDS (ATIDS).
7.1.1 Architecture of ATIDS
Figure 7.1 illustrates the architecture of the proposed ATIDS. In the protected
network, ATIDS monitors the incoming and outgoing network trac on the edge
device with the appropriate conguration, for example, port mirroring in router.
There are three key components in ATIDS: (1) Detector Module, which functions
as the low-level detector to generate low-level alerts for the high-level attack tree
based detection process; (2) Detection Module, which conducts the high-level in-
trusion detection and the advanced intrusion analysis mechanisms; and (3) Support
Dababase Module, which stores all the relevant data, such as: the generated low-
level alert from the Detector Module; and the obtained high-level attack data from
the Detection Module.
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Figure 7.1: Architecture of ATIDS
In addition, the Detection Module is subdivided into the following three sub-
sections: (I) Tree Based Detection Sub-Module; (II) Detection Uncertainty Sub-
Module; and (III) QoD Measurement Sub-Module. Tree Based Detection Sub-
Module implements the fundamental detection process according to the ADtT
based intrusion detection algorithm. Detection Uncertainty Sub-Module deals with
the D-S evidence theory based detection uncertainty analysis as part of the tree
based detection. Moreover, QoD Measurement Sub-Module measures the relevant
QoD metrics values according to the achieved detection results.
Both Detector Module and Detection Module are controlled by the network
security analyzer through the command terminal.
7.1.2 Support Database Schema
Figure 7.2 illustrates the visual overview of the support database module in ATIDS
with the entity relations between the tables. The support database module can
be classied into two main sections: tree detection section and detector support
section. The left dash line box in Figure 7.2 shows the tree detection section, while
the right dash line box in Figure 7.2 shows the detector support section. The tables
in the tree detection section represent the relevant database tables relating to the
modelled tree representation and the detection procedure recording. The tables
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in the detector support section are Snort provided standard tables, for example,
event, signature. The corresponding Snort database schema can be found in [4].
Tree Detection Section Detector Support Section
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tNode
PK nodeID
nodeType
FK1 nodeDecomposition
tEdge
PK,FK2 parentNode
PK childNode
PK edgeID
FK1 compoundSigID
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dSelectedEdges
PK ID
FK1 selectedEdgeID
dResults
PK incidentID
FK1 edgeID
FK2 compoundSigID
startTime
endTime
tSignature
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subSigID1
subSigID2
subSigID3
subSigID4
subSigID5
subSigID6
tMetric
PK ID
FK1 nodeID
TtD
TtCS
TtG
SbD
StG
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NAT
MAN
MAS
Signature
PK sig_id
sig_name
sig_class_id
sig_priority
Event
PK sid
PK cid
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timestamp
Figure 7.2: ER Diagram of Support Database
The tree detection section can be further divided into two parts: tree struc-
ture part and detection procedure part. The tree structure part tables are estab-
lished based on the ADtT formalisation. We set ve tables: tNode, tEdge, tSigna-
ture, tDecomposition and tMetric to represent ADtT's node N , edge E , signature
SIGu;v, node decomposition D and metric M, respectively. All values from the
modelled attack detection tree are stored in the relevant tables. In the detection
procedure part, dResults table stores the detected high-level atomic attack inform-
ation, whereas, dSelectedEdges table records the selected edges during detection
process about the possible edges which may be checked in the next DW.
Within the range of tree detection section, tNode and tEdge are most funda-
mental modelled tree elements due to each edge having two nodes and the edge
provides the framework of the tree. Hence, there is one relation between tNode
and tEdge. In addition, each node entity has been attributed with the correspond-
ing decomposition and metric entities. Thus, another two relations exist between
tNode and tDecomposition, and between tNode and tMetric. For each edge entity,
there is another relation between itself and the signature entity, since each edge
has its own unique signature. Besides the entity relations within the tree detection
section, there is one relation that connects from tSignature entity to signature en-
tity in the detector support section. Consequently, the modelled Attack Detection
Tree is virtually represented in the database.
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7.2 Experimental Initialization
7.2.1 Testbed Setup
A testbed had been constructed to implement the proposed ATIDS. Figure 7.3
illustrates the network structure of the built testbed. Two laptops with installed
Ubuntu OS connect to each other via a network hub. The version of applied
Ubuntu on both laptops is v9.10. According to Figure 7.3, the left laptop plays
as the attack trac provision server, irrespective of whether it is a compromised
bot, or the root attack source from an adversary; whereas the right laptop plays
as the detection server. In the left one, a piece of network trac replay software
had been installed to replay the captured attack trac in .PCAP format. In the
right one, the developed ATIDS had been deployed to implement the high-level
detection on the attack trac.
Attack Traffic
Provision Server
ATIDS Deployed
Detection Server
ATIDSAdversary
Figure 7.3: Constructed Testbed
During the ATIDS development process, the development platform is also
Ubuntu v9.10; the main developing language is C and the applied C compiler
is the GNU C Compiler (v4.4.4.1-1ubuntu2) in Ubuntu; the applied database
is MySQL (v5.1.37-1ubuntu5.4). In addition, the attack trac provision server
installed replay software is tcpreplay (v3.4.1). Furthermore, Snort (v2.8.4.1) is
utilised as the low-level detector of ATIDS.
7.2.2 Experimental Data Set Selection
As the proof of concept, DARPA2000 data sets [55] have been applied to examine
the proposed ATIDS. Compared with other well-known intrusion data sets (for
example, KDD CUP 1999 [1], DARPA1998 [52], DARPA1999 [53]), the signicant
feature of DARPA2000 is that DARPA2000 data sets are multi-step intrusions
for the unique ultimate attack goal (to compromise host by DDoS) by the single
adversary or the multiple cooperating adversaries. Thus, there are causal relations
between two consecutive intrusion steps. In contrast, for the other data sets,
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though they contain large volume of attack trac, these attacks target on dierent
attack goals (for example, in DARAP1999, DoS targets on the disruption of a host
or network service, Remote to Local (R2L) targets on the remote and illegal access
to the local machine, User to Root (U2R) targets on the local user illegally obtain
the administrator privilege [64].) and may launched by dierent adversaries from
dierent sources without any comprehensive causal relations. From the view of
attack tree modelling, it is dicult to build an attack tree with multiple ultimate
attack goals (root nodes). Therefore, we apply DARPA2000, which includes two
separate data sets: LLDOS1.0 and LLDOS2.0.2.
The simulated network of DARPA2000 is divided into three segments repres-
enting the networks inside an Air Force base, which is the target network system
of the adversary; the outside Internet of the Air Force base; and the De Militarized
Zone (DMZ ) that connects the inside and outside. Within each data set, there
are two groups of provided trac les in .PCAP format. One group is a set of
trac les from the \Inside" network, and another is a set of trac les from
the \DMZ" network. The abstracted network topology is shown as Figure 7.4.
Both \Inside" trac and \DMZ" trac are captured simultaneously when the
adversary conducting the multi-step attacks. Thus, both of \Inside" trac and
\DMZ" trac have same attack process and most of the attack packets are same.
Outside Internet
Adversary
172.16.114.0/24
DMZ Network
172.16.115.0/24
172.16.113.0/24
172.16.112.0/24Inside Network of Air
Force Base
Victim Server
Victim DNS Server
Victim Server
Victim Server
Figure 7.4: Network Topology of DARPA2000 Data Sets
In LLDOS1.0 data set, the adversary targets on four subnets within the inside
network and compromises three victim servers to launch DDoS attacks. In LL-
DOS2.0.2 data set, the adversary targets on the DNS victim server to exploit the
same victim servers to launch DDoS attacks. In addition, both LLDOS1.0 data
set and LLDOS2.0.2 data set have ve intrusion steps, the main process of each
step is briey described in Table 7.1. More statistics information of each phase
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will be presented in Section 7.2.3.
We apply the \Inside" les to establish the model of ADtT and initialize the
detection performance of Snort. We then apply both the \Inside" and \DMZ"
les to evaluate our proposed ATIDS.
Table 7.1: Typical Attack Phases Matching in DARPA2000 Data Sets
Data Set Phase Attack Description
LLDOS1.0
Phase 1 IP Sweep
Phase 2 Probe by Sadmind Vulnerability
Phase 3 Break into Victims
Phase 4 Install DDoS Daemons on Victims
Phase 5 Launch Attacks to Primary Victim
LLDOS2.0.2
Phase 1 DNS Probe
Phase 2 Break into Victim
Phase 3 Install DDoS Daemon on Victim
Phase 4 Install DDoS Daemons on Victims
Phase 5 Launch Attacks to Primary Victim
7.2.3 Prerequisite Detection Evaluation
Since Detection Uncertainty Analysis requests the calculation of total uncertainty
(as Equation (5.24) in Section 5.2.3) during the attack detection tree based in-
trusion detection process, it is necessary to obtain the uncertainties from both
the membership functions and detector's detection performance. This subsection
provides the corresponding process to evaluate the detector's detection perform-
ance.
In order to identify Snort's detection performance on DARPA2000 data sets,
the rst essential task is to investigate the ground truth of the examined trac.
Though DARPA2000 is one of the widely applied data sets for intrusion de-
tection related research, there is limited information about the ground truth of
DARPA2000 from MIT Lincoln laboratory. In addition, few relevant publications
clarify the detailed ground truth of those data sets. Thus, we have conducted
the ground truth analysis on DARPA2000. The detailed process is presented in
Appendix B. Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 show the measured ground truth including
the total number of trac packets from each \Inside" .PCAP le, the number
of identied attack packets and the number of identied normal packets in both
LLDOS1.0 and LLDOS2.0.2 data sets.
After that, the next key process is to determine Snort's detection precision.
The general idea is to examine whether the alert generated packet is the attack
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Table 7.2: Ground Truth of DARPA2000 LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac
Phase
Number of Number of Number of
Total Packets Attack Packets Normal Packets
Phase 1 40 40 0
Phase 2 158 151 7
Phase 3 225 111 114
Phase 4 520 190 330
Phase 5 73924 34059 39865
Table 7.3: Ground Truth of DARPA2000 LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac
Phase
Number of Number of Number of
Total Packets Attack Packets Normal Packets
Phase 1 4 2 2
Phase 2 6 4 2
Phase 3 72 42 30
Phase 4 203 135 68
Phase 5 954 609 345
packet or the normal packet according to the measured ground truth. The detailed
process is presented in Appendix C.
Refer to the four fundamental intrusion detection metrics in Section 2.2.3, the
packet which had been labelled as positive in both ground truth and detection
result is determined as TP ; the packet which had been labelled as negative in
both ground truth and detection result is determined as TN ; the packet which
had been labelled as positive in ground truth and negative in detection result
is determined as FN ; the packet which had been labelled as negative in ground
truth and positive in detection result is determined as FP. Table 7.4 shows the
measured four common detection metrics (TP, FP, FN, TN) of each phase on
the DARPA2000 LLDOS1.0 Inside trac. The measured results for DARPA2000
LLDOS2.0.2 are shown in Table 7.5.
Then, it is possible to calculate the relevant detection performance for each
phase by applying the detection performance examination equations as Equa-
tion (2.1), Equation (2.2), Equation (2.3) and Equation (2.4) in Section 2.2.3.
Table 7.6 shows the measured detection performance in terms of DR, FAR, Pre-
cision and Accuracy in the corresponding columns. Note that \NAN" in \LL-
DOS2.0.2 Inside Phase 1" row and \LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Phase 3" represents Not
A Number. The reason to \NAN" is due to there being no packet detected in both
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Table 7.4: Measured Detection Metrics of DARPA2000 LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac
Phase Number of TP Number of FP Number of FN Number of TN
Phase 1 40 0 0 0
Phase 2 151 0 0 7
Phase 3 28 7 83 107
Phase 4 7 4 183 326
Phase 5 267 311 33792 39554
Table 7.5: Measured Detection Metrics of DARPA2000 LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac
Phase Number of TP Number of FP Number of FN Number of TN
Phase 1 0 0 2 2
Phase 2 4 0 0 2
Phase 3 0 0 42 30
Phase 4 4 2 131 66
Phase 5 3 2 606 343
phases, thus, the corresponding 0 TP and 0 FP cause the division 0/0.
Table 7.6: Detection Performance of Each Phase
Phase DR FAR Precision Accuracy
LLDOS1.0 Inside Phase 1 100% 0% 100% 100%
LLDOS1.0 Inside Phase 2 100% 0% 100% 100%
LLDOS1.0 Inside Phase 3 25.23% 20% 80% 60%
LLDOS1.0 Inside Phase 4 3.7% 36.36% 63.64% 64.04%
LLDOS1.0 Inside Phase 5 0.78% 53.81% 46.19% 53.87%
LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Phase 1 0% NAN NAN 50%
LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Phase 2 100% 0% 100% 100%
LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Phase 3 0% NAN NAN 41.67%
LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Phase 4 2.96% 33.33% 66.67% 34.48%
LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Phase 5 0.49% 40% 60% 36.27%
As all four metrics represent the detection performance, the following task is
to determine the most suitable metric to be applied in D-S analysis. For DR, FAR
and Precision, they determine the detection performance by only investigating
the fact of generated alerts. Accuracy measures the detection performance by
examining not only the correctly labelled attack packets, but also the correctly
classied normal packets. Though the former set shows the performance about how
the detector can correctly detect the attack packets, the latter metric represents
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the comprehensive detection performance on both attack packets detection and
normal packets labelling. Therefore, Accuracy is a more appropriate metric to
represent the detector's general performance. The values from all phases will be
utilised for the following detection process.
7.2.4 Attack Tree Modelling
To build the attack detection tree model for DARPA2000 data sets, there are two
essential steps: (1) tree framework construction, and (2) attack signature creation.
According to ADtT formalisation in Denition 23, the infrastructure of the tree
consists of node N , edge E and decomposition D, whereas SIGu;v represents the
attack signature and can be applied in intrusion detection. Hence, the rst phase
determines the fundamental structure of the tree according to the data set's attack
process. Meanwhile, the second phase composes the attack signatures for the
corresponding tree edges.
 Tree framework construction. The les are the network captures within
each of the DARPA2000 data set containing ve attack phases. Generally,
the adversary probes the target network system to determine the live hosts,
then, compromises the live hosts and installs the DDoS daemons, and nally,
launches the DDoS attack on the primary victim. More detailed information
can be found from the DARPA2000 website of MIT Lincoln Laboratory [55].
With the attack description information, we can construct the DARPA2000
Attack Detection Tree model based on the analysis of the general attack step
sequence and the causal relations between attack phases. The general attack
step sequence analysis is applied to construct the overall tree structure of the
ve phases in DARPA2000, whereas the causal relations analysis is applied
to determine the appropriate position of each phase within the overall tree
structure.
In practical computer network attacks, irrespective of how the attacks are
dierent from each other, there is typically a general attack step sequence:
reconnaissance; exploit vulnerable port and attack goal.
In LLDOS1.0, the main operation of Phase 1 is to identify the live machines
in the target network by applying the IP sweep attack. Then, in Phase
2, the adversary explores the aws of targeted machines based on the port
information. Thus, both of phases are classied as reconnaissance in the
general attack step sequence. Phase 3 and Phase 4 are the exploit vulnerable
step as the adversary breaks into the secondary victims and installs the DDoS
attack daemon programs. The DDoS attack had been launched targeting on
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the primary victim in Phase 5, which is the ultimate attack goal as the nal
step. Table 7.7 concludes the steps in the general attack step sequence attack
phases and the corresponding phase and attack description for LLDOS1.0.
Table 7.7: Typical Attack Phases Matching in LLDOS1.0 Data Set
Typical Attack Phase Phase Attack Description
Reconnaissance
Phase 1 IP Sweep
Phase 2 Probe by sadmind Vulnerability
Exploit Vulnerability
Phase 3 Break into Victims
Phase 4 Install DDoS Daemons on Victims
Attack Phase 5 Launch Attacks to Primary Victim
In DDOS2.0.2, the operation of Phase 1 is to probe the DNS server by
conducting HINFO query as reconnaissance. Then, the adversary breaks
into the secondary victims and installs the DDoS daemon in Phase 2, Phase
3 and Phase 4 as exploit vulnerable process. At last, the adversary launches
the DDoS attacks by controlling these secondary bots to the primary victim.
Table 7.8 concludes the steps in the general attack step sequence attack
phases and the corresponding phase and attack description for LLDOS2.0.2.
Table 7.8: Typical Attack Phases Matching in LLDOS2.0.2 Data Set
Typical Attack Phase Phase Attack Description
Reconnaissance Phase 1 Probe by DNS HINFO Query
Exploit Vulnerability
Phase 2 Break into one Victim
Phase 3 Install DDoS Daemons on Victim
Phase 4 Install DDoS Daemons on More Victims
Attack Phase 5 Launch Attacks to Primary Victim
Therefore, we determine that all of these ve phases in both LLDOS1.0 and
LLDOS2.0.2 follow the generic attack sequence, and the overall structure of
these phases is one phase linking to another subsequent phase. The determ-
ined edges, relevant nodes and labels are listed in Table 7.9. The syntax
of a node name is represented as \NX.X", which the prex \N" indicates
\Node", the rst \X" indicates data set and the second \X" indicates the
corresponding phase index. The \R" indicates the root node.
 Attack signature creation. As dened in Denition 28, an atomic attack
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Table 7.9: Framework of Modelled Attack Detection Tree
Data Set Edge ID Child Parent Label
LLDOS1.0
E1.1 N1.1 N1.2 IP Sweep
E1.2 N1.2 N1.3 sadmind Probe
E1.3 N1.3 N1.4 Breakin Victims
E1.4 N1.4 N1.5 DDoS Daemons Installation
E1.5 N1.5 R DDoS Attacks
LLDOS2.0.2
E2.1 N2.1 N2.2 DNS Probe
E2.2 N2.2 N2.3 Breakin Victim
E2.3 N2.3 N2.4 DDoS Daemon Installation
E2.4 N2.4 N2.5 More DDoS Daemons Installation
E2.5 N2.5 R DDoS Attacks
signature (SIGu;v) of ADtT is a group of combined signatures from related
incidents. As all of the incident signatures (SIGI) appear with a particular
order in each phase, it is important to construct SIGu;v with multi SIGI
obeying that specic sequence. In addition, because most SIGI must appear
in the signature to fully represent the attack step, we apply logical AND to
connect the incident signatures. The symbol [ indicates the AND connection
in the SIGu;v.
From the view of detection on DARPA2000 data sets, the possible incidents
are the network trac packets, which are labelled as attack packets by Snort.
While, the signature of each incident is the corresponding Snort signature.
Thus, we may obtain SIGIs by implementing the Snort detection on the
provided sample data. Table 7.10 lists all of the 16 kinds of Snort alert names
as the low-level incident types within DARPA2000. Some of the incidents
appear in both LLDOS1.0 data set and LLDOS2.0.2 data set. Note that
our obtained attack incident list is slightly dierent from other researchers'
work (for example, 15 in total in [5]) even though we applied the same data
les. The possible reason could be due to our applied Snort versions being
dierent (for example, Snort 2.8.2 in [5], but ours is Snort 2.8.4.).
Table 7.11 shows the details of the incidents that make up the atomic attack
signatures and corresponding edges in the attack tree.
Figure 7.5 displays the modelled attack detection tree of DARPA2000. The left
branch represents the LLDOS1.0, whose initial phase is Phase 1; the right branch
represents the LLDOS2.0.2, whose initial phase is Phase 2. Note that Phase 1
and Phase 3 in the right branch have been represented with the dash line. This is
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Table 7.10: Summary of Low-Level Incident Types in DARPA2000
Index Name of Incident
I1 ICMP PING
I2 ICMP Echo Reply
I3 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP
I4 RPC sadmind UDP Ping
I5 ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable
I6 RPC sadmind UDP NETMGT PROC SERVICE
CLIENT DOMAIN overow attempt
I7 RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP
I8 INFO TELNET access
I9 INFO TELNET login incorrect
I10 INFO TELNET Bad Login
I11 RESERVICES rsh root
I12 COMMUNITY SIP TCP/IP message ooding directed to SIP
proxy
I13 (snort decoder) Bad Trac Loopback IP
I14 BAD-TRAFFIC loopback trac
I15 SNMP AgentX/tcp request
I16 BAD-TRAFFIC tcp port 0 trac
Table 7.11: Atomic Attack Signatures of DARPA2000
LLDOS1.0 LLDOS2.0.2
Edge Sig ID Sig Value Edge Sig ID Sig Value
E1.1 SIGN1:2;N1:1 I1[I2 E2.1 N/A N/A
E1.2 SIGN1:3;N1:2 I3[I4[I5 E2.2 SIGN2:4;N2:2 I3[I6[I7
E1.3 SIGN1:4;N1:3 I6[I7[I8[I9[I10[I3 E2.3 N/A N/A
E1.4 SIGN1:4;N1:4 I11[I8 E2.4 SIGN2:5;N2:4 I3[I6[I7[I8
E1.5 SIGR;N1:5 I8[I12[I13[I14[I15[I16 E2.5 SIGR;N2:5 I8[I12[I5
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Figure 7.5: Constructed Attack Detection Tree of DARPA2000
due there being no Snort alerts generated in Phase 1 and Phase 3 in LLDOS2.0.2
according to Section 7.2.3. In addition, the DDoS attack on the primary victim
is the ultimate attack goal of both two datasets, thus it is the root node of the
tree. Since the adversary had implemented only one attack operation to achieve
each single sub-goal in the dataset, the modelled tree has only two direct branches
without any more leaf nodes or additional paths, where achieving the sub-goals
of any branch leads to the nal goal (root node). The label and the signature
information are drawn on both sides of each edge. Each edge contains the atomic
attack signature ID as detailed in Table 7.11.
7.3 Experimental Results
Once we have established our testbed and generated ADtT for DARPA2000,
the experiments are conducted by executing ATIDS on testbed and replaying
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DARPA2000 data sets. The experimental input is the malicious network trac
from either LLDOS1.0 data set or LLDOS2.0.2 data set, while the experimental
outputs include the generated high-level alert and the measured on-going intrusion
detection metrics. The whole experiments last two weeks from 20th October 2011
to 2nd November 2011, in which we are kept ATIDS executing and replayed the
attack data set into the monitored network at any time as we wish.
The general detection process of ATIDS is stated as follows. ATIDS conducts
the high-level intrusion detection within each specied time period according to
DW setting. The detection process follows strictly on the modelled multi-step
attack signatures and further implements the detection uncertainty analysis to
allow any wrong detection (Please refer to Chapter 6 for the detailed intrusion
detection process). On GUI of ATIDS, it shows the time information of each DW.
ATIDS additionally shows attack information, which including Attack Phase, DW
start time, DW end time and the name of high-level attack step, as soon as any
high-level attack step been detected. All the experimental data shown in the tables
of this section are obtained from the detection process.
We dene two DW settings: (1) Non-overlapped setting is congured with T
= now, S = 6 and  = 6; (2) Overlapped setting is congured with T = now, S =
6 and  = 5. The former DW represents that ATIDS examines Snort generated
low-level alerts every 6 seconds and the investigated time period is latest 6-second
period without the overlapping between two consecutive DWs. The latter DW also
represents that ATIDS examines Snort generated low-level alerts every 6 seconds,
but the investigated time period is latest 5-second period plus with an additional
overlapped 1-second period between the current DW and the last DW.
However, the time constraint is always exist as the research limitation. The
reason is that the relevant detection process only investigates the low-level alerts
within the specied time period, no matter it is overlapped or not. Any generated
low-level alerts beyond the current DW cannot be examined. Thus, the hidden
logic and relation may be dicult fully identied.
We conduct three groups of experiments: (1) AAT based intrusion detection;
(2) ADtT based intrusion detection with sequential based assessment; and (3)
ADtT based intrusion detection with combination based assessment. The meas-
ured experimental results of each group are as follows.
7.3.1 AAT Based Intrusion Detection
With the AAT Based Intrusion Detection approach, we have conducted three sets
of experiments with two targets. The rst two experiment sets target on the de-
tection performance evaluation on \Inside" trac with both the non-overlapped
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DW setting and the overlapped DW setting, while the third experiment set targets
on the detection performance evaluation on \DMZ" trac.
Non-overlapped DW Setting
Table 7.12 and Table 7.13 show the relevant detection results of each attack
phase on LLDOS1.0 \Inside" attack trac and LLDOS2.0.2 \Inside" attack trac.
In both tables, the \Detection" column represents the detection results of that
phase. The possible detection results are True, False and N/A. True indicates
that the attack phase is detected through detection process. False indicates that
the ATIDS has conducted the relevant detection on the attack phase, but the
detection result is negative. N/A indicates the corresponding detection is unable
to be implemented due to the unachieved detection of last attack phase. Then,
the \DW Start" column and the \DW End" column represent the start time
and the end time of the DW, which is the corresponding detection time window
of the attack phase detection. The last \High-Level Alert" column represents the
generated high-level alert of each phase according to the edge label from Table 7.9.
It is clear that ATIDS generates the high-level alerts for all modelled ve at-
tack phases in LLDOS1.0 Inside data set and three attack phases in LLDOS2.0.2
Inside data set. Figure 7.6 illustrates the snapshot of LLDOS1.0 Phase 5 detection
and the corresponding high-level alarm generation on the Ubuntu terminal.
Table 7.12: AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac with Non-
overlapped DW Setting
Attack Phase Detection DW Start DW End High-Level Alert
Phase 1 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
IP Sweep
09:41:06 09:41:11
Phase 2 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
Sadmind Probe
09:41:30 09:41:35
Phase 3 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
Breakin Victims
09:41:54 09:41:59
Phase 4 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26 DDoS Daemons
09:42:18 09:42:23 Installation
Phase 5 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
DDoS Attacks
09:42:36 09:42:41
Overlapped DW Setting
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Figure 7.6: Output Snapshot of AAT Based Intrusion Detection
Table 7.13: AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac with Non-
overlapped DW Setting
Attack Phase Detection DW Start DW End High-Level Alert
Phase 2 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
Breakin Victim
09:46:07 09:46:12
Phase 4 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26 More DDoS Daemon
09:46:31 09:41:36 Installation
Phase 5 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
DDoS Attacks
09:46:55 09:47:00
This experiment set investigates the detection performance with the overlapped
DW scenario. The measured detection results of LLDOS1.0 data set and LL-
DOS2.0.2 data set are shown in Table 7.14 and Table 7.15.
Same as the detection results in the Non-overlapped DW Setting, all of the
modelled atomic attacks have been detected successfully. However, note that the
detection of LLDOS1.0 Phase 1 and LLDOS2.0.2 Phase 2 are repeated once after
the rst detected DW. This demonstrates that ATIDS has the capability to detect
the atomic attack with the historic information. In addition, any historic inform-
ation is helpful to identify any hidden relation between the past and the on-going
intrusion.
DMZ Trac
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Table 7.14: AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac with Over-
lapped DW Setting
Attack Phase Detection DW Start DW End High-Level Alert
Phase 1 True
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
IP Sweep
08:36:51 08:36:56
Phase 1 True
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
IP Sweep
08:36:56 08:37:01
Phase 2 True
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
Sadmind Probe
08:37:11 08:37:16
Phase 3 True
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
Breakin Victims
08:37:31 08:37:36
Phase 4 True
2011-10-31 2011-10-31 DDoS Daemons
08:37:56 08:38:01 Installation
Phase 5 True
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
DDoS Attacks
08:39:01 08:39:06
Table 7.15: AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac with Over-
lapped DW Setting
Attack Phase Detection DW Start DW End High-Level Alert
Phase 2 True
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
Breakin Victim
08:39:36 08:39:41
Phase 2 True
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
Breakin Victim
08:39:41 08:39:46
Phase 4 True
2011-10-31 2011-10-31 More DDoS Daemon
08:40:21 08:40:26 Installation
Phase 5 True
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
DDoS Attacks
08:40:36 08:40:41
The experiment set with DMZ trac applies non-overlapped DW setting.
Though the applied \DMZ" trac les and the applied \Inside" trac les are
captured simultaneously on the same network trac, there are some dierences
between them, such as the total number of captured packets in each phase, the
number of incident types. Take Phase 5 of LLDOS1.0 for example, the modelled
attack signature has six modelled incident types in the \Inside" le, but, there are
only three incident types in the \DMZ" le.
The detection results of DMZ trac are shown in Table 7.16 and Table 7.17
to represent LLDOS1.0 data set and LLDOS2.0.2 data set. In Table 7.16, the
rst four attack phases have been detected with \True" results, while the last
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attack phase had been evaded. In Table 7.17, the detection results of LLDOS2.0.2
DMZ trac show that only the rst modelled attack phase had been detected, the
second modelled attack phase had been evaded due to the unmatched signature,
while the last attack phase cannot be achieved since the Phase 4 is unachieved
yet.
Table 7.16: AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 DMZ Trac
Attack Phase Detection DW Start DW End High-Level Alert
Phase 1 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
IP Sweep
09:48:30 09:48:35
Phase 2 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
Sadmind Probe
09:48:36 09:48:41
Phase 3 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
Breakin Victims
09:48:54 09:48:59
Phase 4 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26 DDoS Daemons
09:49:12 09:49:17 Installation
Phase 5 False N/A N/A N/A
Table 7.17: AAT Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ Trac
Attack Phase Detection DW Start DW End Alert
Phase 2 True
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
Breakin Victim
09:52:48 09:52:53
Phase 4 False N/A N/A N/A
Phase 5 False N/A N/A N/A
Summary
According to the above generated alerts information, we summarise that the
proposed AAT based intrusion detection approach can detect the atomic attacks
which satisfy the modelled atomic attack signatures from the attack trac, irre-
spective of whether the applied DW has been set with either the non-overlapped
or overlapped DW setting.
With the non-overlapped DW setting, ATIDS detects the atomic attacks by
investigating only the Snort generated alerts within that time range without bind-
ing any historic information. If DW contains all of the relevant incidents, ATIDS
generates the high-level alerts as TP. Otherwise, it generates FN.
With the overlapped DW setting, ATIDS is able to detect any atomic attacks
which are low-level incidents that happened in the two consecutive DWs. Thus,
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the reason why the Phase 1 high-level alert in LLDOS1.0 and the Phase 2 high-
level alert in LLDOS2.0.2 repeat is because the low-level incidents are generated
in the exactly overlapped part.
However, ATIDS lacks detection capability to identify any signature non-fully
matched atomic attacks as demonstrated by the experiment set on DMZ trac
les. These attacks can be regarded as the uncertainties in the detection process.
Without access to the trac ground truth, the possible reasons of the undetected
incidents may be due to the FNs generated by Snort or the inexistence of incidents
from trac. In practice, it is possible for a sophisticated adversary to achieve any
atomic attacks by using only a subset of the incidents modelled in the atomic attack
plus other unmodelled incidents. Therefore, the next detection approaches will
conduct the high-level atomic attack detection and additionally try to address the
detection uncertainty as the problem of incidents not fully modelled within atomic
attacks (that is, no relevant incidents within attack trac, low-level intrusion
detector unable to detect incidents).
7.3.2 ADtT Based Intrusion Detection with Sequential
Based Detection Uncertainty Assessment
In this category, the attack data sets are detected by applying the ADtT based
intrusion detection with sequential based assessment approach as described in Sec-
tion 5.2.4. Generally, the main idea of this approach is to determine the achieve-
ment of every single modelled incident within the atomic attack through the se-
quential detection uncertainty assessment to cause the achievement of an attack
tree edge.
The main process of this approach is as follows. ATIDS rstly detects the
achievement of modelled atomic attack signatures in each DW as the AAT based
approach does. If any of the atomic attacks have been matched, ATIDS generates
a \caution" instead of a high-level alarm to indicate the signature matching. Next,
the sequential based approach implements the detection uncertainty assessment on
each modelled incident within the atomic attack based on the obtained real-time
assessment factors. The assessment mainly measures the identied incidents with
evidence to trigger the alert. If the measured evidence supports the identied
incident, then, ATIDS labels that incident to be achieved. Otherwise, ATIDS
labels it as unachieved. Once all of the modelled incidents within an atomic attack
have been achieved, ATIDS generates a high-level alert to conrm the detection
on the corresponding edge. If not, ATIDS continually examines the currently
unachieved incident without high-level alert generation.
Dissimilar to the previous tables in the last approach, the tables in this ex-
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periment set record more detailed information. The \Detection" column shows
the results of the basis signature matching detection. The \Assessment" column
shows the results of the sequential based assessment. Two \True" values from
both \Detection" and \Assessment" columns indicate the achievement of the at-
tack phase. Otherwise, the attack phase cannot be achieved by ATIDS, and the
following attack phase cannot be examined. In addition, the \Achieved Incidents"
column and the \Unachieved Incidents" column list the relevant index of achieved
and unachieved modelled incidents during the assessment. Moreover, the \DW
Start" column and the \DW End" column represent the corresponding DW start
and end time.
Non-overlapped DW Setting
Table 7.18 and Table 7.19 show the detection results on LLDOS1.0 Inside at-
tack trac and LLDOS2.0.2 Inside attack trac by applying ADtT based intrusion
detection with sequential based assessment and the non-overlapped DW setting.
Table 7.18: ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac
with Non-overlapped DW Setting
Attack Dete- Asse- Achieved Unachieved DW DW
Phase ction ssment Incidents Incidents Start End
Phase 1 True True I1, I2 NULL
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
16:50:25 16:50:30
Phase 2 True True I3, I4, I5 NULL
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
16:50:37 16:50:42
Phase 3 True False
I6, I7, I10
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
I8, I9 16:50:55 16:51:00
Phase 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Phase 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
According to Table 7.18, Phase 1 and Phase 2 within LLDOS1.0 Inside attack
trac have been successfully detected since the atomic attack signatures have been
matched and all of the modelled incidents (that is, I1 and I2 in Phase 1, I3, I4 and
I5 in Phase 2) have been determined. However, in Phase 3, I10 can not be achieved
through the computation of the detection uncertainty assessment. Therefore, I10
has been recorded in the \Unachieved Incidents" column. Additionally, \False"
value has been generated for the whole edge assessment due to not all of the
incidents achieved in current DW. The unachieved Phase 3 causes the detection
process to continually check the current phase. Any further detection on Phase 4
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Table 7.19: ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside
Trac with Non-overlapped DW Setting
Attack Dete- Asse- Achieved Unachieved DW DW
Phase ction ssment Incidents Incidents Start End
Phase 2 True False NULL I3
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
16:53:26 16:53:31
Phase 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Phase 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
and Phase 5 have been evaded.
Table 7.19 shows the detection results on LLDOS2.0.2 Inside attack trac.
The assessment of rst attack phase has failed because the rst modelled incident
I3 cannot be achieved based on the measured assessment factors, even though the
signatures are matched.
Overlapped DW Setting
With the utilisation of the overlapped DW setting, Table 7.20 and Table 7.21
display the obtained results of this approach. Same as the last experiment with
the non-overlapped DW setting, Phase 3 in LLDOS1.0 and Phase 2 in LLDOS2.0.2
have been achieved with failure due to the same reason: I10 in Phase 3 and I3 are
not determined according to the detection uncertainty assessment.
As one of the possible characteristics of the overlapped scheme, Phase 1 and
Phase 3 in LLDOS1.0 repeat in the two consecutive DWs since the atomic attacks
are conducted in the overlapped part.
DMZ Trac
The detection results of LLDOS1.0 DMZ trac and LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ trac
are shown in Table 7.22 and Table 7.23. Only the rst attack phase in LLDOS1.0
has been detected and achieved by ATIDS's process.
Summary
We conclude that the proposed ADtT based intrusion detection with sequential
based assessment approach generates poor results. Since this approach requires
that all of the modelled incidents within the atomic attack must be achieved
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Table 7.20: ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac
with Overlapped DW Setting
Attack Dete- Asse- Achieved Unachieved DW DW
Phase ction ssment Incidents Incidents Start End
Phase 1 True True I1, I2 NULL
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
16:54:38 16:54:43
Phase 1 True True I1, I2 NULL
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
16:54:43 16:54:48
Phase 2 True True I3, I4, I5 NULL
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
16:54:58 16:55:03
Phase 3 True False
I6, I7, I10
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
I8, I9 16:55:13 16:55:18
Phase 3 True False
I6, I7, I10
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
I8, I9 16:55:18 16:55:23
Phase 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Phase 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Table 7.21: ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside
Trac with Overlapped DW Setting
Attack Dete- Asse- Achieved Unachieved DW DW
Phase ction ssment Incidents Incidents Start End
Phase 2 True False NULL I3
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
16:57:40 16:57:45
Phase 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Phase 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
through both the signature matching and detection uncertainty assessment, any
of the unachieved incidents handicap the successful detection of the atomic attack.
Therefore, the limitation of this approach is that once any of the modelled incidents
cannot been achieved, the detection of that whole attack phase will fail.
According to the above generated alerts information, the main reason of the
unachieved incident is due to the weakness of the measured evidence. However,
it is dicult to conclude that the obtained weak evidence cannot support the
achievement of the incident, or any missed evidence can support the unachieve-
ment of the incident. Therefore, we will solve this problem in the next experiment
set by applying the combination based assessment approach.
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Table 7.22: ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 DMZ Trac
Attack Dete- Asse- Achieved Unachieved DW DW
Phase ction ssment Incidents Incidents Start End
Phase 1 True True I1, I2 NULL
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
16:59:16 16:59:21
Phase 2 True False I3, I4 I5
2011-10-31 2011-10-31
16:59:40 16:59:45
Phase 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Phase 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Phase 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Table 7.23: ADtT Sequential Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ Trac
Attack Dete- Asse- Achieved Unachieved DW DW
Phase ction ssment Incidents Incidents Start End
Phase 2 True False NULL I3
2011-10-26 2011-10-26
17:01:00 17:01:05
Phase 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Phase 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
7.3.3 ADtT Based Intrusion Detection with Combination
Based Detection Uncertainty Assessment
In this experiment set, the attack data sets are detected by applying the ADtT
based intrusion detection with combination based assessment approach as de-
scribed in Section 5.2.5. The main background idea of this approach is to determ-
ine the detection of an atomic attack with general detection uncertainty analysis.
Specically, the atomic attack detection is examined by fusing the multiple sets
of measured evidence which are provided from each single incident.
For each atomic attack detection, ATIDS rstly detects the achievement of
modelled atomic attack signatures in each DW as AAT based approach does. Next,
ATIDS obtains the assessment factors as the evidence to measure the certainty
of every modelled incident as the ADtT sequential based approach does. Then,
instead of the determination on each incident, ATIDS combination based approach
applies the measured results as another evidence set about uncertainty to determ-
ine the detection of the atomic attack. Through this way, it is helpful to determine
the achievement of atomic attack if any of the incidents are missed or have been
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detected falsely by Snort. Once the atomic attack has been achieved through
both signature matching and detection uncertainty analysis, ATIDS generates the
high-level alert to conrm the detection on the corresponding edge. If not, ATIDS
continually examines the currently unachieved incident without high-level alert
generation. Furthermore, ATIDS implements the QoD mechanism to monitor and
record the on-going intrusion detector's detection performance and the on-going
intrusion progress.
In this experiment set, we conduct the experiments by applying the non-
overlapped DW setting in ATIDS to detect the Inside trac les, and additionally
detect the DMZ trac les.
Non-overlapped DW Setting
Non-overlapped DW setting is applied rst to evaluate the detection of ADtT
Based Intrusion Detection with Combination Based Detection Uncertainty Assess-
ment. The detection results on both LLDOS1.0 data set and LLDOS2.0.2 data
set are as follows.
In contrast to detection results of ADtT sequential based detection approach,
the combination based approach has better detection performance as the rst four
attack phases have been identied. In the last phase, though the atomic attack
signature has been matched, the detection uncertainty assessment determines that
the result is weak to generate the nal alarm. Specically, there are three modelled
incidents I8, I12 and I16, each of which has only one generated low-level alert.
Thus, the proposed D-S evidence based combination analysis cannot support the
atomic attack achievement due to three sets of weak evidence from these modelled
incidents. Table 7.24 displays the detection results on LLDOS1.0 Inside trac.
Table 7.25 shows the detection results on LLDOS2.0.2 Inside trac. Although
the last attack phase is not achieved, the rst two atomic attacks have been
detected and achieved. Figure 7.7 illustrates the snapshot on the relevant detection
uncertainty assessment results on LLDOS1.0 Phase 3. Figure 7.8 illustrates the
output snapshot on LLDOS2.0.2 Phase 5 detection.
The measured QoD metrics of each attack phase in LLDOS1.0 are shown in
Table 7.26. In addition, the measured on-going QoD metrics of LLDOS2.0.2 are
displayed in Table 7.27. The measurement of QoD metrics are based on the pro-
posed computation methods in Section 5.1. The logical steps based metrics (that
is, StD, StG and PtG) are computed according to Equation (5.1), Equation (5.2)
and Equation (5.3). The time based metrics (that is, TtD, TtCS and TtG) are
computed according to Equation (5.6), Equation (5.7) and Equation (5.8). While,
the alert based metrics (that is, NAT, MAN and MAS) are computed according to
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Figure 7.7: Output Snapshot of ADtT Combination Based Intrusion Detection on
Phase 3
Figure 7.8: Output Snapshot of ADtT Based Intrusion Detection on LLDOS2.0.2
Phase 5
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Table 7.24: ADtT Combination Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 Trac
with Non-overlapped DW Setting
Attack
Detection Assessment
DW DW High-Level
Phase Start End Alert
Phase 1 True True
2011-10-27 2011-10-27
IP Sweep
22:02:11 22:02:16
Phase 2 True True
2011-10-27 2011-10-27
Sadmind Probe
22:02:23 22:02:28
Phase 3 True True
2011-10-27 2011-10-27
Breakin Victims
22:02:35 22:02:40
Phase 4 True True
2011-10-27 2011-10-27 DDoS Daemons
22:02:53 22:02:58 Installation
Phase 5 True False
2011-10-27 2011-10-27
N/A
22:03:23 22:03:28
Table 7.25: ADtT Combination Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside
Trac with Non-overlapped DW Setting
Attack
Detection Assessment
DW DW High-Level
Phase Start End Alert
Phase 2 True True
2011-10-27 2011-10-27
Breakin Victim
22:10:11 22:10:16
Phase 4 True True
2011-10-27 2011-10-27 More DDoS Daemon
22:10:29 22:10:34 Installation
Phase 5 True False
2011-10-27 2011-10-27
N/A
22:10:41 22:10:46
Equation (5.11), Equation (5.12) and Equation (5.13).
In this experiment, we assign Tmin = 10 sec to avoid unnecessary computa-
tion complexity and unreasonable attack time consumption. The \Edge Metrics"
columns display the measured metrics about the alert-based information from
the \Detector Module". The \Node Metrics" columns display the measured lo-
gic and time metrics according to the modelled tree information with ADtT. The
\Phase" column in table denotes the corresponding atomic attack on edge and the
\NodeID" column denotes the corresponding node of each edge (\Phase"). Since
the achievement of parent node indicates the compromise of the (sub)goal, we
assign the node metrics of parent node on the same row with the \Phase" (edge).
Note that we initialise the leaf nodes of the bottom edges as the abstracted starting
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Table 7.26: Measured QoD Metrics of LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac Detection
Phase
Edge Metrics
NodeID
Node Metrics
NAT MAN MAS
TtD TtCS TtG StD StG PtG
(Unit: Second) (Unit: Step)
P1.1 2 20.00 3.00
N1.1 0 0 50 0 5 0.00
N1.2 10 10 40 1 4 1.00
P1.2 3 50.33 2.46 N1.3 22 12 38 2 3 1.00
P1.3 6 9.50 1.88 N1.4 34 12 26 3 2 1.00
P1.4 3 8.00 1.54 N1.5 52 18 8 4 1 1.00
P1.5 6 289.50 2.67 R 82 30 0 5 0 1.00
Table 7.27: Measured QoD Metrics of LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac Detection
Phase
Edge Metrics
NodeID
Node Metrics
NAT MAN MAS
TtD TtCS TtG StD StG PtG
(Unit: Second) (Unit: Step)
P2.2 3 2.00 1.67
L2.2 0 0 30 0 3 0.00
L2.4 10 10 20 1 2 1.00
P2.4 4 2.00 2.00 L2.5 28 18 12 2 1 1.00
P2.5 3 1.67 2.60 R 40 12 0 3 0 1.00
point of attack and store the leaf node metrics on the row of the bottom edges.
ATIDS generates a separated alert with a set of corresponding QoD metrics in
each DW.
According to the measured edge metrics from the Edge Metrics columns, the
system administrator can quickly have a general idea about the attack trac.
As the measured NAT is exactly same as the modelled incident type number on
each edge, the system administrator can know that the adversary follows the
exactly modelled attack process to compromise the system without any other
attack attempts. MAN and MAS metrics can assist the system administrator to
understand the average attack incident number and the seriousness of the detected
attack incidents. Take Phase 5 from Table 7.26 for example, the measured MAN
= 289.50 and MAS = 2.67. The system administrator knows that there are lots of
malicious trac with low risk level, which may be DoS/DDoS attack. While the
generated high-level alert may conrm his understanding of the attack process.
From the Node Metrics columns, it is clear that there is one incremental factor
in StD metric column and one decremental factor in StG metric column from the
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start phase to the end phase in both datasets. With the progress of the attack, the
system administrator can identify that the attack is getting close to the ultimate
goal of the simulated attack. Take Phase 4 for example, the measured StD =
4 steps and StG = 1 step. Thus, the system administrator can determine that
the adversary had already achieved the 4th attack step and with only one step to
compromise the whole system in attack scenario LLDOS1.0.
In columns of MT , the value of TtD follows the increasing tendency and the
value of TtG follows the decreasing tendency. Once ATIDS detects the achieve-
ment of the rst attack phase, the corresponding metrics can be measured on the
parent node N1.2. Since the values of TtD and TtG have been obtained with the
assistance of Tmin, ATIDS simply assumes that the initial values of TtD, TtCS and
TtG are 0, 0 and 50, respectively. As the attack progress, the values of TtD, TtCS
and TtG are dynamically updated till the achievement of the root node. We can
also identify the hidden relation between these three metrics. The current value
of TtD equals to the sum of the last measured TtD value with current TtCS value
(for example, TtD = 34 sec in Phase 3, TtCS = 18 sec in Phase 4, so, TtD = 34
+ 18 = 52 sec in Phase 4 ). This represents that the current detection time since
the beginning is based on the detection time cost of the last phase and the current
detection time consumption. In addition, the current value of TtG equals to the
dierence between the previously measured TtG value in last phase with current
TtCS value (for example, TtG = 34 sec in Phase 3, TtCS = 8 sec in Phase 4, so,
TtG = 34   18 = 16 sec in Phase 4 ). This represents that the achievement of the
current phase is closer to the ultimate than the last phase. Though TtCS and Tmin
are similar since both of them represent the time on each single edge, we found
that there is no constraint between the actually measured TtCS and the theoret-
ically assumed Tmin. In order to better assign a value on Tmin, we suppose that
there should be one justiable mechanism on Tmin as the threshold according to
the feedback from the detection result and the measured metrics value. Figure 7.9
illustrates the snapshot on the relevant QoD measured results on the LLDOS1.0
Phase 3.
DMZ Trac
Since some attack phases in DMZ data set (for example, Phase 5 in LLDOS1.0)
have incomplete incidents compared with the modelled incidents in the built At-
tack Detection Tree, thus, the assistance of DMZ trac can help us to identify the
detection capability of the combination based detection with the missing alerts as
uncertainty. It is possible for us to regard the missed incidents as the unable to be
detected incidents since Snort cannot generate alerts fort them. In that case, the
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Figure 7.9: QoD Output Snapshot of ADtT Combination Based Intrusion Detec-
tion on LLDOS1.0 Phase 3
assessment factors can be assigned with 0 for the alert amount, while maintaining
the value of the alert severity. The results are stated as follows.
Table 7.28 and Table 7.29 show the measured detection results and QoD res-
ults on LLDOS1.0 DMZ les. Figure 7.10 illustrates the output snapshot on the
DMZ Phase 5 detection. As Snort only generates the alerts for I8 and I16 in that
phase, the numbers of the undetected incidents are assigned with 0. Through D-S
evidence assessment, Phase 5 has not been achieved according to Snort generated
evidence. Table 7.30 and Table 7.31 show the measured detection results and QoD
results on LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ les. Figure 7.11 illustrates the output snapshot on
the DMZ Phase 4 detection.
Summary
According to the obtained detection results, we can summarise that the pro-
posed ADtT based intrusion detection with the combination based assessment ap-
proach can detect most of the modelled atomic attacks by handling the uncertainty
issues during the detection process. Since this approach fuses all of measured
evidence from each single modelled incidents within the atomic attack, the D-S
evidence based assessment determines the detection of the atomic attack by fus-
ing all of the evidence into the ultimate evidence to support the atomic attack
detection. Therefore, the combination based assessment approach is more ex-
ible and more general to determine the detection achievement compared with the
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Table 7.28: ADtT Combination Based Detection Results of LLDOS1.0 DMZ
Trac
Attack
Detection Assessment
DW DW High-Level
Phase Start End Alert
Phase 1 True True
2011-11-01 2011-11-01
IP Sweep
11:18:18 11:18:23
Phase 2 True True
2011-11-01 2011-11-01
Sadmind Probe
11:18:30 11:18:35
Phase 3 True True
2011-11-01 2011-11-01
Breakin Victims
11:18:42 11:18:47
Phase 4 True True
2011-11-01 2011-11-01 DDoS Daemons
11:18:55 11:19:00 Installation
Phase 5 True False
2011-11-01 2011-11-01
N/A
11:19:07 11:19:12
sequential based assessment.
However, we notice that some of the modelled incidents within the typical un-
detected atomic attack (that is, in LLDOS1.0 Phase 5 Inside trac, the generated
low-level alert number of I8, I12 and I16 are 1, 1, 1, respectively) only have a few
number of the generated low-level alerts. In addition, according to Table 7.6, we
notice that the applied values of PIDS in the assessment of the typical undetected
atomic attacks (for example, PIDS = 53.87% in LLDOS1.0 Phase 5, PIDS = 34.48%
in LLDOS2.0.2 Phase 4) are lower than the values of detected atomic attacks (for
example, PIDS = 100% in LLDOS1.0 Phase 1, PIDS = 100% in LLDOS2.0.2 Phase
2). As these applied values are required for the D-S evidence based detection un-
certainty assessment, we will discuss whether these dierent values may aect the
assessment results in the next section.
7.4 Discussion
We discuss two points in this section based on two settings within the detection
uncertainty assessment. The rst discussion targets on how the dierent detector
precision PIDS value within the basic probability assignment process may aect the
assessment result. The second discussion targets on how the dierent threshold 2
value within in the alert amount membership function may aect the assessment
result.
Our discussions are conducted based on the ADtT combination based intrusion
detection approach on LLDOS1.0 Inside trac. Every discussion is classied into
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Table 7.29: Measured QoD Metrics of LLDOS1.0 DMZ Trac Detection
Phase
Edge Metrics
NodeID
Node Metrics
NAT MAN MAS
TtD TtCS TtG StD StG PtG
(Unit: Second) (Unit: Step)
P1.1 2 392.50 3.00
N1.1 0 0 50 0 5 0.00
N1.2 10 10 40 1 4 1.00
P1.2 3 45.00 1.96 N1.3 22 12 38 2 3 1.00
P1.3 6 23.00 1.99 N1.4 35 13 25 3 2 1.00
P1.4 2 5.50 1.55 N1.5 47 12 13 4 1 1.00
P1.5 N/A N/A N/A R N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Table 7.30: ADtT Combination Based Detection Results of LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ
Trac
Attack
Detection Assessment
DW DW High-Level
Phase Start End Alert
Phase 2 True True
2011-11-01 2011-11-01
Breakin Victim
11:11:28 11:11:33
Phase 4 True False
2011-11-01 2011-11-01 N/A
11:11:40 11:11:45
Phase 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
two steps. The rst step discusses the aect on the measured results from the
basic probability assignment process, while the second step discusses the aect on
the measured results from the fusion process.
7.4.1 Detector Precision Value Setting for Basic
Probability Assignment
The basic probability assignment with the detector precision PIDS value has been
described in Section 5.2.3. PIDS represents the detection precision of the low-level
detector, the value of PIDS determines the certainty on the correctly classied
low-level incidents and low-level normal actions. While the value of 1   PIDS
represents the uncertainty on the incorrectly classication. Since the applied PIDS
value may be assigned with dierent values within ADtT based intrusion detection
approaches, this subsection discusses how the dierent PIDS values may aect the
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Table 7.31: Measured QoD Metrics of LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ Detection
Phase
Edge Metrics
NodeID
Node Metrics
NAT MAN MAS
TtD TtCS TtG StD StG PtG
(Unit: Second) (Unit: Step)
P2.2 3 2.00 1.67
N2.2 0 0 30 0 3 0.00
N2.4 10 10 20 1 2 1.00
P2.4 N/A N/A N/A N2.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
P2.5 N/A N/A N/A R N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Figure 7.10: Output Snapshot of ADtT Combination Based Intrusion Detection
on LLDOS1.0 DMZ Phase 5
atomic attack detection results.
We set PIDS with three typical probabilities: the maximal, the medium and
the minimal. Note that all these values should be measurable and reasonable. For
the former, the probabilities should be obtained directly according to any relev-
ant analysis or computation (that is, Snort detection performance evaluation as
described in Appendix C). For the latter, the applied values should be meaningful
(for example it should not be \NAN" in Table 7.6) and possible (for example 0
is the minimal probability to represent that an IDS misses all of the intrusions at
all, but it is impractical because the normal IDS should generate some TP and
TN).
According to the \Accuracy" values from Table 7.6, which records the meas-
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Figure 7.11: Output Snapshot of ADtT Combination Based Intrusion Detection
on LLDOS2.0.2 DMZ Phase 4
ured detection performance through the ground truth analysis and detection eval-
uation, the possible probabilities are as follows: 100% as the maximal, 75% as
the medium and 53.87% as the minimal. The reason to set the rst probability
with 100% is because 100% is the largest one from the stored data, while it is also
the maximal probability boundary. Likewise, we select the least one 53.87% as
the minimal probability. The reason to assign the second probability with 75% is
because 75% is the average of ve accuracy values in the LLDOS1.0 inside trac.
As the known least value is 53.87% from the \Accuracy" column of Table 7.6, any
values which are less than 53.87% cannot be considered for this discussion.
In our previous experiments in Section 7.3, PIDS has been assigned with dif-
ferent probabilities according to Table 7.6 for each particular atomic attack. We
set this group of fused evidence as \Group 1". Besides, we set a xed PIDS in all
attack phases in Group 2, Group 3 and Group 4 with PIDS = 100%, PIDS = 75%
and PIDS = 53.87%, respectively, to make the comparison against the previous
experiment and also between each other.
Eect on the Basic Probability Assignment
According to Equation (5.24) in the Basic Probability Assignment process in
Section 5.2.3, the proposed divisor takes the uncertainty 1   PIDS into account
by adding the measured evidence from the membership functions together with
the uncertainty on the misclassication. Hence, the lower value of PIDS causes
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the higher value of the divisor, and additionally causes the lower value of the
quotient. While the higher value of PIDS causes the lower value of the divisor,
and additionally causes the higher value of the quotient.
Table 7.32 takes Phase 2 of LLDOS1.0 for example and shows the measured
detection evidence of I3, I4 and I5, which are obtained from the basic probability
assignment process.
Table 7.32: Belief Values on Every Single Incident in LLDOS1.0 Phase 2 with
Dierent PIDS
Attack Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Incident PIDS PIDS = 100% PIDS = 75% PIDS = 53:87%
I3
m(V1) = 0.08 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.07 m(V1) = 0.09
m(V1) = 0.82 m(V2) = 1.00 m(V2) = 0.88 m(V2) = 0.80
m(V1) = 0.10 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.05 m(V3) = 0.11
I4
m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00
m(V1) = 0.78 m(V2) = 1.00 m(V2) = 0.84 m(V2) = 0.73
m(V1) = 0.22 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.16 m(V3) = 0.27
I5
m(V1) = 0.21 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.19 m(V1) = 0.21
m(V1) = 0.65 m(V2) = 1.00 m(V2) = 0.74 m(V2) = 0.65
m(V1) = 0.14 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.07 m(V3) = 0.14
Therefore, we may conclude that, generally, the higher PIDS value generates
strong evidence, for example, m(V2) is higher where V2 corresponds to belief in
there being an attack, in contrast with the lower PIDS value with the same assess-
ment factors. The strong evidence may be helpful to determine the achievement
of the atomic attack.
Eect on the Final Fusion Process
This part discusses how PIDS values may aect the nal fusion process. The
measurement of the atomic attack detection combines the multiple evidences from
each modelled incident as Equation (5.19) in Section 5.2.1, thus, the evidence
values of incidents from basic probability assignment determine the nal fused
results. According to the measured results from Table 7.33, it is clear that the rst
four phases have been achieved since the obtained belief value of the second focal
element exceeds the summation of the rst belief value and the third belief value
(that is, m(V2) > m(V1) + m(V3)). However, the last attack phase is unachieved
as the obtained belief value of the second focal element less than the summation of
the rst belief value and the third belief value (that is, m(V2) < m(V1) + m(V3)).
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Table 7.33: Belief Values on LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac with Dierent PIDS
Attack Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Phase Origin PIDS PIDS = 100% PIDS = 75% PIDS = 53:87%
Phase 1
m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.15 m(V1) = 0.22
m(V2) = 1.00 m(V2) = 1.00 m(V2) = 0.84 m(V2) = 0.73
m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.01 m(V3) = 0.04
Phase 2
m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.01 m(V1) = 0.02
m(V2) = 1.00 m(V2) = 1.00 m(V2) = 0.99 m(V2) = 0.97
m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.03 m(V3) = 0.01
Phase 3
m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.01 m(V1) = 0.01
m(V2) = 0.99 m(V2) = 1.00 m(V2) = 0.99 m(V2) = 0.99
m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00
Phase 4
m(V1) = 0.11 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.08 m(V1) = 0.12
m(V2) = 0.83 m(V2) = 1.00 m(V2) = 0.89 m(V2) = 0.79
m(V3) = 0.06 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.03 m(V3) = 0.09
Phase 5
m(V1) = 0.56 m(V1) = NAN m(V1) = 0.60 m(V1) = 0.56
m(V2) = 0.44 m(V2) = NAN m(V2) = 0.39 m(V2) = 0.44
m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = NAN m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00
Therefore, we may conclude that dierent value of PIDS could not aect the
nal results on any atomic attack detection, though the measured evidences in
each group are slightly dierent.
7.4.2 Threshold Setting for Alert Amount Membership
Function
In the applied ADtT combination based intrusion detection approach, three pos-
sible thresholds 1, 2 and 3 of the Alert Amount membership functions (that
is, Equation (5.20) and Equation (5.21) in Section 5.2.2) are dened with 1, 3
and 30, respectively. The value assignment on 1 and 3 are direct. 1 = 1 is
because that 1 represents the existence of the incident as the minimal. 3 = 30
is because that 30 is the measured average incident number in LLDOS1.0 Inside
data sets. However, the assignment of 2 is indirect. Thus, in this subsection, we
discuss how dierent settings on 2 may aect the evidence measurement in the
basic probability assignment process and the detection results of the atomic attack
detection.
We dene four threshold setting groups: Set 1, Set 2, Set 3 and Set 4. 2
in these four groups are 3, 5, 10, 15, respectively. While 1 = 1 and 3 = 30
are xed in each group. The applied PIDS value in each attack phase sets as the
corresponding \Accuracy" value from Table 7.6.
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Eect on the Basic Probability Assignment
Table 7.34 shows the measured evidence on I8 and I10 of Phase 4 by the basic
proability assignment process. According to Equation (5.20) in Section 5.2.2, 2
is only relating to the evidence measurement on the rst focal element V1, which
represent no risk as the non-achievement. It is clear that all measured values of
m(V1) in both I8 and I10 increase from Set 1 to Set 4. The reason to this trend
is because the higher value of 2, the more possibility the measured evidence to
represent the non-achievement of the modelled incident.
Table 7.34: Belief Values on Every Single Incident in LLDOS1.0 Phase 4 with
Dierent PIDS
Attack Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4
Incident 2 = 3 2 = 5 2 = 10 2 = 15
I8
m(V1) = 0.45 m(V1) = 0.69 m(V1) = 0.76 m(V1) = 0.78
m(V2) = 0.31 m(V2) = 0.18 m(V2) = 0.13 m(V2) = 0.12
m(V3) = 0.24 m(V3) = 0.13 m(V3) = 0.10 m(V3) = 0.10
I10
m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.04 m(V1) = 0.14
m(V2) = 0.83 m(V2) = 0.84 m(V2) = 0.82 m(V2) = 0.73
m(V3) = 0.06 m(V3) = 0.16 m(V3) = 0.14 m(V3) = 0.13
Figure 7.12 illustrates an abstracted relation between 1, 2 and 3. The left
part of 2 represents the area of \No Risk" as the non-achievement, whereas the
right part of 2 represents the area of \Risk" as the achievement. As 2 increasing
from 3 to 15, the \no risk" area becomes wider. In that case, there is higher
possibility about the non-achievement of the incident.
Therefore, we may conclude that the higher value of 2 increase the certainty
of m(V1) as the non-achievement. Next, we will identify how 2 may aect the
nal fusion on the atomic attack detection.
Eect on the Final Fusion Process
Table 7.35 shows the measured belief values on the detection of each atomic
attack with dierent thresholds. According to the provided data from Table 7.35,
the phases from Phase 3 to Phase 5 share the same tendency: with the value of
2 increases, the value of m(V1) also increases, but the value of m(V2) decreases.
The reason of the values unchanged in Phase 1 and Phase 2 is because the applied
PIDS = 100% without any detection uncertainty.
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Figure 7.12: Abstracted Relation Between Three Thresholds
As the evidence combination approach considers all the measured evidence
(that is, m(V1), m(V2) and m(V3)), the higher m(V1) value of the incident leads
the higher m(V1) value of the atomic attack after the fusion. Therefore, we can
summarise that the higher 2 value cause the generation of higher m(V1) evidence
value. Note that, the generated detection results are dierent in Phase 4 of Set 4.
Because Phase 4 in Set 1, Set 2 and Set 3 are achieved, but the highest 2 value
in Set 4 causes that attack phase unachieved.
From the view of intrusion detection, the security administrator aware of a
security issue once an alert had been generated by IDS. By setting the lower
value of 2, it is possible to make the \No Risk" eld smaller and the \Risk"
eld bigger. Compared with other three groups, Set 1 is the optimum group
because it can generate least \No Risk" eld and most \Risk" eld. Therefore, it is
easier to generate evidence to support the achievement of the detection uncertainty
assessment.
7.4.3 Discussion Summary
Through the discussions on the dierent values of PIDS and 2 about the potential
eect on the basic probability assignment and the nal fusion process, we can make
the following conclusions: (1) the higher value of PIDS generates the higher value
of m(V2) on single incident detection; (2) the value of PIDS could not aect the
nal results on any atomic attack detection; (3) the higher value of 2 leads the
higher value of m(V1) on single incident detection; (4) the value of 2 may aect
the nal results on any atomic attack detection.
Therefore, several ideas are made to suggest the corresponding value settings.
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Table 7.35: Belief Values on LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac with Dierent Thresholds
Attack Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4
Phase 2 = 3 2 = 5 2 = 10 2 = 15
Phase 1
m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00
m(V2) = 0.10 m(V2) = 0.10 m(V2) = 0.10 m(V2) = 0.10
m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00
Phase 2
m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.00
m(V2) = 0.10 m(V2) = 0.10 m(V2) = 0.10 m(V2) = 0.10
m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00
Phase 3
m(V1) = 0.00 m(V1) = 0.01 m(V1) = 0.04 m(V1) = 0.11
m(V2) = 0.99 m(V2) = 0.99 m(V2) = 0.96 m(V2) = 0.89
m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00
Phase 4
m(V1) = 0.11 m(V1) = 0.25 m(V1) = 0.39 m(V1) = 0.55
m(V2) = 0.83 m(V2) = 0.70 m(V2) = 0.57 m(V2) = 0.42
m(V3) = 0.06 m(V3) = 0.05 m(V3) = 0.04 m(V3) = 0.03
Phase 5
m(V1) = 0.55 m(V1) = 0.77 m(V1) = 0.84
m(V2) = 0.44 m(V2) = 0.23 m(V2) = 0.15 N/A
m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00 m(V3) = 0.00
(1) No particular requirement on the PIDS value assignment. (2) The 2 value
should be set closer to the threshold 1.
7.5 Summary
This chapter has presented our conducted experiments and relevant analysis.
Firstly, the design of ATIDS and the design of corresponding database have been
described. Second, the relevant experimental initialization process has presented
including how we setup the testbed, how we select the experimental data set, how
we analyse the ground truth of data set and how we generate the attack detection
tree against the data set. Then, we presented three set of experimental results
by applying three attack tree based intrusion detection approaches. Finally, we
discussed how the dierent value settings may aect the detection uncertainty
analysis during the intrusion detection process.
According to the obtained experimental results, AAT based intrusion detection
approach conducts the detection process as a typical SID. It can detect intrusions,
which are fully modelled as the signatures. As a common SID limitation, it is un-
able to generate intrusion alarm if the identied low-level alerts not matching the
modelled how-level signature. ADtT sequential approach conducts the detection
process by considering the detection uncertainty analysis. However, since it has
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been proposed with the strict signature matching process (that is, every modelled
low-level incident must be achieved by both low-level detection and detection un-
certainty assessment), any generated weak evidence from the detection uncertainty
assessment will cause the whole step detection fail. Finally, ADtT combination
approach deals with the detection uncertainty assessment to accept any low-level
incident detection missing or ignorance.
By comparing the obtained detection results, though AAT based intrusion de-
tection approach and ADtT combination approach have better detection perform-
ance, it is dicult for us to determine which approach is the best one. The reason
is because each approach has its own feature and mechanism. For the AAT based
approach, it achieves the detection with the full signature matching without any
detection uncertainty assessment. Hence, any missed low-level detection makes
the high-level attack step detection fail. For the ADtT sequential approach, it
achieves the detection with the not only the full signature matching, but also the
evidence assessment achieving on each low-level incident. For the ADtT combin-
ation approach, it achieves the detection if the evidence assessment been achieved
with either full or partial signature matching. Even if some of the low-level intru-
sions are missed by the detector, it is still possible to generate high-level alert if
the generated evidence supports the detection uncertainty assessment.
In the next chapter, we will make the conclusion of the whole thesis. Addi-
tionally, we will summarise the limitations and future work of this research.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
This thesis has presented our research on the advanced attack tree based intru-
sion detection to detect high-level atomic attack of the multi-step attack. In this
thesis, Chapter 2 had reviewed the relevant background on intrusion detection
and couple of related work on detection uncertainty analysis. Chapter 3 had re-
viewed the background on attack graph and attack tree modelling techniques,
which have particularly investigated how attack graph modelling technique assists
intrusion detection research and how attack tree modelling technique and com-
ponents may be extended for intrusion detection. Chapter 4 had presented our
proposed theoretical contributions on the Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree and
attack resistance attribution within a general attack tree. Then, targeted on the
intrusion detection, Chapter 5 had described our proposed Quality of Detectability
metrics and Detection Uncertainty Analysis mechanisms, and additionally given
the formalisation of Attack Detection Tree. Our proposed intrusion detection al-
gorithms based on advanced attack trees are presented in Chapter 6. Next, the
design of our intrusion detection system, the experimental initialisation, the meas-
ured experimental results and further discussions have been described in Chapter
7.
Generally, our research can be split into two parts: the research on the advanced
attack tree and the research on the intrusion detection. Table 8.1 summarises the
main research contributions and research weaknesses. Two main contributions
are an advanced attack tree modelling technique for intrusion detection (that is,
ADtT) and an attack tree based IDS with uncertainty assessment (that is, ATIDS).
ADtT is the rst known attack tree modelling technique specialised for intrusion
detection purpose, while ATIDS is the rst known IDS based on modelled attack
tree road map and provides detection uncertainty assessment. However, there are
126
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 127
two weaknesses in our research. The rst weakness is that ATIDS is unable to
detect the unknown high-level attack. Since the detection of ATIDS is mainly
depends on the modelled signature, any unmodelled attacks cannot be detected
by ATIDS. This weakness indicates that ATIDS is a signature based IDS. The
second weakness is that there is no metrics been modelled from the applied data
sets, because no detailed state information been provided from the data sets. Thus,
it is dicult for us to conduct our proposed aggregations within our experiments.
Table 8.2 summarises the information of each main contribution, including the
elementary minor contributions and the corresponding description.
Table 8.1: Summary of Research
Main Research Contributions Research Weaknesses
1. ADtT (Attack tree modelling tech-
nique for intrusion detection.)
1. ATIDS is unable to detect the un-
known high-level attack.
2. ATIDS (IDS based on attack tree
model and additionally with uncer-
tainty assessment.)
2. No node metrics provided from the
applied data sets to verify the proposed
aggregation approaches.
Table 8.2: Summary of Research Contributions
Main Minor
Description
Contributions Contributions
ADtT
QoD
Provides the real-time tree structure based
and alarms based metrics to describe the se-
curity situation.
DUA
Provides the real-time detection uncer-
tainty assessment during intrusion detection
process.
UPAT
Provides the theoretical complete attack
tree formalisation for any attack tree exten-
sions.
ATIDS
Aggregations
Provides the theoretical metrics computa-
tion approaches.
ADtT
Provides the intrusion detection capability
for attack tree modelling.
Algorithms
Provides the real-time intrusion detection
approaches based on ADtT.
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The research on the advanced attack tree is the foundation to intrusion de-
tection. Our proposed Attack Detection Tree modelling technique targets on not
only the modelling of the multi-step attack, but also the framework for intrusion
detection. The Attack Detection Tree modelling technique applies the notion of
Augmented Attack Tree, and furthermore provides two advanced mechanisms to
facilitate the intrusion detection. These two proposed mechanisms are the Quality
of Detectability mechanism and the detection uncertainty assessment mechanism.
The proposed Quality of Detectability mechanism measures the real-time met-
rics to represent the on-going intrusion detection progress according to the mod-
elled tree structure, the detection time and the alert information. While the pro-
posed detection uncertainty assessment mechanism measures the evidence from
the real-time generated alerts to conduct the relevant detection uncertainty ana-
lysis, and especially investigates the situations such as any modelled low-level
attack incidents are missed by Snort.
Specically, two detection uncertainty assessment approaches have been pro-
posed: the sequential based approach and the combination based approach. The se-
quential one examines each single modelled incident one-by-one within the atomic
attack according to the captured evidence. The achievement of the atomic at-
tack is indicated by the achievement of all modelled incidents. Any undetected
incident within this approach is unacceptable, as it causes the unachievement of
the atomic attack. The combination approach examines the achievement of the
atomic attack by fusing the measured evidence from all modelled incidents. Any
undetected incident within this approach is acceptable, since the achievement of
the atomic attack is determined by fusing all of the captured evidence together.
According to the original Augmented Attack Tree and our proposed Attack De-
tection Tree, we have proposed two main intrusion detection approaches: the AAT
based intrusion detection and the ADtT based intrusion detection. The AAT based
approach targets on the validation of the high-level atomic attack detection. The
ADtT based approach targets on not only the high-level atomic attack detection,
but also the Quality of Detectability mechanism measurement and the detection
uncertainty assessment mechanism analysis.
The experimental results show that both of the proposed detection approaches
can detect the high-level atomic attacks from the generated low-level incidents
alerts. For the ADtT based intrusion detection approaches, they generate dier-
ent results with the sequential based assessment approach and the combination
based assessment approach. With the sequential based detection approach, the
experimental results show that it generates less TP. The main reason is that any
unachieved modelled incidents lead to the non-achievement of the atomic attack
detection. With the combination based detection approach, the experimental res-
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ults show that it generates more TP. The main reason is that the atomic attack
detection is by fusing all of the measured evidence from all modelled incidents,
irrespective of whether that incident is missed or not. Moreover, the experimental
results show the measured QoD metrics can represent the progress of on-going
intrusion and intrusion detection.
Besides the aforementioned practical detection process, we have additionally
proposed several theoretical mechanisms to enhance the research on the attack
tree: (1) Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree; and (2) attack resistance aggregation
in the attack tree. Our Unied Parametrisable Attack Tree gives the theoretical
prototype for the attack tree extensions, including our proposed Attack Detection
Tree. Since the possible extension locations are tree node, tree edge and tree
connector, the relevant extensions should fall in that scope. While the attack
resistance aggregation shows the metrics attribution approaches on the attack
tree.
In general, this research explores a new attack tree examination with uncer-
tainty and tree based intrusion detection techniques. The framework presented
here is hoped to be the foundation for the security solutions of the future.
8.1.1 Limitations
There are several limitations within this research.
Limitation 1. Detection Window constraint.
Detection window assists the proposed detection mechanism to identify the
low-level incidents and the corresponding evidence within the determined time
period, and not alerts outside that window. However, the detection window con-
straint exists no matter how we set the window length, for example, 1 second, 1
hour, 1 day, 1 year, etc, even if we apply the overlapped setting.
Limitation 2. Lack of capability to distinguish the generated low-level alerts are
from multiple intrusions.
In our proposed detection approach, we take all of the Snort generated alerts
into the account assuming that they are all relating to the current on-going in-
trusion. However, it is possible that there are multiple adversaries conducting the
intrusions on the same victim system simultaneously. For instance, one of the
adversaries conduct the multi-step attack, but the rest of them simply launch any
intrusions without any particular attack goals.
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8.2 Future Work
The possible future work are as follows.
Future Work 1. Automatic Attack Detection Tree construction.
The main reason of this future work is to address the limitation of Assump-
tion 2. In this piece of future work, the Attack Detection Tree would be gener-
ated automatically by software, and would combine the attack information from
any open attack databases (for example, Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS)).
For one, the software based generation is more ecient and eective compared
with the manual work. For another, the software based process may generate
the more comprehensive attack tree by analysing and applying dierent attack
databases, that provided various network intrusions. Therefore, the constructed
attack detection tree may be more precise and can represent more sophisticated
multi-step attacks.
Future Work 2. Attack tree based intrusion detection in real network.
The main reason of this future work is to address the problem of Limitation
2. This piece of future work will apply the attack detection tree mechanism within
the real network. Therefore, the attack tree based intrusion detection should be
capable to identify the low-level alerts which are corresponding to the on-going
multi-step attack, in contrast to those which are the intrusions launched by other
adversaries not mounting multi-step attacks. Therefore, the proposed attack tree
based intrusion detection can be practically applied to implement the high-level
intrusion detection on the modelled attack tree in any real network.
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Appendix A
Formalisation of Augmented
Attack Tree
Augmented Attack Tree (AAT) [92, 91] extended the conventional attack tree
by associating additional information on the tree edge. There are two dierent
formalized AATs for two dierent research. In the former, AAT [91] had been
proposed by augmenting the attack probability label on each edge to identify ma-
licious attacks from authorized insiders. with each branch a sequence of malicious
operations that could have been used in the attack. In the latter, AAT [92] had
been proposed by augmenting the attack signature on each edge to implement
attack forensic analysis. The applied AAT in this thesis is the second one. The
formalisation of applied AAT is as follows.
Denition 30 Augmented Attack Tree. An augmented attack tree is a rooted
labelled tree given by AAT = (V, E, ", Label, SIGu;v), where
 V is the set of nodes in the tree representing the dierent states of partial
compromise or sub-goals that an adttacker needs to move through in order
to fully compromise a system. V 2 V is a special node, distinguished from
others, that forms the root of the tree. It represents the ultimate goal of the
attacker, namely system compromise. The set V can be partitioned into two
subsets, leaf nodes and internal nodes, such that
 leaf nodes S internal nodes = V,
 leaf nodes T internal nodes = ;, and
 V 2 internal nodes
 E  VV constitutes the set of edges in the attack tree. An edge (u,v) 2 E
denes an atomic attack and represents the state transition from a child node
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v to a parent node u, u, v 2 V. An atomic attack is a sequence of incidents.
The edge (u, v) is said to be \emergent from" v and \incident to" u.
 " is a set of tuples of the form hv, decompositioni such that
 v 2 internal nodes and
 decomposition 2 [AND-decomposition, OR-decomposition]
 Label is the name of the exploit associated with each edge.
 SIGu;v is an attack signature which is dened as Denition 32 below.
Denition 31 Incident-choice. An incident-choice is a group of related incid-
ents, the occurrence of any one of which can contribute towards the state transition
in the attack tree.
Denition 32 Attack Signature. An attack Signature SIGu;v is a sequence
of incident-choices (incident-choice1, incident-choice2,: : :, incident-choicen) such
that the sequence (incidenti;1, incidentj;2, . . . ,incidentm;n) constitute an atomic
attack.
Denition 33 AND-decomposition. Given a node, v in an attack tree such
that v 2 internal nodes, the node is an AND-decomposition if all edges incident to
the node are connected by the AND operation, or there is exactly one edge incident
to the node.
Denition 34 OR-decomposition. Given a node v of an attack tree such that
v 2 internal nodes, the node is an OR-decomposition if all edges incident to the
node are connected by the OR operation.
Appendix B
Process of Data Set Ground
Truth Analysis
This appendix describes the process to examine the ground truth of DARPA2000
data sets.
The data information of applied LLDOS1.0 and LLDOS2.0.2 \Inside" tracs
are provided in Table B.1 and Table B.2, respectively. Note that all of the applied
les are from the \inside" network category of the DARPA2000 data sets.
Table B.1: Applied Files for LLDOS1.0 Inside Trac Ground Truth Analysis
Phase IDMEF Alert File TCPDUMP Trac File Session List File
Phase 1 mid-level-phase-1.xml phase-1-dump.pcap phase-1.list
Phase 2 mid-level-phase-2.xml phase-2-dump.pcap phase-2.list
Phase 3 mid-level-phase-3.xml phase-3-dump.pcap phase-3.list
Phase 4 mid-level-phase-4.xml phase-4-dump.pcap phase-4.list
Phase 5 mid-level-phase-5.xml phase-5-dump.pcap phase-5.list
Table B.2: Applied Files for LLDOS2.0.2 Inside Trac Ground Truth Analysis
Phase IDMEF Alert File TCPDUMP Trac File Session List File
Phase 1 mid-level-phase-1.xml phase-1-dump.pcap phase-1.list
Phase 2 mid-level-phase-2.xml phase-2-dump.pcap phase-2.list
Phase 3 mid-level-phase-3.xml phase-3-dump.pcap phase-3.list
Phase 4 mid-level-phase-4.xml phase-4-dump.pcap phase-4.list
Phase 5 mid-level-phase-5.xml phase-5-dump.pcap phase-5.list
MIT Lincoln laboratory provides a list of IDMEF alert les in XML for each
attack phase. Although each XML alert is a part of the attack, it represents the
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Figure B.1: Abstracted Process of Data Set Ground Truth Analysis
alert as the network session instead of the network packet. As Snort implements
the intrusion detection by examining every single network packet, it is necessary
to accurately identify the malicious attack network packets from the TCPDUMP
le relating to each provided attack session. Thus, the IDMEF alert le is tra-
versed to obtain the key information (for example, attack time stamp, source IP,
destination IP) of alert session record, to identify the corresponding attack packet
in TCPDUMP le. Note that \sessionduration" eld in IDMEF le represents
the amount of time between the attack start and end times [54].
Figure B.1 displays the general attack packets determination process. Briey,
both sets of IDMEF alert les in XML format and the set of TCPDUMP trac
les in PCAP format are converted into les in CSV format, and then imported
into MySQL database. The tables which contain IDMEF alert les are called as
IDMEF alert tables, while, the tables which contain network trac les are called
as network trac tables.
To each attack phase in DARPA2000, the developed C ground truth analysis
program extracts each attack session's key information from IDMEF alert table.
After that, the program selects the corresponding attack packet(s) with the exactly
same information in network trac table according to sessionduration value. If
sessionduration equals to 0 second, the matched single attack packet in network
trac table will be labelled as attack packet; if sessionduration exceeds 0 second,
a number of matched attack packets in network trac table within session will be
labelled as attack packets. The analysis program traverses the IDMEF alert table
from the rst alert record till the last one. Figure B.2 illustrates the ow chart
of attack packets determination for an attack phase. The determination process
repeats in all of the phases in DARPA2000. Therefore, the ground truth of data
set is determined.
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Figure B.2: Flow Chart of Data Set Ground Truth Analysis
Appendix C
Process of Snort Detection
Evaluation
This appendix describes the detailed process how we examined Snort's detection
results against the obtained data sets ground truth.
As the typical attack alert from the intrusion detector contains the same char-
acteristic values as the originally network packet has, such as source IP, destination
IP, source port, destination port and protocol, the key mechanism of this process
is to identify these essential alert information from each Snort alert, then, ap-
ply these information to match the corresponding attack packet from TCPDUMP
trac le.
Figure C.1 illustrates the abstracted process to examine Snort's detection per-
formance. By replaying the exactly same TCPDUMP trac les as Ground Truth
Determination phase, Snort generates the relevant alerts for each phase. Once
again, ve alert CSV les have been generated by setting Snort alarming with
CSV output and also been imported into MySQL database. Additionally, all of
the converted TCPDUMP trac les in CSV format are imported into MySQL
database. The tables contain Snort alert information are termed as Snort alert
tables, while, the tables contain raw network trac information are termed as
TCPDUMP trac tables.
In each phase, the developed Snort detection examination program in C re-
trieves the alert information from the rst alert till the last one in each Snort alert
table from database. Firstly, the program selects a set of selected alert informa-
tion of each alert. Then, the program identies the corresponding matched attack
packet in TCPDUMP trac table by selecting the retrieved alert information.
Once an attack packet had been matched, the examination program retrieves the
next alert information and implements the matching process till all of the alerts
in current Snort alert table been retrieved.
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Figure C.1: Abstracted Process of Snort Detection Examination
Note that there is a special scenario, where several successive alerts in Snort
alert table have exactly same packet characteristics (for example, source IP, same
destination IP, source port, destination port and protocol) but with dierent alert
types. This phenomena is generated due to the packet information from one single
packet has been matched by multiple Snort attack signatures (rules). Thus, these
successive alerts only match with the relevant single attack packet.
Figure C.2 shows the process ow of Snort detection examination.
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Retrieve Alert Information of an Alert
in Sequence from Snort Alert Table
Select the Matched Attack Packet with
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All Alerts Been
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END
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Figure C.2: Flow Chart of Data Set Ground Truth Analysis
